"The war on crime": The securitization of narco-trafficking in Mexico during the Calderon administration. by Blanco Barrios, Diana Gabriela (author) et al.
“THE WAR ON CRIME”: THE SECURITIZATION OF NARCO-TRAFFICKING 
IN MEXICO DURING THE CALDER6N ADMINISTRATION
by
Diana Gabriela Blanco Barrios
B.A., Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
April 2013
© Diana Gabriela Blanco Barrios, 2013
1+1 Library and Archives CanadaPublished Heritage Branch Bibliotheque et Archives CanadaDirection du Patrimoine de I'edition
395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 
Canada
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-94135-5
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-94135-5
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non­
exclusive license allowing Library and 
Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distrbute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non­
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats.
AVIS:
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le 
monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur 
support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou 
autres formats.
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in this 
thesis. Neither the thesis nor 
substantial extracts from it may be 
printed or otherwise reproduced 
without the author's permission.
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni 
la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci 
ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation.
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting forms 
may have been removed from this 
thesis.
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, their 
removal does not represent any loss 
of content from the thesis.
Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la 
protection de la vie privee, quelques 
formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de 
cette these.
Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans 
la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu 
manquant.
Canada
A b s t r a c t
This thesis applies the securitization framework developed by Barry Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) to study the case of Mexico during the government of 
Felipe Calderon. I use discourse and content analysis to answer the following questions: 
How and why has narco-trafficking been securitized during the Calderon government?
What are the consequences of this securitization? I argue that Calderon successfully 
securitized narco-trafficking by using a rhetoric that emphasized the “moral otherness” of 
criminals, resulting in two important consequences: the neglect of social approaches to 
combat narco-trafficking and the use of this discourse to limit government accountability 
regarding the high number of casualties in the country. I conclude by arguing that exploring 
the link between narco-trafficking and securitization theory can bring about new insights to 
guide theoretical research and policy making.
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C h a p t e r  1: I n t r o d u c t io n
On December 2006, eleven days after taking office as the new President o f Mexico, Felipe 
Calderon declared a “war” against narco-trafficking. The President aimed to break down the drug 
cartels by using a strategy based on military offensives, as he argued that fighting organized 
crime was a pressing need to restore “order and security in the country” (Calderon, 2007). It has 
been estimated that during the six years of his administration, more than 65,000 people were 
killed in Mexico (BBC, 2012; Cave, 2012; Ley, 2012; Ramos, 2012). These deaths were a 
product of the increasing violence attributed to the confrontations between criminal 
organizations and enforcement agents.1 Still, despite major drug seizures and the capture of key 
drug lords, violence and crime persisted. In fact, some believed that the government’s strategy 
was making the country more insecure. Academics, politicians, and civilians debated whether 
this was a war that could be won and if it was worth fighting at all.2
The state of affairs in Mexico is the departure point for this thesis. As crime and violence 
increased in my native city, Monterrey, I became more aware of the importance of studying 
narco-trafficking. However, despite the significance that anti-narcotics measures have in 
international and national agendas (especially in the Americas), the study of this topic remains 
limited. Moreover, the existing literature is guided by hegemonic perspectives of security (Craig,
1 Official numbers are not updated frequently, but most specialists as well as the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI) estimate that the number is between 65,000 and 95,000 (BBC, 2012; Cave, 2012; Ley, 2012; 
Ramos, 2012).
2 Although critiques to the strategy followed by the President are quite common in the press, important public 
figures have also become voices of dissent. Ex-President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) for example, as well as 
respected intellectual Carlos Fuentes, contributed to the report of the Global Commission on Drugs, which rejected 
the war against narco-trafficking. Also, ex-President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) has publicly declared his 
disagreement with the strategy in several media outlets. Most importantly, numerous protests against violence have 
taken place in the country. Two of the major groups behind these have been The "Movement fo r  Peace with Justice 
and Dignity” (Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad) lead by poet Javier Sicilia, and the Campaign “No 
More Blood” (No Mis Sangre), lead by famous caricaturist Rius. Sicilia’s profile was even featured in 201 l ’s Time 
Magazine Person of the Year.
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1980,1980a; Lupsha, 1981; Carpenter, 1985; Bagley, 1988, 1988a; Sharpe, 1988; Toro, 1993; 
Krasna, 1999; Carstairs, 2005). This has contributed to the conception of narco-trafficking as an 
outside threat to the state (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998; Edwards and Gill, 2002; Crick,
2012). Approaching illegal narcotics trade from this viewpoint limits the relevance of these 
works in drug producing states, and puts into question the prescription of public policy from 
drug-consuming to drug-producing states. These are some of the challenges that motivate my 
research. In this thesis, I explore the issue of narco-trafficking during the Calderon 
administration by using the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach as a theoretical 
foundation. I argue that exploring the link between narco-trafficking and securitization theory 
can bring about new insights to guide theoretical research and policy making. In this chapter, I 
describe my research objectives, identify my research question and thesis statement, as well as 
introduce the research methodology of this thesis. I conclude by reflecting on some of the major 
contributions of this thesis and by providing a chapter overview.
1.1 - R e s e a r c h  p r o b l e m , o b j e c t iv e s , q u e s t io n  a n d  t h e s is  s t a t e m e n t
This thesis began as an interest in studying the narco-trafficking -  security nexus in 
Mexico. As such, it is informed by the literature on the sub-field of security studies, specifically 
that which takes an interest in the illegal drug trade. These works are relatively new. The first 
studies surfaced during the 1980s in the United States (Craig, 1980, 1980a; Lupsha, 1981; 
Carpenter, 1985; Bagley, 1988,1988a; Sharpe 1988; van Wert 1988). Subsequent interest on this 
topic can be attributed to the dominance of traditional views (realism and liberalism) of security 
in the sub-discipline for much of the twentieth century. Broadly speaking, these views conceived 
threats in military terms and saw the state as the referent object of security. Therefore, in this 
worldview, the illegal drug trade did not constitute a threat. Towards the end of the Cold War,
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there was a shift in the calling for the “broadening” and “deepening” of the security agenda 
(Tuchman, 1989; Nef, 1995; Tickner, 1995; Smith, 1999), in order to include more than armed 
threats originating from other states. This is the period when works on narco-trafficking started 
to emerge. Yet, it should be noted that the changes in the sub-field came gradually, particularly 
in America (Waever, 2004). Therefore, even though researching narco-trafficking as a security 
threat constituted a shift from the orthodox views of security, the literature still conceived illegal 
drug trade as a danger to (in this case, the United States’) national security in the most traditional 
sense.
Apart from their state-centrism and US perspective, the works cited above share another 
commonality: they are policy oriented (Bagley, 1988). In fact, the under theorization of the 
literature continues until present day, although to a lesser degree. Perhaps, one of the most 
important challenges for the creation of a more sophisticated theoretical framework to study this 
issue is the difference between the experience of drug-consuming and drug-producing countries 
(Griffith, 1994). On the one hand, consuming countries see drug trafficking mainly as an outside 
threat which hinders sovereignty by the illegal crossing of state borders and that has 
repercussions in local crime and in public health. On the other hand, producing countries such as 
Mexico, Colombia and Afghanistan, see it as a threat within the state with more implications to 
public and national security than just violent aggression. Attempts to transcend this dichotomy 
during the second half of the 1990s resulted in the framing of illegal drug trade as a threat to 
international peace and security (Crick 2012,407). With this understanding, the literature 
explored this issue as part of the dynamics of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) (Lupsha, 
1996; Farer, 1999; Berdal and Serrano, 2002; Lowenheim, 2002; Edwards and Gill, 2003). Still, 
the majority of the literature remains state centric, policy-oriented and rooted in the perspectives
of the “threatened” (those that see it as an outside threat) states. As such, an issue of particular 
importance to this thesis is the dominance of traditional views of security and drug-consuming 
state perspectives in the study of narco-trafficking.
This thesis seeks to approach narco-trafficking from a perspective that is more sensitized to 
the situation in Mexico, while connecting with broader literature on narco-trafficking and 
security studies. Being aware of the limitations of the existing approaches in the narcotics 
literature, I attempt to raise awareness of the “grey areas” by using securitization theory to study 
this case. This theory was developed by scholars connected with the Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute (COPRI) during the 1990s. The most complete and representative book for this theory, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), written by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap 
de Wilde, constitutes the basis for my investigation.
Broadly speaking, securitization is a process by which an issue is presented as an 
existential threat (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 214) that calls for the placement of the issue in a 
condition of emergency, and justifies the adoption of special measures to handle it. There are 
three important components in this exercise: the securitizing agent, the referent object, and the 
audience. The securitizing agent performs the speech act by framing a certain issue (in this case 
narco-trafficking), as a threat to the referent object (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). 
Ultimately, the audience decides if they accept the securitization or not, by tolerating the 
breaking of rules or procedures that otherwise would have to be obeyed (Ibid.). Unlike 
traditional approaches, securitization theory does not define threats to security in objective terms. 
This means that in theory, anything can be securitized. At the same time, defining the threat as 
“existential” allows it to remain focused. I consider this to be one of the securitization’s 
strengths, for it allows speaking about security amply, without overstretching the concept. In a
way, this division reflects the influences that shaped securitization theory, which comprise 
(mostly realist) traditional views of security as well as constructivist approaches3 (Williams, 
2003, p. 528). Securitization theory itself however, is usually considered as a critical approach to 
security (Krause and Williams, 1998; Williams, 2003: Waever, 2004; C.A.S.E Collective, 2006; 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010).
Although I talk about this with more detail in my literature review, for the purposes of this 
chapter I argue that this “heterogeneous” background is important to my thesis for several 
reasons. First, the traditional approaches that inform securitization theory make it relatable to 
previous works on narco-trafficking. Indeed, traditional approaches still have a dominant role in 
security debates and policy making, at least in America (Waever, 2004). This makes it important 
to conduct research that can still engage with these perspectives. At the same time, the 
constructivist background of securitization theory has the potential to take research on narco­
trafficking in new directions, and in particular this approach allows a more complete 
understanding of the experiences of producing countries. By making the perception of the 
audience the ultimate indication of making illegal drug trade a security concern, the theory 
allows us to implicitly weigh important cultural, political, and economic factors intrinsic to drug- 
producing countries. In many of these states for example, drug dealers are not vilified as they are 
in consumer states. Also, this activity is an important component in some local economies. 
Considering factors such as these is paramount to understand security in these states. In the 
Mexican case in particular, building a negative image of narcotrajicantes4 has been one of the 
biggest challenges for the government, because narcos have lived among citizens for decades
3 Constructivist approaches bring assumptions of social constructivism into security studies (Smith 1999, 87). 
Generally speaking, they see concepts as socially constructed rather than objective and fixed, unlike traditional 
approaches (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.204).
4 Word used in Spanish to describe drug dealers.
without representing a direct threat. Lastly, because this theory does not limit the analysis of 
security to a determinate set of threats or to a particular referent object, the consumer/producer 
dichotomy has the potential to be transcended. Securitization allows both parties to speak about 
security without it necessarily being in the same terms.
An analysis that uses securitization as its main theoretical approach aims to elucidate “who 
securitizes, on what issues, for whom, why, with what results, and under what conditions” 
(Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.32). The first objective of my research therefore, is to 
apply the framework developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) to illustrate the 
characteristics of the securitization of narco-trafficking in Mexico. By this, I am referring to the 
analysis of the internal structure of the speech act and its components as enacted by the Mexican 
government. Nevertheless, securitization is not limited to the discursive realm. According to 
Waever (1995) securitization is a “self-referential practice”. This means that by saying the 
words, something is being done. The utterance itself is the act (Waever, 1995, p.55), just like 
naming a ship or performing a marriage (Aradau, 2004, p.391). In other words, securitization has 
implications that go beyond discourse. Therefore, my second research objective is to outline 
policy consequences of framing narco-trafficking as a security issue.
It should be noted that despite being an accepted and fairly popular theory, works that 
apply the securitization framework to study real-life cases remain scarce. Although there is a 
growing body of case studies (Wilkinson, 2005; Huysmans, 2006; Bilgin, 2011; Salter and Piche, 
2011; Walby and Monaghan, 2011; McDonald, 2012), the literature remains dominated by works 
that discuss securitization theory as opposed to works that apply it. This is odd considering that 
the authors had envisioned the framework as an analytical tool to understand security. Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde (1998) even include a case study in their book (Buzan, Waever, & de
Wilde, 1998, p. 163). In any case, works that apply the securitization framework to study the 
issue of narco-trafficking are especially limited. At the time of writing, there are only three 
works that use this framework to study the illegal drug trade: two articles published in academic 
journals (Jackson, 2006; Crick, 2012) and a thesis (Brinkmoeller, 2011). Therefore, my third 
research objective is to assess about the viability of using this framework to study narco- 
trafficking in a real-life context. Summarizing, the three research objectives that guide this thesis 
are: first, to apply the framework developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) to illustrate 
the characteristics of the securitization of narco-trafficking in Mexico; second, to outline policy 
consequences of framing narco-trafficking as a security issue, and third, to assess the viability of 
using this framework to study narco-trafficking in a real-life context.
Although this thesis began as an interest in studying the narco-trafficking -  security nexus 
in Mexico, conceiving this issue as a security concern, is not new. In fact, narco- trafficking was 
described as a threat to national security for the first time in 1987 by President Miguel de la 
Madrid. Interestingly narco-trafficking never constituted a sustained government priority - that is 
until the Calderon administration. Ultimately, my decision to limit the analysis to the six years of 
the Calderon government was influenced by the upsurge in violence. This lead me to hypothesize 
that something was qualitatively different about the way in which this government was dealing 
with narco-trafficking. I should also note that because anti-narcotics policy is dictated by the 
Federal government and since this study is to a large extent concerned with discourse, my case 
study had to have a national geographic scope.5 By limiting my case study I was able to define 
my research questions, as follows: How and why has narco-trafficking been securitized in
5 This study is not focused on special regions of Mexico because, although there are cities that are more affected by 
narco-trafficking than others, again -  narcotics policy is a federal issue. Limiting it to a local agenda would 
complicate the study a lot more. Also, involving the US-Mexico dynamic would make this thesis lengthy and would 
change my original research interest. Furthermore, I wanted to differentiate this study from those already existent in 
the literature, where the US-Mexico relation has been exhausted.
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Mexico during the administration of Felipe Calderon? What have been the consequences of this 
securitization?
In order to answer these questions, I analyzed 44 speeches using a conceptualization of the 
framework of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (for the conceptualization, please refer to the coding 
sheet in the appendix).6 The discourse analysis revealed that one of the most interesting features 
in this case is the construction of threat and enemy. It is assumed that this distinction is clear and 
accepted by the audience otherwise the element will fail to be securitized. However, the 
construction of a collective idea and mentality concerning narco-trafficking is particularly 
challenging when studying the issue in a producing country like Mexico. Producing countries 
tend to have ambiguous attitudes towards illegal drug trade. In Afghanistan for example, poppy 
cultivation is an important economic activity that supports hundreds of families. In Mexico, 
illegal drug trade dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century (Grillo, 2012) and for 
many decades, it did not pose a direct danger for the population. In fact, in some northern areas 
of Mexico, the narco-trafficking subculture such as the corridos7 became somewhat accepted and 
narcos8 are portrayed as popular heroes (Astorga,1995; Campbell, 1997; Cantarell, 2002; Heau 
and Gimenez, 2004; Mendoza Rockwell, 2008; Sanchez-Godoy, 2009).
With the sudden upsurge in violence related to the government’s crackdown on the illegal 
drug trade, many citizens chose to blame Calderon’s strategy and not cartels per se (Buendia & 
Laredo, 2011, 2012). As such, the Mexican government had a difficult time justifying its actions, 
and as time went by and casualties increased, this became even harder. Indeed, the construction 
of the collective image of an enemy represented a challenge because narcos do not seem to have
61 explain both the coding sheet as well as the sampling and research methods in chapter 3
7 Songs that evolved from traditional folk music: corridos, from the northern part of Mexico. Narco-corridos tell 
stories about illegal drug traffickers. The lyrics usually refer to particular events and include real dates an places.
8 Short for “narcotraficantes.”
a particular agenda. Also, there are no perceptible economic, ethnic or religious differences 
between the population and them; narcotraficantes are ordinary Mexicans. The enemy is one of 
“our people.” Indeed, this has been one of the key challenges when analyzing some of the most 
important armed conflicts in the twentieth century, where “the lines between civil war and 
crime” are blurry (Carpenter, 2010, p.401).
Despite these difficulties, Calderon successfully securitized the issue. Surveys show that 
nearly 80% of the population supported the use of the military against the cartels (Pew Research 
Center, 2012). This number has remained stable since 2009 (Pew Research Center, 2011). 
Because of the lack of discernible features of drug dealers, I argue that the government has relied 
on a moral discourse that emphasizes the difference between “good” and the “bad” Mexicans, 
with narcos belonging to the latter group. This rhetoric has also proven useful for particular 
political purposes. By saying that victims have been criminals rather than civilians, the 
government minimizes the controversy caused by the high number of casualties. This contributes 
to the purpose of making the strategy seem effective and the government in control. The 
government is just doing what it was supposed to, and the deaths are the normal costs of war.
This serves the purpose of limiting government accountability. The reality is, however, that a 
shadow of doubt is cast upon many of the deaths occurred during the administration, as the 
victims’ nexus with criminal organizations is sometimes ambiguous, if not completely missing.
The discourse analysis also revealed a very emotional war-like rhetoric and with it frequent 
references to enforcement policy. Indeed, one of the most interesting features of securitization is 
its emphasis in the construction and confrontation of threats and enemies (Buzan and Hansen, 
2009, p.212). This contributes to one of the most known characteristics of the Calderon 
administration, which is the militarization of the narcotics strategy. When the President declared
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that his government would be using military offensives against the cartels, Calderon justified the 
incursion of the armed forces by arguing that the cartels had acquired deadlier weapons than 
those normally used by local policemen (Calderon, 2007). Nevertheless, military operations did 
not result in the eradication of the cartels but rather in their fragmentation, which contributed to 
the escalation of the conflict (Carpenter, 2010). In that scenario, the government faced a constant 
need to use more and more force. This was made easier too by framing narco-trafficking as a 
military threat that endangered the state by terrorizing its population and corrupting its 
institutions. Calderon’s determination not to change the strategy seems to have turned the 
discussion (and budget) away from other strategies to combat narco-trafficking, particularly 
social approaches.
Considering all of these factors, it will be argued here that the government of Felipe 
Calderon has securitized narco-trafficking (in Mexico) by using a rhetoric that emphasizes the 
“moral otherness” of criminals. This results in two important consequences: The neglect of social 
approaches to combat drug-trafficking, and the use of this discourse to limit government’s 
accountability regarding the high number of casualties in the country.
It should be noted that in order to test the consequences of securitization, I used additional 
research methods. The neglect of social programs in anti-narcotic policy involved the analysis of 
government spending. Also, in order to describe how the government had responded to civilian 
casualties, I studied two cases - the deaths of students in ITESM (Monterrey) and Villas de 
Salvarcar (Ciudad Juarez), in 2010. In both cases, the government had rushed in asserting the 
victim’s connection with organized crime. Yet, it was later proven that the victims did not have 
any relationship with the criminals. This caused anger among family members and civilians. The 
methodology of this thesis, however, is explained with more detail on the third chapter.
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1.2 -  C o n t r ib u t io n s  a n d  c h a p t e r  o u t l in e
This thesis seeks to contribute to the narco-trafficking and securitization literature by 
engaging in informed theoretical discussion and by being policy relevant. It contributes by 
adding to the few works that explore illegal drug trade from a precise theoretical view and by 
providing insights into the strengths and shortcomings that arise when securitization theory is 
applied to a real life context. This latter point is particularly important because this thesis is an 
interesting case in which the theory is used to study an issue not commonly addressed in the 
securitization literature (securitization is generally used to study issues such as migration and 
societal security). Also, the findings of the thesis contribute to an assessment of the validity of 
securitization theory to cases outside of Europe. These have been important sources of debate for 
students of securitization. Ultimately, this will contribute to broaden the applicability of the 
theory.
Apart from its theoretical value, this thesis invites a much needed reflection about the way 
in which we study narco-trafficking. This is important because of its real world implications. As 
long as narco-trafficking exists, governments, international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) will debate the issue, proposing policies to deal with it. How these groups 
discuss or frame this problem is not critically studied by many. Indeed, many drug-producing 
countries are influenced by the attitudes of drug-consuming states towards narco-trafficking. 
This, in turn, influences domestic public policy. Indeed, the “war on drugs” is one, if not, the 
most representative example of this exercise. The model of using military operations to eradicate 
drug trafficking has been “exported” to different countries that do not necessarily have the same 
needs. This issue needs to be addressed as drugs and trafficking continue to take a toll in human 
lives.
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This thesis has six chapters, of which this is the first. The subsequent chapter reviews the 
literature on this topic and is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on exploring the 
literature of narco-trafficking, describing its evolution and assessing the strengths and flaws of 
the current approaches to study illegal drug trade. The second part of the literature review 
provides an overview of the sub-field of security studies, highlighting the emergence of critical 
security studies and identifying the different schools of thought within this tradition. Also in this 
section, I explain the framework developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) which is the 
theoretical and methodological basis for this thesis. In the third chapter, I explain the 
geographical and chronological parameters of the case study. Also in this chapter, I provide with 
a detailed account of the methodology of this thesis. In the fourth chapter, I provide an overview 
of narco-trafficking in Mexico. In the first part of this chapter, I give some historical context of 
the emergence and development of this activity in Mexico. In the second part, I examine the 
enforcement strategies that the government has implemented. Chapter 5, begins with a reflection 
about whether or not previous administrations had securitized the issue of narco-trafficking. For 
this task, I provide a concise examination of the discourse linking drug trade and national 
security in Mexican history. This leads to the most important part of the chapter, which are the 
results of the analysis. The final chapter of this thesis, chapter 6, provides some concluding 
remarks. There, I discuss the most relevant findings of this thesis and discuss its theoretical and 
practical value.
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C h a p t e r  2: L it e r a t u r e  R e v ie w  
Even though international concern with drug trafficking can be traced back to the first 
decade of the twentieth century, as shown by the 1912 Opium Convention (League of Nations, 
1912), academic works addressing the issue from an international security perspective did not 
emerge until the 1980s. This thesis, however, argues that this literature is full of omissions that 
result from looking at the issue from traditional security approaches. In such a scenario, the 
works have neglected some of the experiences of countries with a narcotics production problem. 
With this in mind, there are two main objectives for this chapter. The first objective is to note 
such omissions in order to provide a justification for the use of securitization theory to study 
narco-trafficking in Mexico. The second objective is to explain the framework developed by 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), which is used for the speech analysis and is central to the 
argument of this thesis.
By using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as its foundation, this thesis 
explores the drug trade through the lens of critical security studies. This theory conceives 
security as constructed through the “speech act” and focuses on the process by which an issue is 
constructed as a threat. Much has been written about the theoretical and disciplinary aspects of 
securitization (McSweeney, 1996; Neumann, 1998; Huysmans, 1998; Bigo, 2002; Williams, 
2003; Smith, 2005; Taureck, 2006; C.A.S.E Collective, 2006), but assessments about its validity 
in a real-life context remain secondary in the literature (Wilkinson, 2005; Huysmans, 2006; 
Bilgin, 2011; Salter and Piche, 2011; Walby and Monaghan, 2011; McDonald, 2012). By 
applying securitization theory to study narco-trafficking in Mexico, this thesis will contribute to 
the literature in two ways. First, this thesis adds to the works that seek to apply the securitization 
framework to study real-life problems. Second, it also contributes by assessing securitization
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theory’s validity outside of Europe, which has been its dominant geographic focus so far 
(Huysmans, 1998; Hansen, 2000; Waever, 2004; Jackson, 2006; Wilkinson, 2007). Both goals 
will serve to broaden the applicability of the theory.
This thesis also speaks to the literature focusing on drug-trafficking as a security issue.
Both securitization theory and the literature on narco-trafficking reflect the transformations 
taking place in the sub-field of security studies during 1980s and 1990s. During these two 
decades, a call for the broadening of the security agenda to encompass more than just military 
threats to the state resulted in the study new of issues and in the emergence of interesting new 
theories. Nevertheless, critical explorations of
, , Figure 1 -  Disciplinary approach of this thesisthe illegal narcotics trade remain nearly
nonexistent (Edwards and Gill, 2002;
Jackson, 2006; Brinkmoeller, 2011). Because
of this, exploring the drug trade from this
particular viewpoint (critical security studies)
requires an informed knowledge of both the
literature on narco-trafficking and the broader theoretical discussions in the sub-field of security
studies (see figure 1).
In the first part of this chapter, I provide an overview of the existing literature on narco- 
trafficking, in which I identify the main approaches to the study of the drug trade in the 
discipline, and make an assessment about their respective strengths and weaknesses. In the 
second part of this chapter, I discuss some of the literature on security studies. I specifically trace 
the emergence of critical security studies in the field. Subsequently, I present the different 
schools of thought within critical security studies, which will help to provide a better
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understanding of the particularities of securitization theory. Also in this section, I explain the 
framework developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998). This chapter concludes with 
some reflections about why I consider critical theories and securitization, in particular, to be 
valid approaches to study narco-trafficking.
2,1  -  N a r c o - t r a f f ic k in g
The academic literature that reviews the issue of narco-trafficking as an international 
security concern is scarce and relatively new in the field of security studies. This is no surprise if 
we consider that during the Cold War, nuclear and military threats dominated the debates in the 
field. With the waning of the bipolar world, alternative conceptions of security which advocated 
a broader definition (Tuchman, 1989; Nef, 1995; Tickner, 1995; Smith, 1999), one that 
considered more than military threats and other actors apart from the state, gained force in 
security studies. It is in this context in which the first works that look at drag-trafficking from a 
security studies perspective emerge. There have been few works that provide an overview of the 
literature in this topic (Sutterlin,1988; Dorn, Levi, & King, 2005). There are also very few 
studies that look at the theoretical elements in the literature (Bagley, 1988; Griffith, 1994;
Krasna, 1999). This section constitutes a modest attempt to look at the works written on the 
subject and to link these with broader discussions in the subject of security studies.
Traditionally, the issue of narco-trafficking fell under the purview of criminology and 
sociology (Engvall, 2006, p.828). During the 1980s, however, the study of the drug trade started 
to gain momentum in the discipline of International Relations. This echoed the changes taking 
place in the sub-field of security studies as well as in the international context (Edwards & Gill, 
2002, p.246). Even though international concern with drag trafficking dated back to the early 
part of the 20th century (taking the International Opium Convention as a landmark), it was not
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until the 1980s that countries began to emphasize its dangers to the national security of states 
(Carstairs, 2005, p.61). As a result, narco-trafficking became more important in the international 
agenda. Evidence of the growth of important of this issue can be seen in the number of 
resolutions discussing this matter in the United Nations’ General Assembly, which increased 
from a total of six during the 1970s, to eighteen in the subsequent ten years (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2011).
The issue was particularly relevant in the Americas, where major anti-drug operations were 
taking place in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Many of these were carried out with the 
assistance of the United States. This was reflected in the first academic publications that looked 
at illegal drug trade from an International Relations perspective, which discussed Washington’s 
anti-narcotics policies and their implications in the relations with Latin American countries 
(Craig, 1980, 1980a; Lupsha, 1981). Richard Craig, for example, published two works that took 
this approach in 1980. By studying “Operation Intercept” (implemented by the US), and 
“Operation Condor” (implemented by Mexico), the author reflects on the influence that the US 
has in setting the Mexican anti-narcotics agenda (Craig, 1980; Craig, 1980a). The next year,
Peter A. Lupsha published a comparative study of Mexico and Colombia’s drug trafficking issue, 
where the author made an assessment of its implications in the two countries and in the United 
States (Lupsha, 1981). After 1985, publications on narco-trafficking became more common (see 
the compilation by Sutterlin, 1988). Interest in the topic by scholarly journals also grew and this 
suggests a growing relevance to the discipline. The Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs for example, became an important hub for debate, publishing a special issue in 1988 
entitled “Assessing the Americas’ War on Drugs” featuring prominent thinkers on the topic. In
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1989, the first specialized journal on drug policy was created, the International Journal o f Drug 
Policy.
The works published in the 1980s have two main characteristics. First, the United States’ 
perspective was dominant, resulting in an important number of papers analyzing Washington’s 
“War on Drugs” (Carpenter, 1985; Bagley, 1988, van Wert, 1988; Morales, 1989). Even if 
scholars sought to explain the drug situation in other countries, they looked at it from the United 
States’ viewpoint (Lupsha, 1981; Healy, 1988; Rosenberg, 1988; McCintock, 1988; Bagley, 
1989-1990). Second, the works were policy oriented and there was little in the way of theory “to 
guide empirical research and interpret findings” (Bagley, 1988). The literature’s focus on 
analyzing anti-drug policy, which at the time comprised enforcement and military strategies, 
inevitably linked these works with the sub discipline of security studies. Indeed, despite their 
theoretical limitations, the works from this decade acknowledged the link between narco- 
trafficking and security in some way. This was usually conceived from a state-centric 
perspective, considering narcotics trade a threat to “national security.” In his comparative study 
for example, Lupsha (1981) describes narco-trafficking as a threat “as dangerous to the United 
States, and a number of Third World states, as are the traditional problems of national security” 
(Lupsha, 1981, p. 95). Others, such as Kenneth E. Sharpe (1988) only described narco­
trafficking as “damaging to US national interests” (Sharpe, 1988, p.84).
In 1988, the United Nations recognized drug trafficking as an “international criminal 
activity” in the “Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances” (United Nations, 1988). This revealed a major shift in the discourse used by the 
international organization, because previous Conventions approached drug control by 
criminalizing users and by regulating the supply and (to a lesser extend) demand of illegal drugs
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(Carstairs, 2005).9 By conceiving narco-trafficking as an international criminal activity, the link 
between this activity and security studies was made, and we begin to see an increase in works 
that explore themes that are more akin to security studies. For example, whereas the supply 
versus demand dilemma -  the debate of whether the drug problem originates from increasing 
demand or from increasing supply of narcotics - was a source of reflection for scholars during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s (Sharpe, 1988; Bagley, 1989), eventually more scholars started to 
engage in discussions about the drug trade and international security, and not just that of states 
(Harding, 1984; Griffith, 1993; Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998). Even though these remained a 
minority, it revealed an understanding of “transnational threats”, an element that resulted from 
broader visions of security.
The second development is related to the discourse used in the Convention, which became 
widely influential in the international community. According to this document, illicit trafficking 
enabled “transnational crime organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of 
government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its levels” (United 
Nations, 1988, p.l). Although it would be simplistic to assume that this influenced scholars and 
not the other way around, towards the end of the 1990s academics aimed for a more standardized 
approach to explain the link between narco-trafficking and security based on this view (Chabat, 
1994; Krasna, 1999; Lowenheim, 2002). If we take Jorge Chabat’s (1994) work as an example, 
we see that the author systematically analyzes whether narco-trafficking in Mexico has a 
perceivable impact on violence, political instability, a connection to “guerrilla” warfare, and to
9 The focus of the Conventions before 1988 was to suppress the abuse of illegal drugs by restricting trade and 
commerce, and by criminalizing individual users. There were also fhigal attempts to treat the addiction of users. For 
a more detailed account, see: Carstairs, C. (2005). The stages of the international drug control system. Drug and 
Alcohol Review 24: 57-65
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corruption. He concludes by saying that instability, which leads to US intervention, and 
corruption are the only two real “threats” (Chabat, 1994, p. 117).
The study of narco-trafficking as a global concern and the quest for a more 
methodological approach is perhaps more clearly articulated in the literature that contextualizes 
drug trafficking as an activity linked to transnational organized crime (TOC) (Farer, 1999;
Berdal & Serrano, 2002; Lowenheim, 2002; Edwards & Gill, 2003). The drug -  TOC nexus 
leads scholars to study other issues besides the production and consumption of illicit drugs. 
Examples include, the threat posed by criminal drug organizations to national sovereignty (Toro, 
1993), the collaboration of traffickers with other criminal organizations (Gakhokidze 2001; 
Cornell and Swanstrdm, 2006; Engvall, 2006), arms trafficking, money laundering, but most 
importantly, the prevalence of conflict and violence (Sharpe, 1988; Bagley, 1989-1990;
Carpenter, 2010; Mercille, 2011; Gautreau, 2012; Lagos & Dammert, 2012). Also, even though 
the Americas remain a dominant focus in the literature, studies on other regions in the world 
surfaced as well (Gakhokidze, 2001; Cornell & Swanstrom, 2006; Engvall, 2006; Jackson,
2006). Most important, even though the literature remains dominantly informed by practice, 
there have been some works that engage in theoretical discussion, reflecting about how this issue 
connects with security theory (Griffith, 1994; Krasna, 1999; Lowenheim, 2002; Toro, 1993; 
Engvall, 2006).
Still, regardless of the growing literature there have not been major theoretical 
developments in the area of narco-trafficking, and the majority of the research remains policy- 
oriented. An important factor that contributes to the little attention given to the “conceptual- 
theoretical basis for the drugs-security linkage” (Griffith, 1994, p. 3) is the dissimilar effects that 
narco-trafficking has on states. In the drug trade literature, countries are classified as consumer,
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producer, or transit. The first group mostly comprises the Global North, while producer and 
transit states are most commonly found in the Global South. For drug consumer countries, the 
narcotics issue generally represents a social or health problem and traffickers are seen as an 
external threat. For transit and producing countries, however, this is an internal problem with 
important implications in terms of govemability and violence. Furthermore, even though there 
are challenges common to all countries, like corruption, for example, these vary widely. If we 
take violence to illustrate this point, we can see that while in consumer countries it is likely that 
drug organizations are smaller compared to those in producing and transit countries such as 
Colombia and Mexico, where violence becomes a pressing matter of national security. 
Consequently, the majority of producer and transit states such as Thailand, Mexico, and 
Colombia have securitized the issue. Meanwhile consumer countries, with the exception of the 
United States,10 have not.
The study developed by Joshua S. Krasna (1999) illustrates this point. The author uses the 
abovementioned criteria (the consequences of drug trafficking) to assess and compare the impact 
of narcotics trade in consumer, producer, and transit countries by using traditional and non- 
traditional definitions of security in International Relations theory. The author concludes that 
indeed, drug trafficking poses a threat to the national security of all countries, according to any 
of these definitions (Krasna, 1999, pp.49-50). Still, Krasna (1999) recognizes that it seems to be 
a more pressing threat to transit and producer countries. In a study that reaches very different 
conclusions, Oded Lowenheim (2002) also points to the differences of the cases between these 
sets of countries. Lowenheim (2002) uses narco-trafficking to argue that transnational crime
10 The largest illegal drug consumer in the world has been the leading voice in the securitization of the illegal drug 
trade, with precedents in the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson and the declaration of the “war on drugs “by 
Richard Nixon in 1971.
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should not be considered an international security threat but rather should be seen as a societal, 
economic, and public health problem. Yet, the author recognizes that the cases of certain 
countries such as Colombia, Mexico and Peru are more complex, but blames this on the 
militarization of the issue (Lowenheim, 2002, p.536). National studies are a constant affirmation 
of these conclusions. By studying chug trade and consumption in Tajikistan, Johan Engvall 
(2006), for example, contrasts the problematic of consumer and producing countries. The author 
finds that narcotics trade poses a threat to national security largely because of the 
“criminalization of the state machinery” (Engvall, 2006, p.852). Meanwhile, consumption 
remains a secondary consideration despite its increasing numbers (Ibid.).
Despite the efforts of scholars to understand producing countries better (Sharpe, 1988; 
Mercille, 2011), narco-trafficking has predominantly been studied through a “threatened” 
perspective. A large part the literature fails to grasp the complexity of narco-trafficking in the 
Global South, despite the academic contributions of scholars in these countries (Toro, 1993; 
Chabat, 1994; Astorga, 1999; Tokatlian, 2000). Inevitably, the prescriptions for public policy are 
influenced by drug-consuming countries as well. This has been noted by some scholars who 
argue that the US has lead the way in setting the international agenda around the criminalization 
of drug trafficking (Bewley-Taylor, 2001; Woodwis, 2003; Crick, 2012) and narcotics operations 
(Sharpe, 1988; Marshall et al., 1990; Bartilow & Eom, 2009).
The case of Mexico and the United States is a good example of this. Indeed, it cannot be 
denied that the US has an enormous influence on Mexican discourse and operations. This 
influence varied according to the value given to this issue on the bilateral agenda, at least before 
the Calderon administration. Not surprisingly, the majority of the literature about Mexico focuses 
on policy making (Astorga, 1999; Chabat, 2002, 2010), and in Mexico’s relations with the
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United States (Craig, 1980, 1980a; Aguayo Quesada, 1990; Toro, 1995; Davidow, 2004). Few 
studies have looked at this issue from a more critical perspective (Mercille, 2011; Gautreau, 
2012). Narco-trafficking is a deep-rooted problem in Mexican history and the approaches taken 
by academics so far sometimes fail to show us the whole picture. The literature cited above 
proves insufficient to account for the impact of illegal drug trade in states where criminal 
organizations have become as powerful as the cartels in Mexico. There are important omissions 
or assumptions regarding the political apparatus of the state, as well as a tendency to make clear 
cut divisions and categories in scenarios which are a lot more complex. Two key omissions are 
the perceptions of the issue by the population, and the manipulation of the discourse by 
politicians.
In conclusion, even though works studying narco-trafficking from a security perspective 
have increased during the last three decades, the literature remains scarce, policy oriented, and 
rooted in traditional notions of security that echo the interests of drug-consuming states. Even 
though researching narco-trafficking as a security concern comes from the widening of the 
security agenda, the early works saw narco-trafficking as a threat to the state and sovereignty in 
particular. This is perhaps a legacy of the influence of the demand-supply dilemma, in which 
drug-consuming states seek to tackle supply and not the demand of narcotics. Even though 
contextualizing narcotics trade as a TOC activity opened the possibility of seeing “humanity” as 
the referent object for security (similar to environmental security), there have not been any major 
theoretical developments in this sense. On a similar note, the individual does not take precedence 
in these works and the implications of drug-trafficking for communities or individuals is rarely 
discussed outside from farmers making a living from growing illicit crops (Healy, 1988). 
Arguably, one of the biggest flaws of the literature is its inability to accurately and fully study
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narco-trafficking from the perspectives of producing or transit states. The power acquired by 
traffickers in countries such as Mexico, Peru and Colombia, their main goals and intentions, the 
way they interact with power structures, the way government institutions function and the 
cultural elements attached to narco-trafficking, are evident when reviewing the literature. Indeed, 
it seems that there has not been a way to overcome the demand-supply dichotomy, which is one 
of the main constraints to building more theoretical work on the subject. Certainly, the way in 
which narco-trafficking is approached reflects to a certain extent the theoretical debates in 
security studies and International Relations more broadly. This, I will discuss in the next section.
2.2 -  S e c u r it y  S t u d ie s  &  c r it ic a l  s e c u r it y  s t u d ie s
In the first part of this chapter, I provided an overview of the way in which security studies 
has approached the issue of narco-trafficking. This section is concerned with the broader 
theoretical context that informs critical security studies. The main purpose of this discussion is 
to explain the elements in securitization theory that make it a viable alternative to study illegal 
narcotics trade. In order to do this, I provide an overview of the evolution of the International 
Relations’ sub-discipline of security studies with the intention of mapping the emergence of 
critical approaches to security, which inform securitization theory. There are two objectives for 
this section. First, to explain the different schools of thought within critical security studies, and 
second, to explain the framework developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde in their book: 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). Therefore, I divide this section into three parts. 
In the first section I discuss the evolution of the subject of security studies, providing background 
information about the main theoretical debates and historical happenings that lead to the 
materialization of critical security studies. In the second section, I discuss the common 
characteristics of critical approaches to security and describe the three schools of thought
associated with this orientation: Aberystwyth (Welsh), Paris and Copenhagen. In the third 
section, I explain and analyze the most important features of securitization theory. Finally, I 
conclude this chapter by explaining which elements of securitization theory and to a lesser extent 
from critical security studies in general, are useful to study narco-trafficking. These approaches, I 
argue, can fill in some of the “gaps” that the traditional approaches ignore because they may be 
more applicable to the experiences of drug producing countries.
2.2 .1  - T h e  e v o l u t io n  o f  t h e  s u b -f ie l d  o f  s e c u r it y  s t u d ie s
The International Relations’ (IR) sub-field of security studies echoes the diversity of 
approaches existing in the discipline. An attempt of dividing the sub-field in clear categories is 
always a difficult task, for it inevitably obscures the diversity within IR. Adding the term 
“critical” to “security studies” denotes a group with similar characteristics. Nevertheless, critical 
approaches are far from homogeneous. Instead, it is useful to think about critical security studies 
as “an orientation toward the discipline rather than a precise theoretical label” (Krause & 
Williams, 1997, p. xi). This view allows many perspectives to be brought into the same forum 
(Ibid.) as well as to remain sensitive to the disciplinary and theoretical discussions among them. 
Still, despite the variety found in critical approaches, these share two commonalities. These 
approaches see themselves as outside the mainstream or traditional approaches to security, and 
they all think of security as a derivative project -  meaning that the way we view and theorize 
security is influenced by the way we theorize about world politics more broadly (Booth, 2005, p. 
13). Therefore, critical approaches to security refute a final or fixed definition of security.
One of the most common ways to describe critical approaches is by contrasting them 
against “traditional” or “mainstream” perspectives to security (Krause & Williams, 1997; Smith,
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1999; Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010). This exercise is useful 
because critical theories emerge as a criticism of the mainstream perspectives. Even though the 
field of security studies today is very dynamic and diverse, it must be understood that this is not 
how the field has always looked. Rather, like Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009) argue, 
conceptual security debates are a product of “an historical, cultural, and deeply political legacy” 
(M.C. Williams 2007, quoted in Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 9). Therefore, the consolidation of 
security studies is influenced not only by the advances in the discipline of International 
Relations, but by historical developments which in turn influence IR. Critical approaches 
surfaced from deviating frameworks of the mainstream (Brinkmoeller, 2011, p. 2), which had a 
dominant role in the discipline. Traditional theories of security stem from broader approaches to 
IR, known as liberalism and political realism (Booth, 2005; Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 
2010). From all of the approaches classified as mainstream though, realism became the dominant 
theory in the discipline for the most part of the twentieth century (Smith, 1999, p. 74).11
Realism became popular after World War I, when conflict in Europe provided evidence of
the failure to guarantee international security through liberal institutions (Tickner, 1995, p. 176).
Not surprisingly then, security studies developed under the image of political realism (Booth,
2005, p.2). The consolidation of the sub-field during the Cold War resulted in the almost
exclusive devotion to the study of nuclear weapons and bipolar rivalry (Buzan & Hansen, 2009,
p. 67). In fact, the label “security studies” as such did not exist from the outset, but was gradually
accepted (Ibid., p.8). Before, although mostly in Europe, this subject was usually referred to as
11 Realism, also known as power politics, has a source in political realism with roots as ancient as in Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes (Evans & Newnhan, 1998, p. 465). In International Relations theory, realists portray 
international politics as a struggle for power in an anarchic context. The theory sees the nation-state as rational units 
and as the main actor (Keohane 1986, 7.). Contrary to critical approaches, they see concepts and social relations as 
objectivist and fixed terms (Buzan, Waever, &  de Wilde, 1998, p.204). They also privilege a positivist 
methodological approach and believe that a “science” o f international politics can be created (Keohane, 1986, p. 10). 
Thinkers in this tradition include E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau.
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“strategic studies” (Smith, 1999, p. 72), a label which highlighted security studies’ centrism on 
realist views of security. Although realism has several variants (classical, neo-classical, or 
structural)12, they all share a particular view of world politics. In broad terms, they portray 
international politics as a struggle for power by rational units, conceived as states. Under this 
perspective, security is viewed as the survival of the state (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, 
p.4) and therefore, the focus of security studies is war conducted by states, and the use of 
military force as an instrument of policy. In one of the first articles discussing security studies as 
a discipline, Stephen Walt (1991) for example, defined it as “the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military force” and argues that military power is “the central focus of the field and is 
subject to political control” (Walt, 1991, p. 121). This portrays much of the focus of the subject 
during the Cold War, particularly in the United States.
Strategic studies, however, were contested by liberal traditions, such as peace research and 
arms control advocates, which were more widespread in Europe. They constitute a normative 
counterpoint to strategic studies, since they concern themselves with the dangers of the strategic 
debate and argue for the reduction or elimination of force in IR (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 36). 
Liberals, in contrast to realists, consider cooperation among states an effective tool for security. 
Still, these are also considered mainstream approaches, since they do not dramatically contest the 
way security is studied. In fact, these liberal traditions also saw security within the context of the 
military security agenda and privilege state-level analysis (Booth, 2005; Buzan & Hansen, 2009;
12 In broad terms, classical realism and neo-realism portray international politics as a struggle for power by rational 
units. Neo-realists however, Waltz (1979) in particular, accused classical realists of failing to explain why states 
behaved in similar ways despite having different political systems and ideologies (see: Kenneth N. Waltz (1986). 
Reductionist and Systemic Theories In R. Keohane (reprinted) . Waltz abandoned the reliance in unitary analysis 
and identified the roots of this behavior in the international system, in which structural constraints forced “non­
conformist regimes” to follow the dominant ways of the anarchical system (Linklater, 1995). Classical realism and 
neo-realism differ then, in that the first emphasizes the roots of power politics in human nature as reflected in states, 
while neo-realists do so in the structure of the international system. It should be emphasized that both stress the 
continuity of the human condition (Buzan, 1996) and rqect a normative approach to theory (Keohane, 1986).
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Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Most importantly, liberalism and realism occupy the same 
ground theoretically, adopting a positivist approach to theory. They both are “explainers” - they 
believe the truth is “out there” to be discovered, and they seek to build a social science of 
international relations (Smith, 1999, p. 75). They both make a claim to scientific objectivity 
(Krause & Williams, 1997).
Critical security approaches developed from an eventual move away from this political- 
military centrism, a shift that is usually referred to as the “deepening” and “broadening” of the 
security agenda (Booth, 2005; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Vaughan-Williams & Peoples, 2010). 
This was influenced by the changing circumstances in the international order, which eventually 
lead to the questioning of many of the analytical frameworks used in the past. The paranoia of 
nuclear war reused skepticism around the effectiveness of military build-up and lead to a serious 
questioning of realist thought (Tickner, 1995, p. 177). During the 1970s and 1980s, this 
questioning was mostly done within liberalism, which challenged the priorities and policies 
privileged by realist thinkers but nevertheless, shared an epistemology as well as an 
understanding of security rooted in the armed confrontation of states. Even so, peace researchers 
constituted itself as an interdisciplinary approach to security (with influences of development 
studies and social theory, for example), which ultimately set the stage for the “widening” of the 
security agenda (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 154, 188-189).
Towards the end of the Cold War, some academics supported the inclusion of issues other 
than military threats. Environmental and economic concerns were among the first sectoral 
expansions for the “wideners”. In 1983 for example, Richard H. Ullman (1983) accused the 
United States of defining national security in “excessively narrow and excessively military 
terms”, which he argues, increases global insecurity by militarizing International Relations
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(Ullman, 1983, p. 129). Ullman (1983) proposed a more “comprehensive” definition of security 
and focused on threats relating to the environment and development, such as population growth 
and scarcity of resources. Although this constitutes an important precedent towards the widening 
of the agenda, it must be understood that this was still done in quite a conservative way (Smith, 
1999; Booth, 2005). After all, the emphasis on “resource wars” fits with the traditional views of 
the world that dominated security studies, for the state remained as the referent object, and 
conflict was the ultimate consequence (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 128). Similarly, in 1988,
Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones made a diagnosis of the discipline and determined 
that the narrowness of strategic studies ignores the “political, economic, and historical context” 
(Nye Jr. & Lynn-Jones, 1988, p.26). Nonetheless, they still see these as factors that influence 
conflict and see the state as the unit of analysis (Ibid., pp.6-7).
These precedents set the stage for a major debate about the discipline that would take place 
after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the end of the bipolar world rendered much of the 
theory and frameworks constructed by strategic thinkers (Nef, 1995, p.4) and by arms control 
researchers and peace researchers outdated. Undeniably, a great part of the raison d ’etre for 
much of the theory was now gone (Bigo, 1995 cited in Huysmans, 2006, p. 17). Western states 
were now to a large extent liberated from the need, in theory and real life, to protect their 
physical survival (Krasna, 1999, p, 42). This led to a full-fledged debate about the meaning of 
security (Tickner, 1995, p. 177) and about what issues had priority in its study (Huysmans, 2006, 
P-l 5).
Naturally, the “widening” of the security agenda also had an impact on the levels of 
analysis that were traditionally dominant in security studies. In mainstream approaches the 
security of individuals as citizens is identified with the state (Krause & Williams, 1997, p. 40)
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and therefore, it was irrelevant to study citizens as individuals. However, during the late 1980s 
and 1990s this was put into question. The publication of the United Nations Development Report 
in 1994 (UNDP 1994) for example, is evidence of the momentum gained by the widening- 
deepening movement. In fact, this document introduced the concept of human security to the 
international agenda. Its emphasis on “universal concerns” shifted the focus of analysis to that of 
people (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 203). This was not the only example of this sort during the 
1990s. Along with human security, and feminist approaches, Third World perspectives argued 
for a definition that went “beyond its ethnocentric obsession with external threats to state 
security” (Acharya, 1997, p. 121).
In any case, the discussions were inserted in broader epistemological and methodological 
debates in International Relations (Tickner, 1995; Smith, 1999; Buzan & Hansen, 2009). 
Therefore, the debates were not only between traditional scholars and those that advocated for 
the deepening and widening of security, but between those within the latter group as well. After 
the end of the Cold War, the diversity of views about the widening and deepening of security 
resulted in the discussion of schools and labels particularly relevant within security studies.
Smith (1999) provides us with an accurate picture of the field towards the end of the 1990s, in 
which he describes seven main approaches to security which lie outside of the mainstream.13 It is 
this contentious academic context that sets the scene for critical approaches to security.
2.2.2 - C r itic a l  se c u r it y  st u d ie s  a n d  th e  E u r o pe a n  sc h o o l s  o f  th o u g h t
The end of the bipolar world brought with it important changes in the dynamics of the field
of security studies. Although it would be naive to presume that the end of the Cold War was the
13 Smith (1999) identifies five main approaches: Alternative Defence and Common Security, the Third World 
Security School, the Copenhagen School, Constructivist Security Studies, Critical Security Studies, Feminist 
Security Studies and Post-structural security studies.
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decisive factor that marked the emergence of new approaches to security (and therefore, that the 
views of security before this event were uncontested), after this event we see a dilution of 
American leadership in the field (Waever, 2004, p.l). Whereas in the United States much of the 
debates about security continued along the same lines (Ibid., p.5), the Europeans brought about 
important theoretical developments. One such development is the heterogeneous body of work 
usually referred to as critical approaches to security, which are organized into three different 
“schools” of theory -  Aberystwyth, Paris and Copenhagen.14 Although critical approaches have 
recently called for the development of a common framework in order to go beyond the “artificial 
boundaries” that divide css (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006, p.451), the differentiation between the 
three schools is helpful to understand some the main debates within the discipline. In this 
section, I will provide with an overview of these three approaches, starting with Aberystwyth and 
ending with Copenhagen. This does not pretend by any means to be an exhaustive review of 
critical approaches, but rather it seeks to provide with the necessary context for securitization 
theory, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section of this chapter.
Despite its usual partition in three schools of thought, critical approaches share a number of 
commonalities of which the most evident is a connection to critical theoiy. This theory 
“emphasizes the influence of socio-political processes on the emergence and structurations of 
political questions and institutions” (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006, p. 446). This calls into question 
the ability to theorize from an objective reality, and the possibility of the construction of a “value 
free” social science. Translated into the field of security studies, this approach implies the
14 I am basing my classification on the paper written by the C.A.S.E Collective for the journal “Security Dialogue” 
(2006), in which it considers these three schools as part of critical approaches. I should note that other authors such 
as Buzan and Hansen (2009), Smith (1999; 2005), and Waever (2004) label these three differently, using a more 
narrow definition of CSS and not labeling the Copenhagen School explicitly as critical. The Paris school is often 
referred to as International Political Sociology (see People &  Vaughan-Williams, 2010) or “Bourdieau-inspired 
works” as used by Waever (2004).
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refuting of a “constant” or “settled” meaning of security. Instead, critical approaches see security 
as a derivative concept -contending theories about world politics produce different 
conceptualization of what security is all about (Booth, 2005, p. 13). Critical approaches 
constantly question what security means, as well as its object and objectives, and consider this 
“questioning” central to the discipline (Buzan, 2004; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). 
Moreover, by conceiving security as a derivative concept, critical approaches recognize the 
importance of “security as practice”, a source of reflection for the three schools although leading 
to very different directions and conclusions (Waever, 2004, p.l 1).
Critical security studies15 is associated with the works of Keith Krause, Michael C. 
Williams, and in a further development known as the Aberystwyth School, with those of Ken 
Booth and Richard Wyn Jones (Smith, 1999, 2005; Waever, 2004; C.A.S.E Collective, 2006; 
Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Both variants are more united by their perception of 
defects in the orthodoxy than by any alternative vision (Smith, 2005, p. 40). These authors are 
influenced by critical theory as developed by Robert W. Cox, with whom they share a vision of 
the differences between “problem-solving theory” vs. “critical theory”. While the first takes the 
world as it finds it and seeks to make it work smoothly, critical theory asks how that order came 
about and if it is in the process of changing (Cox, 1986, p.208). A book edited by Krause and 
Williams (1997) adopted a broader vision of what constitutes css and sought to involve different 
visions in it -  subaltern realist, fallen realist, and post-modernist are some of the labels that the 
contributors in the book use to describe their work (Krause & Williams, 1997). Krause and 
Williams (1997) articulate a strong criticism to mainstream views of security, saying that by
15 When used with lower case (css) it refers to a broad definition that comprises the Aberystwyth, Paris, and 
Copenhagen schools of security studies (although, sometimes the Copenhagen School is left out of this 
classification). Whenever CSS is capitalized, it refers exclusively to the Aberystwyth school of security studies. It is 
refered to as “capital c” critical security studies (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006, p.448; Smith, 1999, p.90).
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limiting the study of security to states “the ways in which citizenship is also at the heart of many 
structures of insecurity” are obscured (Krause and Williams, 1997, p.43). By making the 
individual the referent object, the authors recognize that there are threats within the state as well 
as threats for all humanity. This opens the state for “critical scrutiny” (Ibid., p.44).
Community and identity also play an important part in the framework put forward by these 
two authors, as they seek to use it as a tool to transcend some of the difficulties of making the 
individual as the referent object. The second variant of this stream, known as the Aberystwyth 
school - also identified as “Critical Security Studies” (capitalized), developed with the works of 
Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. These works are more influenced by the Marxian-inspired 
school of IR critical theory. Booth and Wyn Jones, as well as their Aberystwyth disciples, go 
beyond challenging the narrow definition of security put forward by the mainstream approaches 
and link security to human emancipation (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 9). CSS 
explicitly challenges the way realist approaches to security see and study the world, and seeks to 
expose it as part of the problem. Parting from the understanding that security is a derivative 
concept, Booth (2005) argues, that realism has created “a prison of categories and assumptions 
that have worked to create a world that does not work for most of its inhabitants” (Booth, 2005, 
p.4), and calls for a study of security that helps to “engage with the problem of the status quo” 
(Ibid., p. 10). This involves rethinking security “from the bottom up”, a task that is achieved by 
the “deepening” and “broadening” of the security agenda, which not only implies expanding the 
study of security beyond the militarized “statist orthodoxy”, but also involves exploring the 
implications of conceiving security as derivative from theories about the nature of world politics 
(Ibid., p. 14).
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This is directly connected to human emancipation - one of the core precepts of CSS. 
According to Booth (2005) the realist order that dominated security studies derived from a 
combination of “Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, top-down, methodologically 
positivist and philosophically realist thinking” (Ibid., p. 13). Therefore, its model is self- 
explanatory and self-replicating. By using this model there have been important omissions in 
security studies. This is why to Wyn Jones (1995), CSS should place “the experience of those 
men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity... at 
the centre of our agenda” (Wyn Jones, 1995, p.206). According to CSS, security studies should 
make the emancipation of the individual its central concern, for emancipation produces true 
security (Booth, 1991, p.319 quoted in C.A.S.E Collective, 2006, p.456). The emancipated 
solution at the individual level has positive consequences in collective security, for these are 
closely connected -  if people are emancipated, what they freely choose to do is peaceful (Buzan 
& Hansen, 2009, p. 207).
Unlike Aberystwyth and Copenhagen, the roots of the Paris School are not directly found 
in IR theory. Instead, the Paris School owes much of its inspiration to political sociology and the 
works of Pierre Bourdieau and Michel Foucault (Waever, 2004, p.9). The main research interest 
for scholars in this tradition are the practices of security - policing as a structuring practice, the 
politicization of societal insecurities and the structuration of internal security fields (C.A.S.E 
Collective, 2006, p. 449). The origins of this research agenda are influenced by the securitization 
of migration in Europe and the construction of an internal security field in the continent (Ibid., 
p.448). The works of the Paris school are associated with Didier Bigo as well as with the works 
of the journal Cultures et Conjlits (Waever, 2004; C.A.S.E Collective, 2006). Jef Huysmans has 
also been a noteworthy contributor to this school, most notably for studying the migration
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security practices in Europe (Huysmans, 2006). Bigo’s work uses Pierre Bourdieau’s concept of 
habitus16 to refer to the framework of orientation within which actors are emplaced in society 
(Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 68). He applies this concept to the field of security, and 
studies the place of security professionals in the field. One of the key findings of Bigo is the 
blurring of lines between the “outside” and “inside”. He shows how internal and external 
security merge as agencies compete for the gradually de-territorialized tasks of traditional police, 
military and customs (Waever, 2004, p.9). According to Bigo (2000) internal and external 
security are de-differentiating after a period of strong differentiation (Bigo, 2000, p.320). By 
focusing its analysis in security professionals, this school is more oriented towards practice than 
discourse (Waever, 2004, p.9.). Indeed, security agencies, budgets and structures are themes in 
this school of research (Bigo, 2000, p.321).
The last school of critical security approaches is the Copenhagen School, which takes its 
name from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) and has Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever as its most prominent contributors. COPRI was founded in 1984 and carried out research 
that was “theoretically informed yet empirically oriented” (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006, p.448).
The school has developed systematic and thorough explorations of the implications of the 
expansion of the security agenda in Europe while avoiding ending up with an all-embracing, 
inflated concept of security (Huysmans, 1998, p. 482). The Copenhagen School is built around 
three main thematics: sectors (of security), regional security dynamics, and securitization 
(Waever, 2004, p.7).
16 According to Pierre Bourdieu, the habitus is a systems of durable and transposable dispositions that the individual 
develops in response to objective conditions. They are set to function as structuring structures of practices and 
representations wich can be objectively “regulated” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 175).
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The Copenhagen School’s work on the sectors of security reflects their interest in the 
expansion of the security agenda. In its first working paper, the Copenhagen School defines its 
research project as centered on the “non-military aspects of European security” (Jahn et al., 1987 
quoted in Huysmans 1998, p.486). The school later draws on elements of Barry Buzan’s 
influential book People, States and Fear (1991), to address some of the ambiguities that result 
from the expansion of the security agenda. From that point on, security as conceived by the 
Copenhagen School encompasses five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and 
ecological. One of the most interesting developments was the school’s formulation of societal 
security, launched in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (1993).
Societal security is defined as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under 
changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Waever, 1993, p.23). Despite the recognition 
of societal security as central in security debates, Buzan and Waever argue that it should not 
replace a focus on state security (Smith, 2005; Buzan and Hansen, 2009).
The interest of the Copenhagen School in the state as a referent object is reflected on then- 
work on regional dynamics, the second larger thematic that guides their work. This literature 
was developed by taking elements from Buzan’s “security complex” in order to try to interpret 
European security dynamics. This approach assumes that a relatively autonomous security 
dynamic can exist between units of a region (Huysmans, 1998, p. 496). Copenhagen’s interest 
in pursuing these two research interests has led to the School’s constitution of a middle position 
between traditional state-centrism and traditional Peace Research’s and Critical Security Studies’ 
calls for “individual” or “global security” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p.213). The Copenhagen 
School draws elements from IR theory, surprisingly quoting realist thinkers such as Kenneth 
Waltz and Carl Schmitt as an important influence, as well as constructivist thinkers such as John
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L. Austin and Jacques Derrida (Waever, 2004; Taureck, 2006). This dichotomy is perceived in 
the third major theme- securitization theory, considered the school’s most distinctive theoretical 
development. Broadly speaking, securitization theory studies the discursive act of framing 
something as a security issue. In their book Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde develop a detailed analytical framework that integrates the sectors 
of security discussed above and that allows its use in real world cases. Most importantly, its roots 
in traditional and constructivist approaches, fosters dialogue and debate across analytic traditions 
(Williams, 2003, p. 528). I will examine this with more detail on the next section of this chapter.
In conclusion, the sub-field of security studies has been through very important changes 
since it first became institutionalized during the Cold War. Today, using Michael C. Williams’ 
(2003) words, it represents “one of the most dynamic and contested” fields of International 
Relations (Williams, 2003, p.511). The dominance of traditional approaches to security, realism 
in particular, has waned and instead, other approaches such as the critical schools have gained 
prominence in the subject. This has contributed to the enrichment of the field and guided 
scholarly debates towards new directions. This section sought to shed some light on the context 
in which securitization theory emerged and to highlight some of the intra-disciplinary debates 
that informed this theory. The next section is devoted to the discussion of this theory, which 
certainly occupies a significant place in the field.
2 .3 -W h a t  is  s e c u r it iz a t io n  t h e o r y ?
The origins of securitization theory can be linked to the early notions of security framing 
(Huysmans, 2006, pp.22-24). These approaches argue that security cannot be defined in 
objective terms, and therefore objective and subjective views of security are misleading (Buzan
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& Hansen, 2009, p. 33).,? Instead, security is more of a rhetorical tool that serves as a political 
instrument to dramatize issues, raising public attention to them and influencing political agendas 
to eventually stimulate action (Deudney, 1990, p.465; Huysmans, 2006, p.22). These ideas were 
put forward during the 1980s by researchers drawing from linguistic philosophers such as Austin 
and Searle (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) to analyze the representation of nuclear issues (for a 
detailed account of those conducting this kind of research, see Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 142- 
144). This conception of security has important implications that go beyond the mere utterance 
of words. It implies that security has a relatively stable meaning that influences the perception 
and the definition of a problem (Huysmans, 2006, p.23). As such, framing something as a 
security concern changes the privileged method of dealing with it. In this perspective, security is 
not about “adding adjectives” to the noun security, but about examining the opposite 
phenomenon; the change in the meaning of the adjectives by adding the noun security to describe 
them (Deudney, 1990, pp.465-469; Huysmans, 2006, p.23). In the latter form, the utterance of 
security mobilizes a certain “mindset” in an audience, which usually implies urgency and the 
creation of threats and enemies. This necessarily changes our understanding of language; it is no 
longer conceived as a tool that merely represents reality, but it is now a tool that also makes it 
perceivable, meaning, it has a performative component to it (Waever, 1995; Huysmans, 2006).
By defining security as a “speech act”, Waever (1995) grasps the intrinsic implications of
transforming something into a security issue. Inspired by the theories developed by Austin and
Searle (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), Waever (1995) argues that by saying the words, something
is done. The utterance itself is the act (Waever, 1995, p.55). In this sense, the meaning of
17 The distinction between objective and subjective security is found in Wolfers’ “National Security as an 
Ambiguous Symbol”. Wolfers (1952) says that: “security, in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to 
acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers 1952, p.485). 
Subjective security however, is attached to objective threat. An example is the shift from the concept of “balance of 
power” to “balance of threat” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, pp.32-33).
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security lies in how the concept is used and not in something that is analytically definable. It is a 
“self-referential” practice because it does not imply that a real threat exists but rather that the 
issue is framed as such (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.24). By defining security as a 
process, Waever, and his colleagues in the Copenhagen School, enlarge both the possible threats 
and those that are threatened (Williams, 2003, p.513). In principle, any issue can be securitized. 
Yet, at the same time they limit the agenda (Ibid., pp.513-514) by conceiving international 
security issues as rooted in the traditional-military political realm, where security is about 
survival (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.21). Securitization is thus a process by which an 
issue is presented as an existential threat (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.214), which calls for the 
placement of the issue in a condition of emergency and justifies the adoption of special measures 
to handle it (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.21).
In this context, it is always a political choice to securitize or to accept securitization (Ibid., 
p.29). Securitization is a further intensification of politicization, but at the same time, it acts in 
the opposite direction. Politicization means to make an issue more open to debate. Securitization 
however, means to present an issue as urgent and therefore it should not to be exposed to the 
“normal haggling of politics” (Ibid., p.29). Securitization then places itself at the end of a 
spectrum where public issues range from the non-politicized (issues that are not matters of public 
debate or decision), to the politicized (the issue is part of public policy), to securitization (Buzan 
& Hansen, 2009, p.214). In the latter category, the issue is no longer debated and it is dealt with 
at an accelerated pace and in a way that potentially disregards procedures or rules which 
otherwise would have to be followed.
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2 .3.1 -  Th e  c o n c e p t u a l  a p p a r a t u s  of se c u r it iz a t io n
The goal of securitization studies is to understand who securitizes, on what issues, for 
whom, why, with what results, and under what conditions (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, 
p.32). In order to answer these questions, Buzan, Waever et al. (1998) distinguish three main 
units in the analysis, all of which play different roles and in a way, interact with each other. The 
three main units are referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors (Ibid., p.36).
The referent objects are those which are “existentially threatened and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival” (Ibid). Although in theory anything can be designated as a referent object, 
middle scale collectivities such as nations or states have been the most amenable to securitize 
(Ibid). Size, it seems, is a key variable to build security legitimacy, which justifies the use of 
exceptional measures to assure its survival. The second unit, the securitizing actor, refers to that 
person or group who performs the security speech act. These usually are personified by political 
leaders, pressure groups, governments, or bureaucracies (Ibid., p.40). Seldom can we see a case 
where the securitizing actor is the same as the referent object. This distinction is clearer when the 
latter is the state, for there are rules about who the spokesperson on determined scenarios should 
be. The issue of security legitimacy noted above is less problematic in the same case; occupying 
a certain position within the government is intrinsically legitimate and therefore gives the person 
the authority to talk on behalf of the state, while for nations or other collectivities for example, 
this privilege can be disputed. Still, it should be noted that a great part of the securitizing analysis 
is deposited on the audience and not in these two units. In fact, we can only say that an issue is 
successfully securitized if the audience accepts it as such (Ibid., p.26). According to Buzan, 
Weaver et al. (1998), this acceptance occurs when an argument achieves “sufficient effect to 
make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed” (Ibid.,
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p.25). Lastly, the functional actors are those that “significantly influence decisions” but that are 
neither the referent object nor the securitizing actor (Ibid., p.36). These vary according to the 
sector of security. While a polluting company can be an example of a functional actor in the 
environmental sector (Ibid.), banks can be an example when talking about economic security.
Securitization theory rejects the recognition of particular issues as security matters and 
rather refers to the process of a successful construction of shared meanings, a “social 
intersubjective constitution of a referent object on a mass scale” (Ibid., p.39). Indeed, a 
successful speech act combines language and society, for it depends on the inherent features of 
the speech as well as in the group recognizing the speech (Ibid., p.32). There are two conditions 
for building a successful speech act - the internal conditions, which refer to the procedures of the 
act, and the external, which has two conditions itself: the social capital of the enunciator, and the 
features of the threat (Ibid., p.33). The first of these two refers to the authority o f the securitizing 
actor (it has to have sufficient legitimacy to announce that something is a threat), while the 
second refers to the characteristics of threats, which can facilitate or impede its securitization. 
This simply means that some things are perceived as more threatening than others, which can be 
useful to build a successful speech act (Ibid.). Successful securitization thus has three 
components (or steps) - existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations 
by breaking free of rules (Ibid., p.26)
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) distinguish five sectors in which securitization can 
take place: the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan, Waever, & de 
Wilde, 1998, p.22-23). This is important since the nature of threat and survival is not the same 
across all of them. Furthermore, characteristic units vary as well (Ibid., p.27). In the first sector, 
for example, the referent object is usually the integrity of a state or territory and threats are
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related to armed aggression. This sector is in a way, similar with the old conceptions of security. 
In the political sector, threats are generally those that question recognition, legitimacy, or 
governing authority (Ibid., p.22), but are not military. In the economic sector, threats are hard to 
define since the state, for example, cannot frame the economy in security terms unless the 
survival of the population is in question. Firms generally do not have a legitimate claim of 
security as it is normal to see them “come and go” in market economies and “doing better or 
worse” is not enough to frame something as a security issue. The societal sector is one of the 
most researched sectors in the Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) framework. A threat to 
societal security is one that jeopardizes the identity of a certain group, such as ethnic and 
religious groups. In this context, the referent object can function independent from the state 
(Ibid.). Finally, the environmental sector is probably the most diffuse of all of them. In this 
context, survival can be put in very different contexts, ranging from all of the human race to 
certain habitats or even, the biological system (Ibid., p.23).
The sectors of security put forward by Buzan and his colleagues have been a source of 
debate in the field. For many, especially those associated with the Aberystwyth school, the 
Copenhagen School remains very conservative and privileges a state centric analysis (Booth, 
2005, p.271). The Copenhagen School is “not critical” enough because of its link to neo-realism, 
which they do not try to hide (Waever, 2004). However, despite the controversy little has been 
written about the roots of securitization theory (Williams, 2003; Taureck, 2006). In the next 
section I seek to discuss the interesting combination of legacies that informs this theory.
2.3.2 - T h e  t h e o r e t ic a l  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  s e c u r it iz a t io n
Securitization theory is influenced by three main components: speech act theory, 
traditional security debates, and the Schmittian understanding of security and exceptionalist
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policies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.213). By defining securitization as a “speech act”, the link to 
Austin’s speech act theory is explicit in Waever’s work (Taureck, 2006, p. 6). In this context, the 
internal rhetorical structure is not the only component of this practice, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, the social context in which language develops. The acceptance and credibility of the 
message by an audience is essential to determine whether it is a successful or failed attempt of 
securitization. This rhetorical structure of security has a constructivist component to it, for 
security issues cannot be conceived as “objective possibilities of harm” (Buzan, Waever, & de 
Wilde, 1998, p.2; Deudney, 1990, p.464; Williams, 2003, p.514). Furthermore, acquiring a 
performative understanding of language (Huysmans, 2006, p.26) is key for understanding the 
implications of securitizing something. By conceiving security as a social construction, 
securitization allows the conception of possible threats and threatened objects to go beyond the 
military realm while also restricting its meaning to avoid becoming a synonym for harm 
(Williams, 2003, p.513). Even though some elements of the theory can be associated with social 
constructivism, its realist and traditional influence are obvious in Waever’s (1995) conception 
about that which constitutes a threat (Waever, 1995, p.516). He retains the focus on existential 
threats from the classical tradition while rejecting the idea that it can only be applied to the state 
(Ibid.). In a way, securitization bridges the debate between those who have a strict and traditional 
view of security that is rooted in the political, and those who argued for an expansion of the 
concept.
The concept of securitization is also informed by Schmittian politics in several ways 
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; Williams, 2003). Carl Schmitt was a German legal 
theorist whose works are related with political realism. He argued that the state could not be 
regulated by law alone, but rather by “the political” in form of power and decision (Taureck,
42
2006, p. 13). For Schmitt, the political is defined by the dichotomy between friend/enemy and 
the political “we” of an entity exists when confronted with an enemy where survival is at stake 
(Williams, 2003, p.517). Thus, we can say that securitization takes some of these elements as it 
emphasizes the construction and confrontation of threats and enemies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 
p.212). The separation between “us” and the “other” plays an important role in this theory, and it 
is assumed that this distinction is clear and accepted by the audience. Otherwise, the element will 
fail to be securitized. Indeed, as previously mentioned, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) 
argue that “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the 
security speech act” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.31). Deudney (1990) also recognizes 
this to be a relevant theme when discussing the implications of applying security language to the 
environment, although he links it to nationalism (Deudney, 1990, p.467). Neumann (1998) also 
discusses this issue; however, he argues that this dichotomy can rather be seen as an ongoing 
negotiation about “who” we are (Neumann, 1998, p.2).
Another element in Schmittian thought that relates to securitization is the conception of 
sovereignty as defined by the act of decision. It refers to the capacity to decide when a threat is to 
be considered an emergency that requires the suspension of normal rules, so that the political 
order can be preserved; “Sovereign is he who decides upon the exception” (Schmitt, 1985, p.5 
quoted in Williams, 2003, p.516). This is similar to various elements in securitization theory, of 
which the most important are the conception of threats as existential, and in the need for the 
suspension of normal rules. The second element is one of the key indicators that securitization is 
taking place, for securitization is only successful if these exceptional measures are accepted by 
the audience: “If by means of an argument of the priority and urgency of an existential threat the 
securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be
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bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.25). 
This also implies that there is a “political we” seeking to survive- another element in Schmitt’s 
theory. Lastly, we could relate the “sovereign” to the condition in which the securitizing actor 
must hold authority or legitimacy to make such claims and thus successfully securitize an issue.
For Schmitt, the political sector defines social relations on the basis of this dichotomy, 
which thus subjugates other functional relations, for example economics, to the first (Huysmans, 
2006, pp. 128-129). In securitization studies this is also noticeable: “Politicization is political by 
definition, and, by extension, to securitize is also a political act. Thus, in a sense societal, 
economic, environmental, and military security really mean “political-societal security”, 
“political-economic security”, and so forth” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.141). In this 
sense, securitization makes politics about security - threats are not defined objectively or 
subjectively, these are defined discursively and hence, politically. The act of securitization is a 
political act, regardless of the sector where the perceived threats are rooted. Therefore, security is 
about politics and by definition all other functional aspects of social life remain subjugated to it.
2 .3 .3  - C r it iq u e s
Securitization has also been subject to debate and controversy. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the most prominent critics stem from approaches outside the mainstream, which at times 
advocate for a more radical expansion of the concept of understanding of security used by 
Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, or that point to omissions in the theory. I will discuss some of the 
most prominent critiques, which I consider can be classified in six groups.
The first and most prominent criticism is that made to the concept of “societal security” by 
Bill McSweeney, considered the main critic of the Copenhagen School. McSweeney (1996)
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argues that the concept of societal security assumes that society has a fixed, single identity, 
which obscures its process of formation and sees it as something that is discovered: “It is clear 
that the term “society” is not meant to connote a process of negotiation, affirmation and 
reproduction ... their concept of society loses all touch with fluidity and process, resulting in a 
near-positivst concept of identity” (McSweeney, 1996, pp. 82-83) . Buzan and Waever 
responded to McSweeney’s critique by arguing that their approach to identity was pragmatic, as 
over time certain characteristics remain unchanged and thus can be taken as given (Buzan & 
Waever, 1997). McSweeney continues to disagree with this vision (Smith, 2005, p.36).
A second set of criticisms are those put forward by the Aberystwyth School. On one hand, 
Booth (2005), argues that securitization continues to be state-centric, elite-centric, discourse- 
dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical (Booth, 2005, 
p.271). On the other hand, Williams (2003) who has written the most extensive review linking 
securitization theory to Schmittian politics, considers that placing the Schmittian legacy front 
and center in the theory “necessarily demands a fuller interrogation of the ethical entailments and 
political consequences of accepting such a vision of politics and security” (Williams, 2003, 
p.528). Furthermore, Williams (2003) questions the adaptability of the theory for contemporary 
times -  specifically the impact of televisual communication. Krasna (1996) has critiqued the 
School’s inability to address economic insecurity. He argues that the relationship between 
militarization and economic welfare are central to questions of state legitimation, but neglected 
by securitization (quoted in Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p.216).
The third set of criticism is that identified with the Paris School, who have put into 
question some of the omissions in securitization theory. Didier (2002) argues that despite being a 
popular theory for studying immigration, securitization does not account for bureaucratic habits
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of security and the role that “security professionals” play in creating a “security state” (Didier, 
2002, p.65). Similarly, Jef Huysmans (2006) argues that “claims of protection are not simply 
constructed through discourse and bureaucratic routine but remain embedded in fields of 
contestation structured by power relations between participating agencies” (Huysmans, 2006, 
p.5).
The fourth set of criticisms is perhaps the most varied group. These scholars focus upon 
the linguistic components of the theory and some incorporate post-structuralist aspects in their 
criticisms. The common feature is that they all point to “omissions” in the theory. Thierry 
Balzacq (2005) for example, finds the discursive action of the Copenhagen School as too formal, 
which eventually reduces security to a fixed code of practice, a conventional procedure (Balzacq, 
2005, p. 172). Similarly, Matt McDonald (2008) argues that securitization is defined too 
narrowly, as it focuses on the way dominant actors construct the speech and does not address the 
potential for security to be constructed over time. Furthermore, it ignores the way in which 
security (as a normative goal or expression of core values) is understood in particular contexts 
(McDonald, 2008, p.564). Others, such as Neumann (1998) examines how the antagonism in the 
creation of identities can lead to physical acts of violence and suggest the incorporation of 
“violisations”. Neumann (1998) sees “violisations” as an exteriorization of the outbreak of war 
and as the final stage in the continua of de-politicized, politicized, and securitized (Neumann, 
1998, p. 14).
The final two sets of criticisms to securitization theory are closely related. Both are best 
put forward by Lene Hansen (2000), who points to two “silences” in securitization theory. The 
first, relates to the omission of gender-based insecurity, which she says arises because these 
problems are often linked with other aspects of the subject’s identity (she gives the example of
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nationality and religion), and therefore, it rarely produces the collective referent object privileged 
by the Copenhagen School (Hansen, 2000, p.287). The second omission, which Hansen (2000) 
identified as “the silent security dilemma”, arises when the subject cannot or is limited, in terms 
of articulating its insecurity problems since this may even aggravate the problem (Ibid.). This 
concept is also used by Claire Wilkinson (2007), who points to the narrow focus of the theory for 
privileging speech over other means of expression (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 12). Both academics 
apply the framework of securitization in non-Westem societies (Hansen studies honor killings in 
Pakistan, Wilkinson studies the overthrow of the government of Kyrgyzstan in 2005), raising the 
question of the applicability of securitization theory outside Europe. This has brought about 
much theoretical reflection (Waever, 2004; Huysmans, 1998), but it has rarely been tested in real 
life cases. Still, the few cases that exist are revealing. Wilkinson (2007) for example, argues that 
the theory is dominated by a Western-centric assumption of the conception of society, identity, 
and the state, along with the presumption of democracy. Therefore, its application results in the 
adaptability of the western-values of the theory to fit other contexts (Wilkinson, 2007, p.22). 
Similarly, Nicole J. Jackson (2006) points out to some of the difficulties of applying the 
securitization in states with authoritarian governments, where policies are constantly in 
“emergency mode” and points to the need of the exploration of “security dichotomies” to explain 
unsuccessful cases of securitization. This last point, I argue, is one of the key issues when talking 
about securitization in the Mexican case.
2 .4 - C o n c l u s io n s
Despite the critiques made to securitization theory, I consider that its “eclectic”
background constitutes one of its most important attributes. By bringing together elements from
realist theory, constructivism, and discursive security, the theory is a demonstration that dialogue
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across analytical traditions is possible and desirable. I believe that the diverse roots of 
securitization theory results in two major strengths: its definition of the concept of “threat”, and 
its applicability and versatility to study real life cases. In my opinion, defining a threat in terms 
of survival prevents stretching the concept beyond recognition while allowing it to be flexible 
enough to be located outside the military-state centric realm. I consider this to be one of the key 
components of the theory, which is carefully intertwined with elements such as the legitimacy of 
the securitizing agent and the role of the audience to offer a framework to conduct versatile yet 
analytical research.
Still, there are two critiques made to the theory that can relate to this thesis. The first is 
pointed by Jackson (2006), who recognizes the existence of “security dichotomies”, which are 
presented whenever a duality of perceptions of a security issue, one positive and one negative, 
arise (Jackson, 2006, p.309). In the case of Mexico, the ambiguous attitudes towards narco­
trafficking constitute an example of this. Another important concern which is also pointed by 
Jackson (2006) and to a lesser extent Wilkinson (2007) is the assumption that Buzan, Waever 
and de Wilde make about the political context for the analysis. The theory rests in the idea of 
securitization as “exceptionalist policies” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.213). Nevertheless, in 
totalitarian and young democracies, these are not uncommon. Therefore, it makes it hard to 
classify what can be considered as “exceptional”. I address both of these issues with more detail 
in chapter 5.
Ultimately this thesis seeks to raise awareness to the “grey areas” in security studies, and to 
encourage a more informed view. Critical approaches to security are more akin to this mindset, 
as they accept the possibilities for “other realities” and therefore, do not claim the right to know 
one truth. I consider that securitization theory provides a valuable approach to study narco­
trafficking because it allows to us to remain sensitive to the experiences of drug producing 
countries. The securitization of narco-trafficking, if it occurs, can occur differently in each 
country. Thus, the consumer/producer security dichotomy, can be transcended as neither threats 
nor referent objects are defined in objective terms. Furthermore, by using this theory, narco­
trafficking is not only measured by criteria such as until what extent it threatens the state, but 
also by how a society perceives that issue. This is particularly useful whenever we find “security 
dichotomies”. This does not undermine how “real” a threat can feel for a society that has been 
seriously damaged by threats that orthodox theory cannot see. Also, securitization implicitly lets 
us weigh important cultural factors which are common in producing countries but are neglected 
in the standard narco-trafficking literature, such as the image and roles of narco-traffickers in 
society, as well as the way structures of power operate. A very powerful move is made by 
making the audience the decision makers about whether an issue is securitized or not. In my 
subsequent chapters, I argue that narco-trafficking was not securitized before the Calderon 
administration in Mexico because the citizens did not conceive of traffickers as a threat, and even 
in some cases, they saw them as positive figures. This was also true for the government, for there 
were “arrangements” between criminal groups and political figures that preserved an order. This 
“negotiation” between the audience and securitizing actors, is not apparent with other 
approaches.
There are also theoretical contributions from using securitization to analyze drug 
trafficking. Using this theory to study an issue area different from what it is traditionally applied 
to (ethnic conflict and migration, just to quote an example) and by studying a case outside of 
Europe, contributes to the applicability of the theory. This will shed some light on the
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shortcomings that arise when the theory is applied in this manner. Moreover, by using this 
theory, we may discover new areas of opportunity for the research of narco-trafficking as well.
More importantly, securitization’s roots in critical security studies invites much needed 
reflection about how policy informs theory and vice versa in the drug-trafficking sphere. The 
rhetoric of the drug wars has rarely been analyzed (Brinkmoeller, 2011; Jackson, 2006), and 
clearly there are important implications in the real world that arise from the manipulation of 
information as well as from the prescription of policies of the West to others (something similar 
to what happened in the 1980s with the economic models imported by the World Bank). 
Notably, it would let us answer the question: Is the securitization of narco-trafficking desirable? 
Perhaps, this is a question to which we should pay more attention.
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C h a p t e r  3 : R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n
As I stated in the introduction, this research grew from an interest in a particular case 
study. Having reviewed Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s (1998) framework, I now turn to explain 
how I seek to apply the concepts of securitization theory to this particular case. This chapter 
provides an overview of the parameters of the case study and the methodology of this thesis. I 
divide this chapter into two parts. In the first part, I define the temporality and geography of the 
case study. In the second part, I focus on detailing the chosen methodology that seeks to 
validate/reject my thesis statement.
3 .1  -  T e m p o r a l it y  a n d  g e o g r a p h y  o f  t h e  c a s e  s t u d y
Narco-trafficking has been an important issue on the Mexican agenda for the last thirty 
years (Chabat, 2002, p. 135). Every six years, along with a new President came a new counter 
anti-narcotics strategy. The approaches taken by Mexican politicians during this period of time 
were not dramatically different from each other: the army would destroy crops and assist in 
seizures, a new intelligence agency would be created, and hopefully, the United States would 
recognize these efforts and certify the country.18 What these strategies also had in common is 
that they were centered on enforcement. Indeed, Calderon is not the first President to frame drug 
trafficking as a security issue. In fact, it was described as a threat to Mexico’s national security 
for the first time in 1987, by President Miguel de la Madrid. Henceforth, every President has 
defined narco-trafficking as a “security concern” (Aguayo, 1990; Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1995,
18 Established in 1986, the Certification is a unilateral decision in which the US rates the anti-narcotics efforts of 
other countries (Spencer, 1998).
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2001, 2007). Despite the rhetorical similarities, I argue that there are three main reasons why the 
Calderon administration should be considered different.
The first reason is that narco-trafficking is a priority issue in the national security agenda. 
It appears that former Presidents did not back the abovementioned statements with sustained 
anti-drug policy and did not consider this issue as one of their top concerns. As Mexican 
narcotics specialist Celia Toro said in 1993, “it seems that the connection between national 
security and drug trafficking has not been fully established in the nation’s political discourse; it 
has simply been asserted” (Toro, 1993, p.325). I will develop this idea further in the following 
two chapters, but the main argument here is that unlike the former heads of government, for 
Calderon, the war against narco-trafficking is a formal government commitment. This can be 
seen if we look at Calderon’s National Development Program (PND), where narco-trafficking, 
together with organized crime, are the dominant issues in the development of the national 
security and public security strategies. This was not the case with the anti-drug strategies for the 
former Presidents. Furthermore, following the discursive tradition of securitization, much can be 
learned from Calderon’s use of the word “war” to describe the strategy against organized crime. 
While other governments sought to minimize drug supply, the current administration seeks to 
confront the cartels directly. This is an important change in the anti-narcotics approach (see 
figure 2).
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Figure 2 -  Historical context of the case study
PaxNarcotica (1921-1980) De-stabilization (1990-2006)
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Calderon’s framing of narco-trafficking is the second reason why it should be considered
different from previous administrations. During his administration, narco-trafficking has been
framed an urgent issue that calls for exceptional measures to handle it. Paraphrasing Buzan,
Waever and de Wilde (1998), I argue that during Calderon’s government, narco-trafficking has
been taken outside of the scope of normal politics. It has been dramatized and placed in a
condition of emergency, which has justified the adoption of special measures to handle it (Buzan,
Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.21). Calderon has argued on numerous occasions that combating
narco-trafficking is urgent and a priority: “It is urgent to combat the structures of organized
crime. That is the main conclusion that we reached when we were elected. It was urgent and that
is how we acted” (Calderon, 2008b). By placing this issue in a condition of emergency, the
adoption of exceptional measures to handle it is justified. In this particular case, the emergence
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of the army as an important actor in the strategy can be considered exceptional, for unlike other 
Latin American countries, this institution has never played a major role in the political life of the 
country. In the PND, Felipe Calderon specifies that he would be using the military to combat 
narco-trafficking. This contrasts with other Presidents, which have relied on the Federal Police 
and institutions for law enforcement while the military was confined to crop eradication (Chabat, 
2010, p. 139). During the presidency of Calderon, the army acquired a central position in law 
enforcement, to the degree that it patrolled in cities that were considered dangerous, supplanting 
police forces. Although these two changes are important, perhaps the most controversial is the 
increase of drug-related casualties, which I consider the third reason for differentiating 
Calderon’s government from others. It is estimated that between 65,000 and 95,000 people were 
killed during the administration (BBC, 2012; Cave, 2012; Ley, 2012; Ramos, 2012). Today, 
people in Mexico consider insecurity as the main problem facing the country (Lagos &
Dammert, 2012), as homicide rates have increased steadily since 2005 (United Nations Office on 
Drug and Crime [UNODC], 2011).
All of these factors I argue, justify the treatment of the Calderon administration as a unique 
case that merits specialized research. This case study will focus on the period starting in 
December 1,2006 and ending in June 31,2012. The first date is the day Calderon took office as 
the new President of Mexico while the second date is the day proceeding new Presidential 
elections. Even though Calderon was legally still in office until December 31, 2012,1 decided to 
use June as a deadline given that it is the end of the second trimester of the year, and because in 
the period between that date and December, elections dominate the political debate and the 
departing administration is less likely to make important statements on the topic of narco­
trafficking. Because this study is centered on the securitization done by the federal government,
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and counter-narcotics strategies have historically and legally been lead by this actor, this study is 
not be confined to a specific region in Mexico. Although certain places are more affected by 
narco-trafficking than others, it is best understood as a national phenomenon. Confining my 
research to specific cities or states would make it difficult to grasp how securitization takes 
place. The influence exerted by the United States was also an important factor to consider. Yet, I 
decided that focusing on securitization in Mexico was sufficient for this project, as I did not 
intend to do a regional analysis. It cannot be denied that the US plays a major role in the 
decisions made by the Mexican government in the issue of narco-trafficking, but the objectives 
of this thesis are not to account for these influences. Furthermore, the nature of this relationship 
has been exhausted in previous work. Therefore, Washington will only be mentioned when 
pertinent and necessary, but the analysis will remain focused on Mexico.
3 .2  -  M e t h o d o l o g y
By using securitization as a theoretical foundation, my research is concerned with 
discursive security. Therefore, the principal method used throughout the analysis is qualitative 
discourse analysis. Nevertheless, I also use qualitative content analysis in specific occasions that 
call for complementary research. The choice of either one (or both) is determined by my thesis 
statement, which makes three assumptions. First, that narco-trafficking has been securitized. 
Second, that there has been a neglect of social approaches as opposed to enforcement policies. 
Third, that the government has used the “us versus them” rhetoric to depoliticize the war on 
drugs. In order to address these three assumptions effectively, I decided to conduct my analysis 
in three stages. Each is connected to one of the statements (assumptions) above. These are: To 
confirm that narco-trafficking is portrayed as a security issue and to explain how this has been 
done. To demonstrate the prevalence of enforcement strategies as opposed to social programs in
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anti-narcotic policy. Finally, to describe how the government has responded to civilian casualties 
by studying the deaths of the students in ITESM (Monterrey) and Villas de Salvarcar (Ciudad 
Juarez), in 2010. I hereby explain the methodology that I follow in each of the stages.
The goal of securitization studies is to understand who securitizes, on what issues, for 
whom, why, with what results, and under what conditions (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, 
p.32), which are the questions that correspond to the first two stages of research. I will talk about 
these two stages simultaneously, because they are informed by the same methodology, although 
the second stage, involves additional content analysis that I discuss below. For the first and 
second stages, public speeches constitute the units of analysis, because the main goal is to 
determine how narco-trafficking is transmitted to audiences. The sampling will consist of 2 
speeches per trimester for each of the six years of the administration (except for the last two 
trimesters of 2012), adding to a total of 44. The main source for the speeches was the 
Presidency’s website (www.presidencia.gob.mx), in which the full text of the speeches could be 
reviewed.19 It is worth noting that the analyzed speeches were not limited to those given by the 
President, but are open to any representative of the federal government (Secretariats). The 
sampling method for the speeches followed a purposive (judgmental) sampling technique 
(Babbie, 2003, p. 183) in which I selected the units based on the criteria that they substantially 
discuss narco-trafficking. In order to be more systematic, I developed a coding sheet for the 
analysis of discourses. Still, I remained attentive to the latent content of the speeches, in order to 
accurately determine the objective of the discourse (see attached coding sheet).
19 It should be noted that because of the election of a new President, which took office in January 2013, the website 
from which the speeches were taken are is not available anymore. However, the speeches exist in the archives of the 
government and in a different online website: www.calderon.presidenca.com.mx.
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In broad terms I divided the coding sheet into two sections which provide the guidelines 
for the discourse analysis. These are labeled in the coding sheet as “Section 1: Securitization” 
and “Section 2: Policy Measures”. As their names indicate, the first section seeks to determine 
how securitization is taking place while the second section is concerned with the public policy 
being mentioned in the speeches. The main research goals of the first section in the coding sheet 
are directly connected to the first stage mentioned above, which is to confirm that narco- 
trafficking is portrayed as a security issue and to explain how this has been done. This first part 
(labeled as “Section 1: Securitization” in the coding sheet), comprises questions la,lb,lc, Id and 
le. It can be further broken down into two subsections. The first sub-section deals with the three 
components of securitization (securitizing agent, referent object, and audience) and it comprises 
questions la to lc. It seeks to answer the questions: Who securitizes? What is being threatened 
(referent object)? Is the issue framed differently to different audiences? In case there are several 
securitizing agents, is securitization is framed differently by each? And finally, has securitization 
changed over time?. The second sub-section deals with the creation of identities (“us versus 
them”), and comprises questions Id and le. The main goal here, is to analyze how identities are 
constructed (the “us versus them” rhetoric), and to determine what is it that “they” want. In this 
section, I place special care in trying to determine which adjectives are being used to describe 
each of the groups being mentioned.
The second section in the coding sheet (labeled as “Section 2: Policy Measures”), relates to 
the second research stage, which is to demonstrate the prevalence of enforcement strategies as 
opposed to social programs in anti-narcotic policy. In this section, I seek to determine which 
public policies are mentioned the most by the securitizing agents. This objective will be 
complemented by the analysis of public policy. I specifically look for the implementation or
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change of social programs that relate to drug-trafficking in areas such as eligibility, 
implementation, and budgets, in order to assess the overall situation of these in the 
administration.
Finally, for the third stage, which is not related to the coding sheet, I analyze two cases of 
civilian killings that took place in 2010. The first case consists of the assassination of 18 young 
students by a death squad in Ciudad Juarez which was quickly attributed to cartel rivalries by the 
federal government. Protests by family members later caused the President to retract his claim. 
The second case is one where two ITESM students were killed in a cross-fire between the army 
and cartels. Again, government representatives quickly announced that the deceased were hit 
men, but it was later discovered that they were innocent graduate students. Evidence even 
suggests that the army planted weapons on the bodies and stole their student identification. For 
this analysis, I rely on newspaper articles, as well documents issued by NGOs with important 
presence in Mexico, such as Amnesty International and the Commission of Human Rights. These 
documents will provide a clearer insight into the issue, because both cases are very controversial 
and information can be unreliable. The importance of the last stage is paramount. Although 
initially, Calderon’s initiative was welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the population, as 
casualties and levels of violence increased, the war against the cartels lost popularity. Therefore,
I argue that as killings increased, so did the pressure for the government to act. Consequently, to 
portray the strategy as effective is fundamental, which is not compatible with civilian killings. I 
argue that by making casualties shift from “victim” to “criminal”, the government’s image also 
shifts from “unsuccessful” to “successful”.
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3 .3  -  C o n c l u s io n
This chapter provided an overview of the methodology for this thesis. The analysis will be 
done in three stages, each of which is connected to an assumption made in the thesis statement of 
chapter 1 (see figure 3).
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Summarizing, this thesis uses qualitative discourse analysis to study 44 speeches 
pronounced by federal officials over a period of six years. The analysis of these speeches aids 
our understanding who securitizes, for whom, why, with what results, and under what conditions 
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998, p.32). A coding sheet was developed for this task, which 
divides the speech analysis in two large sections: securitization and policy measures. In the first 
section, the main goals are to identify the securitizing agent, referent object and audiences, as 
well as to provide an insight about the dichotomy “friend versus enemy” or “us
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versus them”. For the second theme, the methodology consists of identifying the policy that is 
being mentioned in the speeches, in order to determine if social or enforcement related policies 
are more common. This thesis also draws on qualitative content analysis as an additional 
research tool, in order to provide with a more complete understanding about anti- narcotics 
policy during the government of Felipe Calderon. Also by using content analysis I seek to 
critically analyze what have been the results of securitizing narco-trafficking and to understand 
how the government’s rhetoric can be used to manipulate cases of civilian deaths.
This chapter also sought to contextualize the temporality and the geography of the case 
study, which will consist of the six years of Calderon’s time in office, and will remain a nation­
wide study. In providing with this context, this chapter tried to justify this choice by arguing that 
the strategies followed by Calderon differ from those of other Presidents, even though the nexus 
between drug-trafficking and security had already been asserted. This theme is taken up in the 
next chapter where I describe the drug war in Mexico.
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C h a p t e r  4 :  T h e  D r u g  W a r  in  M e x ic o
Drug trafficking in Mexico is an issue that raises worldwide interest. Recent outbursts of 
violence and Felipe Calderon’s militarization of the “war on drugs” has put Mexico in the 
spotlight, although not necessarily in a good way. Today, Mexico has one of the largest drug 
industries in the world, accounting for between $11 and $39 billion annual profits (Mercille,
2011, p. 1637). A combination of internal and external factors has allowed this industry to grow 
dramatically. Geography is perhaps the most significant factor because Mexico makes an ideal 
passageway into the United States, one of the largest illicit drug consumers in the world.
Although the huge demand for drugs in the US is undoubtedly a major factor which motivates 
the increased supply of narcotics, a legacy of corruption and weak institutions in Mexico has also 
played an important role its expansion (Chabat, 2002, p. 135).
Throughout this thesis, I have noted that Mexico has a history dealing with narco- 
trafficking and that this is reflected on the population’s attitudes. In this chapter, I provide the 
reader with some historical background that will be useful to contextualize my analysis. This 
chapter will be divided in three sections, covering information about the cartels, counter-drug 
efforts, and concluding with some thoughts regarding the consequences of narco-trafficking in 
Mexico.
4.1  -  T h e  o r ig in s  o f  n a r c o -t r a f f ic k in g  in  M e x ic o
The United States has historically been (and continues to be) the largest destination for the 
drugs produced and trafficked in Mexico. It is not surprising then, that the evolution of this 
industry is highly influenced by the state of affairs in Washington. Generally speaking, the drug 
business in Mexico has steadily increased since it originated more than a century ago. Last year,
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experts estimated that its profits accounted for 1% to 3% of Mexico’s 1.4 trillion GDP (Mercille, 
2011, p. 1637). The cartels that we know today, however, were not always powerful 
organizations headed by criminal tycoons. In fact, the first groups to smuggle illicit drugs into 
the United States were Chinese immigrants selling opium to their former countrymen living 
north of the border (Grillo, 2012, p.29). This enterprise switched hands quickly, for during the 
next twenty years, Mexicans in the northern states took over the Chinese business20 and became 
the dominant smugglers.
During the early twentieth century, opiates and its derivatives, heroin in particular, were 
the main drug being traded. Reports from Washington denouncing the collusion of Mexican 
authorities with the narcos emerged as early as 1916 but, in the midst of a violent civil war21, 
these were not pressing concerns for the most part of the Mexican population. In fact, this 
behavior continued as the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) held a grip on the Mexican 
political arena; corruption and bribery were seen as normal practice and the drug business was no 
stranger to this enterprise (Ibid., p.34). This environment facilitated the development of a small 
yet growing drug industry in Mexico. Furthermore, as the United States became involved in the 
Second World War, drug trafficking plummeted on Washington’s list of priorities. Some 
Mexican drug producers argue that the US government bought opium from Mexico in order to 
offset the shortage of this commodity during the war when the military was in desperate need of 
morphine. Still, this has been repeatedly denied by Washington and apart from some testimonies 
by local producers, it has never been proven (Ibid., p.36). What is true, however, is that in the
20 This “taking over” was in reality systematic bullying and killing o f Chinese people in the northern states of 
Mexico (Grillo, 2012, p.33).
21 Mexican Revolution: 1910-1921.
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northern states of Mexico, such as Sinaloa and Chihuahua, the illicit drug business was growing 
and Washington was on the watch for important players.
During the 1960s, drug consumption in the United States grew dramatically (in part due to 
the “hippie” movement) and with it so did drug supply from Mexico, particularly heroin and 
marijuana (Bucardo et al., 2005; Chabat, 2010; Grillo 2012). In 1960, it was estimated that 
between 75% and 80% percent of the heroin, and almost all of the marijuana introduced to the 
US came from Mexico (Astorga, 1999). This escalated American pressure on Mexican 
authorities to pursue tougher strategies against the illegal drug trade, reaching a climax during 
the Nixon administration. The Mexican government complied with Washington’s interest and 
enforced notable anti-narcotic operations during the 1970s. Mexican drug exports decreased 
dramatically. Marijuana exports decreased from 90% in 1974 to 5% in 1981, and heroin 
decreased from 85% in 1974 to 37% in 1980 (Chabat, 2010, p.2).
Nevertheless, this trend did not last long, and from the 1980s onwards the drug industry 
grew rapidly. At that time, smuggling routes in the Caribbean had been successfully intersected 
by US authorities, making Mexico the only available route to reach the United States (Mercille, 
2011, p. 1642). This led to an arrangement between the Colombian cartels and Mexican criminal 
organizations in which the latter would smuggle the drugs into the United States. It was not long 
before the Mexicans demanded 50% of the cocaine of each shipment and distributed it through 
their own networks (Constantine, 1996). By the second half of the 1980s, it is estimated that 
Mexico became the source of 70% of the marijuana and 25% of the heroin smuggled into the US, 
and that 60% of the cocaine entering the country was transported through Mexican territory 
(Chabat, 2002, p. 136). The assassination of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique 
Camarena in 1985 (with complicity of local policemen) confirmed the power acquired by the
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cartels in Mexico during the last few years. It called attention to the fact that the political and 
social elite were no longer immune to the cartel violence (Astorga, 1999). After the collapse of 
the Cali and Medellin cartels in Colombia in the second half of the 1990s, the Mexican cartels 
grew even stronger and more sophisticated (Chabat, 2010, p.3). Cartel assassinations of Mexican 
authorities and figures also became more common during the 1990s. Police officers, journalists, 
and prosecutors were the most common targets. In 1996, the DEA director Thomas A. 
Constantine, testifying in Congress, referred to the “the Mexican Federation”, composed of: The 
Tijuana Organization; the Sonora Cartel; the Juarez Cartel; and the Gulf Group. By this time, 
these organizations were able to smuggle marijuana, heroin, cocaine and methamphetamines into 
the US (Constantine, 1996).
Not only did geography and the collapse of the Colombian cartels contribute to the growth 
of the drug industry in Mexico, but the economy and important political transformations during 
the second half of the 1990s also played in favor of the Mexican cartels. The country was 
undergoing a deep transformation from a planned to an open market economy that resulted in 
important structural changes that left many people without a job, and especially affected farmers 
(Mercille, 2011, p. 1642-1643). The crisis of 1994, which increased levels of unemployment and 
poverty throughout the country, made recruitment easy for the cartels (Mercille, 2011, p. 1642; 
Chabat, 2010, p.3). It was simple to convince farmers to grow marijuana and opium crops for a 
larger profit. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) facilitated the 
smuggling of drugs and weapons (Mercille, 2011, p. 1642).
The waning dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexican politics 
also had a de-stabilizing effect. The PRI had ruled the country since 1929, but in 1989 it was 
defeated for the first time in the elections for Governor of Baja California. In 1997 it lost the
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absolute majority in Congress and the Presidency in 2000. All of the defeats were to the 
National Action Party (PAN).22 As the political dominance of the PRI wore off, the 
“agreements” between government officials and criminals were harder to sustain (Chabat, 2010, 
p.6). In this context, the cartels now had to fight each other to maintain or seize control of new 
territories, which generated more violence (Mercille, 2011, p. 1643)
Statistics seem to confirm the notion that the cartels continued to grow, for the illegal drugs 
that enter the US via Mexico have not seemed to decrease. In 2005 for example, between 70% 
and 90% of cocaine entering the US from South America passed through Mexico, which is in 
fact an increase of the 55% figure in 2000 (Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] 2001, 2006). 
Mexico also remained a major transit and production zone for marijuana, heroin, and 
methamphetamines (Ibid., 2006). Furthermore, since 2008, Mexican traffickers have 
significantly expanded their presence in Central America, Latin America, the Caribbean, and 
Europe (Ibid., 2012).
4 .2  - E n f o r c e m e n t  s t r a t e g ie s
Although the illegal drug industry in Mexico goes back for decades, in a similar fashion to 
that of the international anti-drug regime, it received limited attention from the Mexican 
government until the 1980s (Chabat, 2002, p.2010). Nevertheless, even though counter-narcotics 
may have not been a top priority in Mexico’s agenda, US pressure translated into several 
domestic efforts on the part of Mexican authorities. The oldest precedent of enforcement in 
Mexico dates back to 1912, when the country supported the Hague International Opium
22 The PRI was traditionally founded as a socialist party. Nevertheless, throughout the years its political identity has 
become more ambiguous and today it is positioned in the moderate left. The PAN defines itself as right-wing. While 
PRI was seen as a corporatist party, PAN was founded by members of the middle class and businessmen (Barranza 
&Bizberg, 1991).
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Convention (Chabat, 2002, p. 135) and ratified subsequent Conventions (Chabat, 2010, p.2). The 
government banned the growing and selling of marijuana in 1920, and poppy in 1926 (Astorga, 
1999). Yet, other than that, there were no other anti-narcotics measures taking place. As the 
Mexican Revolution came to an end and PRI comfortably moved itself to “Los Pinos”23, 
authorities had taken on the commitments required by the Conventions. Illegal crop eradication 
began in 1948 (Astorga, 1999), and tougher sentences for those involved in drug trafficking were 
implemented during the 1940s and 1950s (Chabat,2010).
During the 1960s, the United States and Mexico began to work more closely together. 
Throughout this decade, the Mexican government acquired airplanes, jeeps, weapons, helicopters 
and spare parts from its northern neighbor (Astorga, 1999). A series of informal meetings that 
had been taking place between Mexico and the US since 1960 (Craig, 1980, pp.558-559), 
reached new heights during the Richard Nixon administration. In a context of rising drug abuse, 
the American President declared a “War on Drugs” and made its campaign as international as 
much as it was domestic. During the late 1960s, Mexico was the primary source of high potency 
marijuana entering the country and a major source of heroin as well. Acknowledging the 
increasing levels of smuggling and production, Mexican authorities launched the largest antidrug 
campaign in the country so far, involving 2,000 federal troops as well as planes and helicopters 
in February 1969 (Ibid., p.559). Nevertheless, they still relied on dated techniques to destroy 
crops such as sticks and flame throwers and refused to change their techniques to those 
suggested by US officials, (Ibid.). During a series of talks between both governments in June 
1969, Washington’s wishes to step up anti-narcotics operations were ignored by the Mexican 
government. This resulted in Washington’s implementation of “Operation Intercept” in
23 Official residence of the President of Mexico.
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September, in which all vehicles entering the US would be inspected. Intercept was not well 
regarded by Mexicans (particularly businessmen, because they were deeply affected by 
decreased tourism) and it evolved into a diplomatic conundrum (Ibid., pp.567- 575). The not so 
subtle message sent by US authorities ultimately pressured Mexico to step up anti-drug efforts, 
and during the 1970s, trafficking decreased substantially.
By 1975, the Mexican government had started to use herbicides to destroy crops as part of 
its new permanent “campana” (campaign) against drug trafficking (Craig, 1980a, p.346). In 
general, the strategy was very much focused on seizures and crop destruction, but it would also 
combat drug-related corruption. The Mexican government poured 35 million dollars into the 
strategy (Craig, 1980, Toro, p. 1995), which translated into increased resources: double the 
number of federal police, more soldiers, aircraft, and technology such as sensors and satellites 
(Craig, 1980, p.347). Also, better working relations between different agencies and between 
local and national authorities in Mexico ensued. In 1977, the Mexican government implemented 
“Operation Condor”, which became the core of this “campana” and which aimed to destroy 
large quantities of opium plantations and to pacify the countryside in what became to be known 
as the “triangulo critico” (critical (dangerous) triangle) or Zone IV: Sinaloa, Durango, and 
Chihuahua, where the drug industry was concentrated. In Washington’s eyes and for Mexican 
authorities, “Operation Condor” was a huge success. Army soldiers and the federal police 
destroyed large amounts of crops, affecting the supply of heroin and marijuana to American 
markets (Craig, 1980a, p.357).
The strategy did not turn out to be as permanent as it was envisioned. During the 1980s, 
anti-drug efforts deteriorated and it seems that there was not a real strategy to combat narco­
trafficking. Instead, an era of tolerance envisioned to contain levels of violence came into place
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(Chabat, 2010, p.2). Some have even suggested that behind this Pax Narcotica there were deals 
between the government and the cartels (Mercille, 2011; Steinberg, 2011; O’Neill, 2011). Still, 
it is worth noting that Presidents had been employing the military more and more to combat 
drug-trafficking since the 1980s, and that during the second half of the 1990s, narcotics 
operations involved more than the eradication of crops (Chabat, 2010, p.5). Indeed, the 
counterdrug efforts during this decade were characterized by institutional and administrative 
changes, accompanied by legal modifications. Since 1990, for example, money laundering has 
been considered a felony and a special unit against it was created in 1997. In 1993, it was 
decreed that amounts of money exceeding $10,000 had to be reported when entering to Mexico 
(Chabat, 2002, p. 141). In 1996, President Zedillo enacted a law against organized crime, 
increasing penalties against the culprits and allowing enforcers to take special measures to detect 
it.24 In any case, it is estimated that in 1997, the Mexican government devoted 1 billion dollars to 
counter-narcotics operations and strategies (Ibid, 143).
Also during this time, numerous new intelligence and investigation agencies and 
commissions were created. This continued during the Fox administration (2000 -  2006). For the 
most part, however, agencies and commissions were short-lived and changed frequently.25 It is 
worth noting, that during the Fox administration the Ministry of Public Security was created, 
with the aim to make enforcement structures in the country work more efficiently, especially the 
Attorney General’s office and the military. At this point, if the most important characteristic 
during the 1970s were raids and crop eradications, these two were now complemented by high- 
level arrests, including politicians with alleged connections to narco-trafficking, such as the
24 The law allowed telephonic interception, protection of witnesses, covert agents and seizures of goods (Chabat, 
2002, p.141).
25 Accounting for all of these is far too extensive and in any case irrelevant for this topic.
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Governor of Quintana Roo (Chabat, 2002, p. 141). The high level and numerous arrests did not 
seem to dramatically affect the levels of drug production and smuggled into the United States.
Anti-drug strategies adopted by the Calderon administration required an analysis of its 
own, which will be done in the next chapter. What can be said is that this government has 
devoted enormous resources to battling narco-trafficking. In 2012, the security budget for all 
security-related secretariats was $12 billion dollars, an increase of 10.7% from 2011 (DEA, 
2012). It is also worth mentioning that besides the frontal attack against the cartels, a distinctive 
feature of his administration has been the Merida Initiative, which was implemented in 2008. 
The Merida Initiative consists of a security cooperation agreement between Mexico, Central 
America, and the United States with the aim to modernize and build the capacity of enforcement 
agencies (Cook, Rush, & Ribando Seelke, 2008). In it, it is agreed that the United States will 
support Mexico in counter-narcotic strategies with intelligence and equipment. So far, the US 
has delivered $1.5 billion to Mexico for this purpose (Mercille, 2011, p.1645).
After this review, the question that remains is: Have these strategies really made a 
difference? Observers have frequently struggled with this debate, reaching mixed conclusions. 
This is often the case when discussing narco-trafficking because of its condition as part of the 
underground economy and as an illegal activity one can only speculate about the accuracy of the 
information. Furthermore, the internal state of affairs in Mexico can be quite complicated, an 
important factor being the political transformations occurred in the country during the last three 
decades. What is true, is that regardless of the reasons, many argue that violence and insecurity 
in Mexico are currently at their peak.
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4 .3  - C o n c l u s io n
Reports of the complicity between narcos and authorities have long been present in 
Mexican history. It seems that this proliferated after the 1980s. The strategy, followed by the 
government during the 1980s allowed the cartels to grow substantially and to commit crimes 
with impunity. The kidnapping and assassination of DEA agent Enrique Camarena with the aid 
of corrupt police officers constitutes an accurate representation of the context in which the cartels 
operated. Most importantly, it portrayed the level of corruption of Mexican police agents and 
even, politicians (Astorga, 1999). Accounting for cartel assassinations of Mexican authorities 
and figures is a difficult task as these became more common during the 1990s. Police officers, 
journalists, and prosecutors were the most common targets.
Behind the violence was an enormous network of corruption that stretched from the low 
ranks of the police and reached the President’s inner circle. Even President Salinas’ brother was 
accused of accepting bribes from the cartels (El Universal, 2006). The most common accusations 
were among police officers, which is why many Presidents have resorted to the military to 
implement antidrug operations. Still, there have also been cases of corruption among high ranks 
in the military, the most recent during the Calderon administration. Politicians are not immune to 
corruption either, and governors in the northern states have historically played important roles in 
the development of this industry (Astorga, 1999). In 1997 for example, The New York Times 
suggested that the governors of Sonora and Morelos had links with narco-trafficking (Dillon & 
Pyes, 1997). The Washington Times accused former Presidential candidate and Zedillo’s 
Secretary of Interior, Francisco Labastida, as well (The Washington Times, 1998). More 
shocking however, was the escape of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, a top criminal ranked by
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Forbes magazine as one of the wealthiest men in the world, from a high security prison in 2001 
(Chabat, 2002, p. 139). Many presume that this was done with the aid of federal authorities.
Despite the high profile cartels, Mexico remained a relatively safe place during the 1990s. 
Its violence levels were by no means comparable to those of Colombia, for example (Chabat, 
2010, p.2). As the political grip of the PRI wore off towards the end o f this decade, the corrupt 
structures that were in place with the previous government officials were harder to sustain (Ibid, 
6). In this context, the cartels now had to fight each other to maintain or seize control of new 
territories, which generated more violence (Mercille, 2011, p.1643). Despite Mexican and US 
efforts, these organizations continued to operate and the flow of narcotics to the US did not 
decrease. In fact, this confrontation further de-stabilized the equilibrium between the cartels, 
which lead to more fighting between them and increasing levels of violence (Chabat, 2010, p.7).
When Calderon took office in December 2006, violence had increased in some cities in the 
north of Mexico as a consequence of inter-cartel fighting. This caused a lot of problems with the 
United States, which pressured the government to control border towns. Furthermore, traffickers 
were very powerful in some parts of the country, even being able to exercise political and 
economic control. Violence towards public figures had increased substantially (Chabat, 2010; 
Bucuardo et al., 1995). Lastly, drug use in Mexico had increased during the last years. Although 
these are the main reasons why Calder6n decided to declare a full-frontal war against the cartels, 
it is important to examine these with a degree of skepticism.26 It is true that violence had 
increased in the last few years but it is hard to tell if the influence and control of the cartels were 
unprecedented. As discussed, the penetration of traffickers in Mexican politics has been 
important since the 1980s. It is undeniable that the democratization process had changed the
26 For a detailed analysis of this, see: Gonzilez, (2009), O’Neil (2009).
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context in which they did business. As political opposition grew stronger in Mexico, and several 
parties competed for power, corrupting an institution or a structure with bribes is not as easy as 
before. Not only are politicians under the scrutiny of their competitors, but also of civil society. 
Today there are higher political costs to pay today than there were before if you are viewed as 
corrupt. Democratization has also changed the way in which information is transmitted 
internationally and domestically. With democratization, the freedom of the media has increased 
over the years. This has made Mexicans and also the world more aware of what is happening in 
the country. In the past, it was relatively easy to censor an issue or to divert attention from it. 
Today, drag dealers represent a bigger threat to the media than the government ever was.
In conclusion, it has been said that clashes between criminal organizations and authorities, 
and intra-cartel fighting have been at their peak during the Calderon administration (Mercille,
2011, p. 163 7). Murder figures calculate that the toll of killings during this six year period have 
been between 65,000 and 95,000 (BBC, 2012; Cave, 2012; Ley, 2012; Ramos, 2012). This 
number is hard to ignore and is an indication that there is something different from previous 
strategies followed by the Mexican government. If the changing economic context worked in 
favour of the cartels during the 1990s, changing political structures had a destabilizing effect on 
them. In a time when political institutions are in transition from a state-dominated political 
apparatus to those of a democratic government, the changes in the power structure and 
distribution of the cartels has resulted in a generalized chaos and in increasing levels of violence. 
Still, it is difficult to say that there is “more” or “less” narco-trafficking, but it would probably be 
wiser to recognize that the circumstances are dramatically different.
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C h a p t e r  5 : T h e  s e c u r it iz a t io n  o f  d r u g  t r a f f ic k in g  in  M e x ic o
As I argued in the previous chapter, narco-trafficking has been an important topic in 
Mexican politics for at least thirty years. This chapter builds upon this idea and talks about the 
placement of this issue on the Mexican agenda, focusing on the actions of the Calderon 
administration. The main objectives of this chapter are to demonstrate that narco-trafficking was 
securitized during the Calderon administration, to describe how this was accomplished and to 
discuss some of the implications. For this task, I divide the chapter into three main sections.
In the first section, I briefly review the way in which narco-trafficking has been 
historically framed by Mexican authorities. I aim to demonstrate that although the issue has been 
important on the government’s political agenda, it had never been securitized before. At the core 
of this supposition is the ambiguous and changing definition of the concept of “national security” 
privileged by the Mexican government for the most part of its modem history (Aguayo, 1990; 
Chabat, 2006; Toro, 1990). This clearly had an impact on the strategies and policies 
implemented by the authorities.
The second part of this chapter is the core of this thesis, for it is where I review the results 
of the discourse analysis and explain how narco-trafficking is framed. In this section I explain 
how securitization takes place - who securitizes, what sectors are being securitized, how is the 
process of securitization possible, and reflect on the process of creation of the otherness of the 
enemy. In the third and final section of the chapter, I examine the implications of securitizing 
narco-trafficking. I relate this to two important topics: priority in government spending and the 
possibilities of using the otherness discourse to limit government accountability. The otherness 
discourse relates to the cases of student killings that I mentioned in chapter one and three. I 
conclude this chapter by revisiting the research stages that I laid out in the methodology chapter
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and linking them with the findings. Afterwards, I reflect on how these results are related to the 
original research questions and objectives of this thesis.
5 .1  - N a t io n a l  s e c u r it y  a n d  n a r c o -t r a f f ic k in g
The term national security is seldom used in Mexican political jargon (Toro, 1993, p. 325). 
Therefore, when narco-trafficking was described as a threat to Mexico’s national security for the 
first time in 1987, the implications of this link were somewhat unclear. Certainly, talking about 
national security brings with it visions of strategic thinking and military jargon. Nevertheless, not 
all governments see national security in this way. This is the case of Mexico, which has defined 
the concept more in social and economic terms rather than in military terms (Chabat, 2006, p.
5).27 Despite this characteristic, the use of the concept has been quite ambiguous and at times, 
inconsistent. Indeed, unlike the concept of sovereignty for example, the concept of national 
security is not common used in practice in either Mexican politics or academia. The emergence 
of this concept only dates back thirty years, to the 1980s, when it began to appear in official 
government documents (Herrera-Lasso, 1991). This triggered a moderate interest in the concept 
among national academia, which chose to focus their research on elucidating its usage by 
politicians rather than drawing from theory.
As is common in many third world countries, in Mexico national security was often 
equated with internal security in many occasions.28 In particular, before 1980, it was used to refer 
to the security of the regime in the sense that dissidents posed a threat to national security. After
27 This is not surprising taking into consideration that the “principle of no-intervention” as well as a persistent 
emphasis in international law became the main characteristics of Mexican foreign policy during the twentieth 
century. Although, some say, this was also a tool used by the dictatorial government of the PRI to avoid scrutiny 
from outside. For reference see: “Estrategia y tactica de la politica exterior”, in Ojeda (1976), p. 100.
28 For a detailed account of the use of the term, see Aguayo Quesada, S. (1990). Los Usos, abusos y retos de la 
seguridad nacional Mexicana, 1946-1990. In S. Aguayo Quesada & B. Bailey, En busca de la seguridad perdida, 
Aproximaciones a la seguridad nacional Mexicana ( pp. 107-145). Mexico: Siglo XXI.
74
that, it was frequently used as a synonym for national defense, but the definitions were often 
ambiguous, and even contradictory (Aguayo Quesada, 1990, pp. 115-116). During this decade, 
the typical definition of national security characterized it as the “integral development” of the 
nation, to which the Armed Forces would assist (Ibid, p.l 16). Nevertheless, there was no clear 
definition of national or regional security (Chabat, 2006, p. 4).
The unclear definitions of national security have an impact on the definition of what 
constitutes a security threat. When drug trafficking is defined as a national security problem in 
1987 by president Miguel de la Madrid, the term had only been used once before to address a 
particular issue -  the guerrilla war in Central America earlier in the decade (Aguayo, 1990; Toro, 
1993). Furthermore, in the National Development Plan (PND) of 1989, the Salinas’ 
administration referred to narco-trafficking as “the main” security concern for Mexico.
Naturally, this scenario would likely result in the placement of the issue as a priority. This, 
however, is questionable. Although it cannot be denied that narco-trafficking had increased 
during the decade, de la Madrid’s statement was made shortly after Camarena’s assassination in 
1985, and during the Reagan administration, which had made fighting narco-trafficking one of 
its formal priorities. This was a time when Washington pressured the Mexican government to 
step up its counter-narcotics measures. The “certification process” implemented in 1986 was a 
clear example of how important this was to Washington. Also, in 1987 and 1991 DEA agents 
(through Mexican citizens) had kidnapped two men connected to the Camarena affair without 
notifying Mexico (Chabat, 1994, p. 118). This shocked Mexican authorities, resulting in back 
and forth arguments with American authorities about the violation of Mexican sovereignty and 
the limits of its national jurisdiction.
75
In addition to this, one must consider that the Salinas administration was also under a lot of 
pressure while conducting the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations 
(Chabat, 2006, p. 13). Indeed, it is worth noting that in Salinas’ PND, “economic threats from 
outside (of Mexico)” were also considered a national security concern, although these were not 
explicitly defined (Aguayo Quesada, 1990, p. 120). This is consistent with a memorandum from 
the Defense Intelligence Agency Joint Staff in Washington, written in 1992, in which it was 
stated that Salinas’ cooperation with the US on drug matters “reflects in part president Salinas’ 
hope that paying more attention to drug issues will minimize frictions with the US that could 
jeopardize Mexico’s economic recovery, his top domestic priority” (Chabat, 2006, p. 13).
Specialists argue that despite the noteworthy statements by presidents de la Madrid and 
Salinas, drug trafficking was not a prime national security interest of the government (Chabat, 
1994; Toro,1990). Indeed, both presidents failed to describe why narco-trafficking should be 
considered a threat, vaguely referring to it as a “health problem.”29 Yet, national consumption 
levels were low and antidrug strategies did not seem to be addressing this issue, but rather they 
were focused on limiting the supply to the United States. The Attorney General’s office would 
later say that narco-trafficking “damages Mexico’s international image” as well as institutions, 
stability, and economics - resulting in an even more ambiguous discourse in which the enemy to 
be fought is hard to identify (Aguayo Quesada, 1990, p. 120). Moreover, violence against the 
state was not as common as it became after the 1990s.
At beginning on the 1990s, the few leading academics on the subject agreed that in order to 
be consistent with the definitions of national security used by the government, narco-trafficking 
could only be understood as a security threat if it resulted in the trespassing of the national
29Consumption levels at this time were even lower than they are today. Curiously though, the legal term for narco­
trafficking violations are “crimes against health”.
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borders (from DEA agents or foreign traffickers, for example) or due to corruption’s pervasive 
consequences (Chabat, 1994; Toro, 1990, 1994). They recognized that cartel violence was not at 
a point where it could be considered a national security concern. However, they recognized that 
this could be the case if the government allowed criminal organizations to act with impunity 
(Toro, 1990) or if it declared a “full frontal war” against the cartels (Chabat, 1994).
Certainly, one must not forget that during this time, democratization in Mexico was in its 
nascent stages of development, and that national security, a politically defined concept, was 
largely influenced by whoever was in “Los Pinos” (Aguayo Quesada, 1990; Toro, 1990). The 
concept could therefore be molded to the convenience of the government in office rather than 
following a particular tradition. During the Salinas administration, as in the 1970s, it seemed that 
the Mexican government chose to increase resources devoted to anti-narcotics operations 
whenever more aggressive US behavior was feared (Toro, 1993, pp. 323-324). In fact, on one 
occasion, and perhaps not surprisingly, drug-trafficking was referred to as a “problem of 
international solidarity” (Aguayo Quesada, 1990, p. 120). In this context, the statement by Mario 
Ojeda (1976), seems to be the most viable explanation for the sudden urgency of Mexican 
politicians: “The United States recognizes and accepts the necessity o f Mexico to dissent on 
American politics in everything that is fundamental to Mexico, even though it might be 
important for the United States, but not fundamental. In return, Mexico gives its cooperation in 
everything that is fundamental or even important to the US, if it is not for Mexico” (Ojeda, 1976, 
p.93).
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During the 1990s, while crime substantially increased in Mexico30, a very deficient judicial 
system failed to deliver security to the citizens. At the same time, as NAFTA increased Mexico’s 
international exposure, attention was given to human insecurity in the country (Chabat, 2006, pp. 
7-8). During the Zedillo administration there were no radical changes in the national security 
definition or agenda. The PND for the administration constantly stressed sovereignty as the back­
bone of national security (Poder Ejecutivo Federal [PEF], 1995). Although the document did 
recognize narco-trafficking as a threat, it did so in the same ambiguous sense as the two previous 
presidents.
With the coming of Vicente Fox’s administration, substantial changes occurred in the 
understanding of national security. After 71 years of PRI rule, the panistan President sought to 
differentiate his administration from former governments. The style of the former Coca-Cola 
executive and rancher contrasted sharply to Zedillo’s and Salinas’. While the rhetoric of the last 
two PRI presidents would be perceived as ambiguous, Fox’s rhetoric was more precise. Fox 
insisted on the modification of the concept as he deemed that in the past, it was used to “justify 
illegitimate acts of authority, whose only purpose was to facilitate the continuity of the political 
regime” (Fox ,2001 quoted in Chabat, 2006, p. 12) and therefore, did not reflect the real interests 
of the citizens. In Vicente Fox’s view, the real threats to national security were non-traditional, 
quoting poverty and inequality, natural disasters and ecological degradation, as well as crime and 
narco-trafficking as examples (PEF, 2001, p. 103). The Fox government called for the 
“modernization” of the national security agenda, in a tone that clearly advocated a 
multidimensional definition that emphasized human rights, thus setting itself apart from the more
30 Some of the factors that may have contributed to this rise in crime were: the growth of the Mexican cartels, the 
economic crisis of 1994, and the layoff of corrupt police officer after a decade of deterioration of security forces in 
Mexico, leaving them unemployed and available to work in crime (Chabat, 2006, p. 8).
31 Spanish term used to refer to a person affiliated with PAN.
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traditional definitions used by past administrations.32 This was reflected in the way the 
administration viewed narco-trafficking, seen as a security concern because it compromised the 
physical safety of the citizens and corrupted government institutions (Ibid.). Compared to the 
priistas33, Fox’s definition of national security was more sophisticated and inclusive (Pineyro & 
Barajas, 2008, pag. 234).
Summarizing, even though narco-trafficking has been categorized as a national security 
threat by Mexican authorities since the late 1980s, scholars remained skeptical about this 
assertion (Aguayo Quesada, 1990; Toro, 1993; Chabat, 1994). In a context in which this label is 
uncommon, the PRI administrations failed to provide a consistent explanation for the reasons 
behind this assertion, which is not surprising given the ambiguity of the concept of national 
security at the time. This led some scholars to speculate that this was a gimmick to cope with the 
increasing pressure of the United States in an era where Mexico’s primary concern was the 
economy. The Fox administration adopted a new perspective on national security, making the 
categorization of narco-trafficking as a security threat more consistent. Still, it was viewed as a 
manageable public security problem. Although the Fox administration attempted to make a more 
detailed diagnosis about why the illegal drag trade represented a problem, this was not a key 
element in this period. Quoting Toro (1993), it seems that “the connection between national 
security and drag trafficking has not been fully established in the nation’s political discourse; it 
has simply been asserted” (Toro, 1993, p.325). Or so, it seemed to have been this way until the 
Calderon administration.
32 In fact, in September 7, 2001 Mexico withdrew from the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and 
voted against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, while occupying the presidency in the Security Council.
33 Word in Spanish used to describe those affiliated with PRI.
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Felipe Calderon is a Harvard-educated lawyer with a long career in politics. He served as 
the head of the National Development Bank and as the energy secretary in the Fox 
administration. He was also a local assemblyman and a congressman in the lower house of 
representatives. Most of Calderon’s career was spent among the ranks of PAN, which his father 
helped to create (BBC Latin America, 2011). During his campaign, Calderon had promised to 
become the “President of employment”. However, the most distinctive characteristic of his 
government did not turn out to be the creation of jobs, but the war against narco-trafficking. 
Although drug trafficking and security had already been linked in Mexican politics for twenty 
years when Calderon took office, the administration’s understanding of this association is 
somewhat different from its predecessors’. The most distinctive feature is the prominence of 
narco-trafficking on the security agenda. Narco-trafficking, together with organized crime, 
appear to be the dominant issues in the development of the national security and public security 
strategies.
Narco-trafficking did not constitute such a priority for the former presidents. In the 
Zedillo’s administration PND (1995) for example, national security emphasized the defense of 
sovereignty and the rule of national law in the territory. Similar to Fox, Salinas recognized 
narco-trafficking as a threat, but did not discuss the issue as thoroughly (this is not surprising, 
given the context faced by this administration; the worst economic crisis in the country and 
episodes of DEA incursions into Mexico). In the PND for the Fox administration (2001), there 
is more discussion about why narco-trafficking should be considered a threat, and specific 
measurements to fight against it are enlisted. Still, the administration’s priority when discussing 
national security was the construction of a new definition of this concept and to reinforce 
(intelligence) institutions that would guarantee public and national security.
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The PND (2007) for Calderon’s administration takes a somewhat different tone. The 
document is divided into five sections, of which the first, “Law and Security”34 (PEF, 2007, p. 7), 
discusses matters concerned with security. In this section, we can find three relevant sub­
sections: organized crime, national security, and public security. This is the first time a president 
makes organized crime such a priority in the PND, listing it as a section with specific objectives, 
strategies and a diagnosis. But, what is the understanding of the administration in regards with 
national security? What is considered organized crime and where is it placed in the security 
agenda?
In the sub-section entitled “national security” (defense of sovereignty is also used as a title 
in the online version of the PND35), it is stated that the government seeks “to guarantee national 
security and preserve the physical and patrimonial integrity of Mexicans above any other 
interest” (Ibid., p.24). It is not uncommon for presidents to identify national security as their 
primary concern. However, it is distinctive to appeal to the “physical and patrimonial integrity” 
of people, given that PRI governments almost equated national security to sovereignty. Although 
in the PND the Calderon administration still uses the lexicon initiated by the Fox administration, 
which favors a multidimensional understanding of security, Calderon conceptualizes national 
security as a very textual understanding of physical safety. In fact, if one examines the PND, the 
working sections that are listed under the larger category of national security only talk about the 
importance of the strengthening of the armed forces to preserve the country’s “territorial 
integrity” and to assist in natural disasters (Ibid., pp.23-24). Nevertheless, in the assessment it is
34 “Estado de Derecho y Seguridad”
35 There is no available explanation as to what is the reason for this. The copy that is maintained in the Nation’s 
Archives (PEF, 2007), uses “national security” as a headline. Perhaps the change in headlines is not explained for as 
I mentioned earlier in the section, these two terms (national security and defense of sovereignty) have often been 
used interchangeably.
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stated that the assistance of the armed forces is necessary to combat narco-trafficking in order 
“recuperate normality in the obedience of the law and in social coexistence”, which had been 
affected by violence related to this issue (Ibid., p.23). In the assessment, border control and the 
trafficking of arms and persons as well as the flow of goods and persons within the territory are 
presented as a national security interests, although these are not under the label of national 
security.
Interestingly, narco-trafficking is the first issue recognized as a threat to national security 
in this document. The section on organized crime states the following: “As a manifestation of 
organized crime, narco-trafficking defies the State36 and it becomes a strong threat to national 
security” (Ibid., p. 19). Hence, what is understood by the PND is that organized crime is a larger 
label to which narco-trafficking pertains, but that goes beyond this activity. Paradoxically, under 
the label organized crime, only issues that have to do with narco-trafficking are discussed. 
Meanwhile, in the section that discusses public security, the term crime is used but in reference 
to gangs or delinquents. Another distinction is that narco-trafficking matters are reserved for the 
army while public security is linked to the status of police forces. These seem to be an important 
distinction between the two. In the PND, organized crime and narco-trafficking are a matter of 
national security while crime caused by delinquents, gangs, and drug sellers (narcomenudistas37)  
is a matter of public security.
In conclusion, the Calderon administration seems to have a more anthropocentric vision of 
national security than its predecessors. This understanding centers itself on physical safety. The 
national security agenda of this administration, although more complete and specific than others,
36 Capitalization is made in the original document.
37 “Narcomenudista” contrasts with “narcotraficante” in the sense that the first is a small-scale drug seller while 
narcotraficante is a drug dealer, usually a member of the cartel.
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is dominated by organized crime and its harmful activities such as narco-trafficking and the 
trafficking of arms and persons. Calderon sees the armed forces as the keepers of security, and 
centers the national security strategies in this institution.
5 .2  -  R e s u l t s  o f  s p e e c h  a n a l y s is : T h e  s e c u r it iz a t io n  o f  n a r c o -t r a f f ic k in g  in  
t h e  C a l d e r 6 n  a d m in is t r a t io n
In this section I describe the results of the discourse analysis38, of which the findings are 
organized in two parts. In the first part, I apply the theory of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) 
to reveal that narco-trafficking has been framed as an existential threat that calls for urgent action 
and the adoption of extreme measures, resulting in its securitization and hence depoliticizing the 
issue. In the second part, I continue to explain the characteristics of this securitization process by 
answering the questions: Who is the securitizing agent? What is the referent object? How is the 
threat being framed? I finish this part by providing an assessment of the process by which 
identities are created, the “us versus them” mentality. After this initial assessment, I move on to 
talk about the policy measures that are mentioned in the speeches, which is complemented by the 
analysis of public policies in the next section.
Talking about an issue as a security threat is not sufficient to consider said issue has been 
securitized. According to the theory, there are more criteria to fulfill if one wishes to assert this 
hypothesis. In short, it should be presented as an existential threat and placed in a condition of 
emergency that justifies the adoption of special measures to handle it (Buzan, Waever, & de 
Wilde, 1998, p.21). Therefore, an initial assessment of the securitization of narco-trafficking in 
Mexico begins by questioning how these concepts translate into practice. As I explained in the
38 This section features a considerable amount of quotes which were translated from Spanish in the most literal way 
possible. Sometimes, this means that they are not grammatically correct in English.
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previous section, in the PND, narco-trafficking is described as an existential threat to the 
country. Rhetorically, during the six years of his administration, Calderon presented crime 
(understood as the activities performed by the cartels), as a threat to the “viability” of the state 
that endangered the future of the country: “Today we suffer the consequences of years of 
indifference to the cancer that are criminality, impunity and corruption. This evil became a threat 
to peace and wellness of Mexican families, and challenges the viability of the state itself’ 
(Calderon, 2008d). By making this issue a matter of “life or death”, this becomes an urgent 
matter: “It is urgent to combat the structures of organized crime. This was the first conclusion 
that we reached when we arrived to the Government. It was urgent and that is how we acted” 
(Calderon, 2008b). In fact, this argument was later contextualized by the President by using the 
work of Peter Lupsha (Pimentel, 1999, p. 9). Calderon argued that crime is expansive and that it 
evolves in three stages which, in turn, impact the degree to which governments can deal with the 
issue. In the predatory stage, criminals are still small gangs or thieves that can be handled by 
traditional government authorities. However, when they evolve to the second or parasitary stage, 
criminals infiltrate security forces and institutions. This can develop in the third stage or 
symbiotic, in which state institutions are to the total service of organized crime. Therefore, 
Calderon argues, it is absolutely necessary to stop criminals in order to prevent institutions from 
being completely falling into the hands of criminal organizations (Calderon, 201 lb, 2012)39. This 
reinforces the ideas that narco-trafficking is both an urgent issue and that it threatens the viability 
of the state.
One of the most important ideas in securitization theoiy is that by uttering “the speech act”, 
something is being done and thus, the way to deal with that particular issue changes from a 
condition of “normal politics” to a condition of emergency. This is one of the key ideas leading
39 The first time Calderon talks about these “stages” can be found in a workshop with UNAM in September 5, 2011.
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to my argument that in past administrations the link between narco-trafficking and security was 
merely asserted but not acted upon. In the past, the issue was important but it was not a priority. 
This is not the case in the Calderon administration. When explaining the motivations to start a 
war on crime, the President said to the Congress: “The gravity of the problem and the risk of its 
propagation did not allow for indecision or delay. This is why we decided to act with all the 
State’s force to reestablish order and security” (Calderon, 2007e). By arguing that “all the state’s 
force is needed”, Calderon not only presents this as an urgent matter, but as one that requires 
special measures. The adoption of exceptional measures to deal with an issue is one of the key 
elements in securitization theory. Elements such as institutional changes and the allocation of 
resources are important indicators of whether securitization is taking place (Buzan, Hansen, & de 
Wilde, 1998; Jackson, 2006). In this case, the aggressiveness of the military operations in several 
states (regions) of Mexico shows the “dramatization” of politics taking place during the 
administration. Even though the military had been employed in the past, it had never been done 
on such a large scale - by the end o f2008 the operations had involved close to 40,000 military 
personnel and 5,000 federal police troops (Gonzalez, 2009, p.74). Meanwhile, Calderon argued 
that the presence of the military was “not only possible, just, and legitimate, but indispensable” 
(Calderon, 2009a).
According to securitization theory, the adoption of special measures to handle an issue 
should be accepted or at least tolerated by the audience. In other words, we are witnessing a case 
of securitization whenever an argument achieves sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate 
violations of rules or procedures that would otherwise have to be obeyed (Buzan, Waever, & de 
Wilde, 1998, p.25). This observable in the Mexican case, for although there has been controversy 
surrounding the exorbitant number of deaths since the beginning of the administration, in 2012,
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80% of the population was in favor of the involvement of the army in the war against drugs and 
47% thought that progress had been made against drug traffickers. Surprisingly, the latter 
statistic increased 2% in relation to the previous year (Pew Research Center, 2012). It seems that 
citizens have the notion that there are “sacrifices” to be made if one is at “war”. This idea is 
repeated in many of the speeches of Calderon:
I have said it and I repeat it, it is not an easy fight, it is not a simple battle, it 
is not something that can be fixed rapidly or comfortably; on the contrary, I say 
so and I say so openly to the Mexicans (citizens), it is a hard battle, difficult, that 
will cost us economic resources, that will take time and unfortunately, human 
lives, like it has been doing so (Calderon, 2007b).
Like Deudney (1990) argues, the audience’s mindset in this case is very similar to that 
found during times of war, in which great personal sacrifice is expected from them (Deudney, 
1990, p.466). Indeed, despite the support that the audience gives to the military-backed strategy, 
in the same year roughly 3 out of 4 Mexicans say that violations of human rights by the military 
and the police are a very big problem in the country (Pew Research Center, 2012). In 2011, 85% 
of Mexican surveyed thought that the country was becoming more insecure (Lagos & Dammert, 
2011, p.38). The rhetoric used by the government appeals to this idea, in which violence and 
insecurity are temporary sacrifices that must be endured.
In this context, the importance of this issue in the political agenda results in its de­
politicization. Indeed, securitization limits an issue’s openness to political debate. This is also 
found in several of the discourses of Calderon, particularly after the third year in office, when the 
strategy became more controversial:
Delinquency does not have a political colour and its combat does not 
involve interests of parties: it involves the national interest and the greatest 
demand of the citizens, therefore it is a duty of the State, o f the authority, no 
matter its origin (Calderon, 2008c)
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He argues that narco-trafficking threatens the security of citizens and institutions, and 
given that providing security is the fundamental reason of existence of the state, the war against 
organized crime should not be open for debate. The President refers to the “war against crime” as 
a matter of “national priority” (Calderon, 2010, 2010b, 2012) or as a “national interest” 
(Calderon, 2008).
After this first assessment in which I talk about “how” to speak about security, I now turn 
to the “who” can speak about security and under what conditions and with what effects (Buzan, 
Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.27). This is where the units of analysis and sectors of security 
come into place. This assists in providing a deeper understanding of how the concept of security 
is being used by the government. In the case of Mexico, the majority of the speeches analyzed 
(approximately 93.2%), were made by Felipe Calderon. This was not something specifically 
sought after in this investigation. Rather it resulted because the President’s speeches discussed 
narco-trafficking more substantially, including the government’s strategy and the reasons behind 
it. Meanwhile, other officials would limit their participation to the presentation of results and 
therefore, the discourse did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the particularities of 
securitization. In this context, even though the sample suggests that President Calderon is the 
main securitizing agent, it is important to keep in mind that he is acting on behalf of the 
government. As such, the state’s administrative structures are congruent with the role that 
Calderon is playing - the President is the head of state, the government and the armed forces.
Threat perception is one of the most interesting features in this case study, for even though 
academics, analysts, journalists, and even some politicians talk about “the war against narcos”, in 
reality the government never uses this term. Instead, it talks about “the war against organized 
crime.” In fact, in the speeches the words “narcotraficante” or “cartels” were rarely used and
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instead, the President talked about “criminals” or “organized crime”. This made it harder to 
identify what was being presented as a threat -  the terms were ambiguous, not used 
systematically and changed in relation to events taking place during the administration. At the 
beginning of his, presidency for example, Calderon frequently argued that the main threats were 
narcomenudistas (although he did not use this word as frequently, as he used the word criminals) 
-  those that wanted to “poison the youth” by selling them drugs. Nevertheless, after violence 
started to increase in Mexico, the conception of threat expanded. We see a change from the 
discourse that emphasized the “selling of drugs to youth” to one that emphasized criminal acts 
that “harm the population”, such as kidnapping, robbery and extortion.
In 2010, this idea was incorporated into a more sophisticated account in which the 
President argued that narco-trafficking changed from being a “low profile” criminal activity to 
something that “messed with the people40” (Calderon, 2010, 2010a). Cartels had expanded their 
criminal portfolio under the principle of “economies of scope”, in which going from drug dealing 
to the control of plazas (and the criminal activities taking place in them), was relatively easy. 
Therefore, we assume that the culprits behind the increasing levels of crime are cartels, for they 
control the domain of the plaza. This rhetoric, which almost made it acceptable to engage in 
narcotics trade but at the same time condemned their expansion into other activities, changed 
after a terrorist act in Monterrey in 2011 where more than 50 people lost their lives. After this 
massacre, Calderon openly criticized the cartels and talked about the United States’ 
responsibility in decreasing drug consumption (Calderon, 201 Id). In his last year as President, 
Calderon admitted that Mexico’s problem was not drug addiction but rather the willingness of 
young people to get involved in gangs. This constituted a shift from a threat personified in
40 Literal phrase: “Se empezaron a meter directamente con la gente, con ciudadanos como tu” (Calderon, 2010)
88
narcomenudistas to the cartels (Calderon, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Furthermore, whenever the 
government wished to discuss the results of the strategy, these always involved drug seizures and 
the capture of drug lords. Also, in the speeches of 2009, the President constantly repeated that 
“this war was not only about narco-trafficking” (Calderon, 2009b, 2009c, 2010b). To a degree 
confirms that the threat perception of the audience revolved around narco-trafficking. Therefore, 
although in the speeches the main threat is identified as “organized crime”, an analysis of the 
speeches reveals that implicitly, the cartels are considered as the main threat. Indeed, although 
the Pew Research Centre (2012) found that 73% Mexicans consider that crime is a big problem 
in the country, cartel-related violence yielded an even larger percentage with 75% (Pew Research 
Centre, 2012).
As hinted by the quote that I used at the beginning of this section, the object that is being 
threatened by narco-trafficking is the sovereign state. Nevertheless, in the speeches this 
association is rare, and almost never do we hear this literally. In fact, only 9 speeches of the 44 
made this association. Rather, narco-trafficking is framed as a threat to the citizenry and to the 
state’s institutions, both of which according to the government are understood as parts of the 
state. The threat that narco-trafficking poses is seen as originated within the state. Therefore, 
using the words of Buzan et al., narco-trafficking becomes a military and a political threat that 
compromises the survival of the state, by putting in danger its physical and political integrity.
The physical-military threat is understood in terms of the population, while the political threat is 
understood in terms of its institutions. Threat to the population is the most frequently used 
association, 95% of the speeches reference narco-trafficking as a threat to citizens in some way, 
and nearly 86% made it the dominant object being threatened. Threats to the citizenry were seen 
in the form of physical violence and to a lesser degree, in the form of drug consumption:
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For many years, delinquency, organized crime, insecurity, murders, drug 
consumption, grew until they represented, today, one of the biggest threats to 
Mexico. As a parent, I understand the concern of Mexicans that are afraid that 
their kids are victims of delinquency on their way to school, in parks, and on the 
streets (Calderon, 2007d).
Today, we live a moment in which ... the Nation faces one of the biggest 
challenges in its history: the challenge of insecurity and the threat of crime on 
our society (Calderon, 2012).
Here it could be argued that society at large is the referent object of security, and although 
this may sound similar to the formulation of “societal security”, this is not the case, for narcos do 
not threaten society from this viewpoint for two reasons. First, criminals are not jeopardizing the 
“identity” of a certain group and second, because these groups (of citizens) cannot function 
independently from the state -  these are not organized as a separate community based on 
ethnicity or religion (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.23). Instead, their identity is simply 
seen as “citizens of Mexico” or more accurately, civilians that are not affiliated to criminal 
organizations. Therefore, the threat that criminals pose to civilians is best understood as rooted in 
the military sector, for violence is the existential threat par excellence (Ibid., p.58). In fact, the 
President has referred to as organized crime as the main “threat to human rights in the country” 
(Calderon, 2008a).
In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state and the process of 
securitization is likely to be highly institutionalized (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 22, 
49). This is true in the case of Mexico, for it is the President’s legitimate duty to conduct the 
securitization of the issue (even more so if securitization is understood a priori as a political 
choice). Not only this, but there is an actual employment of the armed forces to confront the 
“threat”, which is congruent with the authors’ view of the military sector: “In practice, the 
military security agenda revolves around the ability of governments to maintain themselves
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against internal and external military threats ... when the perceived threat is internal, military 
security is primarily about the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace and territorial 
integrity” (Ibid., p.50). This is the understanding that the Mexican government has about the 
securitization of narco-trafficking and it echoes Calderon’s justification of his choice to 
securitize, as criminal organizations were becoming a threat to public security (peace) and even 
in some extreme cases, to territorial integrity -  in the regions where narcos exerted a de-facto 
ruling power. In this sense, threatening the citizenry also becomes a threat to the state.
Framing the dealers as a threat because of drug consumption represents a problem. This 
threat is associated with a specific sector of the citizenry: youth. These do not fit any of the 
sectors of security in securitization theory. In fact, it could be argued that it is not really an 
existential threat. This ambiguity has been noted by Jorge Hernandez Tinajero (2012), who has 
argued that “drug consumption problems are the moral basis for a militarized strategy against 
organized crime” (Hernandez Tinajero, 2012, p.57). However, it seems that this link was not 
accepted as a securitizing measure, for the President substantially decreased the use of this 
rhetoric after the second year of government.
The other major theme in the speeches was “narco as a threat to public institutions”. Even 
though this association was mentioned in almost half of the speeches, it was only dominant in 
less than 10%. The way in which criminals threaten institutions is by corrupting them and by 
“creating impunity”. Interestingly, this association was later seen as a threat to the citizens as 
well, for corruption compromised the judicial system, resulting in the failure of the justice 
system to protect the population:
There is no doubt that the advancement of the criminals is explained ... by 
the huge corruption that prevails in security and justice institutions in several 
regions in the country and in different government levels ... in many cases it has 
left society helpless, because those that are in charge for looking after the
citizens’ security, not a few times have been to the service of criminals 
(Calderon, 201 Id).
Associating this discourse with the sectors in securitization theory, narco-trafficking poses 
a political threat. In the theory, this sector concerns non-military threats to sovereignty and is 
about organizational stability of social order (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p.141). In this 
sense, although criminals do not explicitly question recognition, legitimacy, or governing 
authority, that which Buzan et al. (1998) consider characteristics of this sector (Ibid., p.22), they 
do so in an implicit way by corrupting government structures. This, in turn, undermines the 
recognition, legitimacy and authority of the institutions. Although the authors recognize that 
these type of threats can be exerted on political units that are not states, and that there are also 
system-level referents, the heart of this sector is state sovereignty, which is consistent with this 
case.
It should be noted that the discourse also varied according to the audience. The usage of 
the “threat to the institutions” rhetoric increased whenever the audience was made up of 
government officials, as opposed as if it was made up of civilians. Nevertheless, the “threat to 
the population” rhetoric remained dominant in both cases. Also explicitly describing narco­
trafficking as a threat to the state was more commonly used whenever the audience had military 
members in it. However, this was minimal.
In sum, the rhetoric used by the President, framing narco-trafficking as a threat to the 
physical integrity/survival of citizens, as well as a threat to the institutions by its corrupting 
abilities, contribute to the framing of the issue as an internal threat to the state: “enemies are 
those that conspire against institutions, besiege society threatening it and extorting it, those that 
poison the children and that betray the country” (Calderon, 2009). In this sense, narco-trafficking
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is understood as a military threat and to a lesser degree, as a political threat. This is consistent 
with the logic of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), who argue that a state consists of three 
components: idea, physical base, and institutions (Ibid., p. 150). Threats that jeopardize the 
physical base of a state are mostly military, economic, or environmental, while ideas and 
institutions can be jeopardized by political threats (Ibid.).
Although using securitization theory to study the Mexican case does not appear to have 
resulted in adapting or stretching the theory substantially, analyzing the construction of the 
friend/enemy dichotomy represented a bigger challenge. This relates to what Jackson (2006) 
refers to as a “security dichotomy”, which is presented whenever there is a duality of perceptions 
of a security issue - one negative and one positive (Jackson, 2006, p.309). For some of the 
population, drug-trafficking is only a security concern because the government began this 
aggressive campaign. Otherwise, narco-trafficking is not a bad thing. A survey conducted in 
2011 showed that 51% of the interviewees agreed that the strategy was a source of greater 
violence, as opposed to 25% who thought violence remained the same and 18% who thought it 
had decreased. (Buendia & Laredo, 2011, p. 3). Another survey conducted in 2012, revealed that 
27% of the interviewees blamed Calderon for the rise in violence. This was the second largest 
response, after narcotraflcantes, which 33% of the respondents mentioned (Buendia & Laredo, 
2012, p. 2). This was a concern for the government. In fact, after 2010 the President constantly 
addressed this perception and stressed in his speeches that the rise in violence was not caused by 
the government’s strategy:
The critique in Mexico to the government, especially the Federal, is 
intense ... but it should not lead us to omissions in the narrative of the problem, 
in this narrative there is an elemental truth that we cannot lose: the true enemy, 
the threat to society are criminals, not the government, at least not in this case 
(Calderon, 2010c)
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It can be argued that to a certain extent, the “security dichotomy” arises because the 
motivations of drug-traffickers are not clear; they do not particularly aim to attack a specific 
societal group, nor do they seek to replace the state. Although they certainly seek to influence 
institutions for their purposes, this is not different from that of say, big corporations and other 
groups. Furthermore, as I explained in chapter 4, there exists the perception that drug-trafficking 
had taken place in the past (until the Calderon administration) without it necessarily affecting 
civilians directly. In fact, it can be said that there had been a “normalization” of narco­
trafficking and that elements such as the narco-culture, such as the narco-corridos attracted 
certain sectors of the population (Astorga,1995; Campbell, 1997; Cantarell, 2002; Heau and 
Gimenez, 2004; Mendoza Rockwell, 2008; Sanchez-Godoy, 2009).
Being aware of this ambiguity, the government has relied on a rhetoric that seeks to 
construct a negative image of narcos. As I explained earlier, violence and corruption are two 
important themes that contribute to the construction of a threat. Neverthless, in order to construct 
the friend/enemy dichotomy, the government uses ethical arguments in addition to those of 
violence and corruption: “The growth of crime is related to a decay of the social fabric, to a 
society that has, in some cases, less solidity in terms of values and principles, so that it can reject 
crime an illegality” (Calderon, 2008e). As such, one of the most important rhetorical tools to 
differentiate “us” and “them” is morals: “we” (us) have a different set of values than the enemies 
(them), “we” are the decent individuals and not them. The “good Mexicans” are those who are 
interested in the progress of Mexico and safety of all citizens, those whi are concerned about the 
security of their families and are hardworking individuals - they have firm moral values that 
contribute to the rejection of crime as a legitimate or acceptable way to make a living. Sectors of 
the population associated with this group are the Mexican federal government (and to a lesser
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extent, local governments), the citizenry (families in particular), security forces (army and 
policemen), and civil organizations. Each of these has a different role: the federal government, 
for example, is seen as the depositary of the demands of the population and, just like the armed 
forces, as keepers of security and peace in the country. Citizens are seen as those with the right to 
be protected. Still, they are not portrayed as victims and instead, a “moral equivalent of war”, as 
Deudney (1990, p.466) calls it, ensues. In this context, sacrifice is expected from citizens to 
endure these “difficult times” which translate in a rise of violence and casualties. Not only this, 
but it is also expected that the population will change the way it behaves in the political sphere. 
There is a need for “better citizens” and better institutions:
Mexico has a right and demands better policemen, Mexico has a right and 
demands better governments, but also, Mexico has a right and demands better 
parents, a better society, and better citizens that are engaged in dealing with the 
problems that we are having (Calderon, 2007d).
Because there is a belief that the lack of “morals” has contributed to the rise in 
criminality, one of the major changes that the President advocates in his speeches is the need 
for a “better” society, and calls for the rejection of a culture of tolerance and indifference 
towards criminal behavior. This idea is extended to the private sphere in a request for “better 
parents” in order to prevent that youth gets involved in gangs (Calderon, 2010). Meanwhile the 
armed forces play a more active role in confronting the criminals, while the government seeks 
to build better administrative structures to prevent crime. There is a mobilization of the 
population and the government caused by the urgency of this issue. Indeed the President says 
that the “battle for security” will be won with the collaboration of all Mexicans (Calderon, 
2007a).
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The moral rhetoric is most noticeable in enemy perception. The “enemies of Mexico”, a 
phrase that is used in several occasions by Calderon, have a set of anti-values and seek to 
create impunity through corruption. They are only interested in their personal benefit. They are 
presented as greedy, violent, and with no values: “Like cowards, they have even used women 
and children towards their miserable purposes. They act with treason” (Calderon, 2009). 
Criminals are the most obvious party of the enmity group. However, corrupt politicians and 
police forces are also a part of this crew. While violence is used as the main distinction for 
criminals, dishonesty and greed are also major themes for corrupt government officials and 
policemen. In general, the enemies are presented as to have a set of anti-values in which 
acquiring power and money through criminal activity is acceptable:
These kids grow without sufficient axiological baggage (sic) ... they see in the 
powerful, the one with the weapons, with the cars, with the women. And this model 
precisely, of anti-values, if I may, is the one that must be neutralized and that is at the 
bottom of this (delinquency) problem (Calderon, 2010).
In a certain way then, the anti-values of criminals threaten the way of living or the “moral 
identity” of the rest of the population. The way to counter this threat is by changing the way that 
citizens behave and institutions operate. In short, there is a need for better citizens. The 
moralistic speech that was used in threat perception is an extension of the construction of an 
identity of the enemy: an individual with no moral principles that only thinks about their own 
personal benefit.
Table 1 shows a summary of the main terminology used by Calderon to define the “us” and 
“them” groups. In order to provide a more complete understanding of the context in which 
securitization is occurring, the table uses some of the literal terms used by the President. The 
translations to English are done as closest to Spanish as possible, and in some instances, I also
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include terminology used in Spanish. The table includes the main social groups that form “us” 
and “them”, as well as the adjectives, values and actions associated to each.





Citizen-related: Citizens, Mexicanos/Mexicanas, 
“good persons/Mexicans”, “honest workers”, 
“committed citizens” (ciudadanos 
comprometidos), “citizens that do well” 
(ciudadanos de bien), “those who love Mexico and 
want to live in peace”.
Families: Sons/Daughters, children and youth 
(ninos y jovenes), parents.
Collectivities: Community, “the Mexican people” 
(el pueblo Mexicano), society, civil institutions 
(civil organizations).
Government: Army, “guardians of order” 
(referring to police forces), men and women of 
honor, honest police forces (implicit), federal 
government.





“the enemies of Mexico” 
“social cancer”
“criminals with no scruples”
Adjectives Good, honest, hard-workers, committed citizens. 
Brave and loyal army and police men
Violent, terrorists, face of evil 
(rostro de maldad), plague, 
parasites.
Values Civility (civilidad), zero tolerance for corruption, 
respect for the law and institutions.
Anti values of easy money and 
violence. Selfish.
Verbs To fight, to act, to commit, to rescue, “close lines 
to organized crime and impunity”, clean, prevent.
Poison, terrorize, kidnap (the 
future of Mexico), paralyze 
(the government), become the 
authority, extort, defy, 
dominate, assault, attack 
(agredir).
Summarizing, the “us” group, which comprises good citizens, families, the federal
government, and civilian organizations are associated with the values of civility, rejection to 
corruption and hard work. Army and honest police forces in this group are described as loyal and 
brave. The enemies “them”, are formed of criminals (from kidnappers to narcos), drug-addicts, 
corrupt police forces and corrupt authorities. With the exception of drug-addicts, who are seen as
people who need help (before they become criminals), the members in this group are often 
described as “the enemies of Mexico” and as a cancer to society. They are depicted as violent 
with no values, and with selfish motivations. Here, it is interesting to contrast the verbs 
associated to both groups. It is clear that the actions associated with “them” have very negative 
connotations. Meanwhile, the verbs associated with the “us” have almost heroic connotations. 
There is a clear distancing between both groups in every category.
5.3 -  T h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  s e c u r i t i z a t i o n
The securitization of an issue has implications. By conceiving security as a self-referential 
practice, the speech act thus has the power to “enable emergency measures and to (re)order 
sociopolitical relations” (Roe, 2012, p. 254). This concern has been addressed to some extent by 
securitization theorists, who have explored the implications of framing something as a security 
issue. The conception of Ole Waever (1995) and Buzan et al. (1998) of securitization as 
something negative, “as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Buzan, Waver, & de 
Wilde, 1998, p.29), sets the stage for a debate in which the negative aspects of securitization are 
contrasted against the positive. Authors such as Deudney (1990) and Stefan Elbe (2007), for 
example, have warned about the undesirable outcomes of treating the environment and AIDS as 
security concerns. Although both recognize the benefits of an increased interest in the issues 
should these be securitized, this thinking comes with detrimental implications such as short- 
termed strategies and the moving away of the issue from civil society.
In a more theoretical approach, Claudia Aradau (2004) recognizes the benign mobilization 
of attention and funds that securitization brings, but also points to “an exceptionalism that is 
unsettling for democratic politics” (Aradau, 2004, p.406). Ardau (2004) points to a possible 
institutionalization of fast-track decision making and to the complications derived from the
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exclusionary logic of security (Ibid.). This latter point is particularly important, for it draws in 
the Schmittian logic, where securitization results in a zero-sum game in which there are always 
winners and losers (Roe, 2012, p. 253).41 Aradau (2004) is skeptical about the ability to create 
security for everybody (Aradau, 2004, pp.397-400) in the terms privileged by the Welsh school. 
Her thinking is contested by others such as Paul Roe (2012) and Rita Floyd (2007; 2010), who 
believe in a more positive outlook, in which cooperative practices reveal largely exaggerated 
accounts of the harms of securitization (Roe, 2012, pp.252)42. Although the normative debate on 
securitization is beyond the objectives of this paper, this section does seek to explore some of the 
consequences that result from making narco-trafficking a security issue. In this particular case, 
the concerns are classified in two areas which divide this section: public policy and government 
procedures.
In the first part of this section, I test my initial hypothesis that argues that constructing a 
friend/enemy dichotomy leads public policy towards more punitive approaches to the “other”. 
This translates into a prevalence of enforcement over social policy. As a way to approve or reject 
this idea, I examine Calderon’s public policy platform on the issue of security and I identify the 
most frequently cited public policy measures in the speeches. This is complemented by the 
analysis of the security budget of the administration. The second part of this section concerns the 
use of the “us versus them” rhetoric to limit government’s accountability. Indeed, as Roe (2012) 
argues, securitization calls for “silence and speed ... and scrutiny is not really desirable” (Roe,
41 This sharply contrasts with the Welsh school’s vision of “security as emancipation”. In this context, a question 
posed by Aradau (2004) is relevant: can emancipation (security as emancipation) be at anybody’s expense? (Aradau, 
2004, p.401)
42 Aradau’s work is contested by these two authors. Roe (2012) draws on examples of the British parliament to 
argue that “extraordinary politics ... does not mean an abandonment of legislative mechanisms ... the degree of 
scrutiny and oversight nevertheless remains” (Roe, 2012, p.260). Floyd (2007) argues that any judgement over the 
positiveness/negativeness of the employing extraordinary politics is issue dependent, for in some cases in which the 
security of the many over the few prevails, it is possible to talk about positive securitization (Floyd, 2007, p.328).
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2012, p.252). This is noticeable in regards to the deaths of civilians in the country. Many 
grieving Mexicans, as Randal C. Archibold (2012) notes “must also grapple with suspicion from 
those who wonder if the victims were asking for trouble and if their relatives might be outlaws, 
too... there is no breakdown of how many of the victims were innocent” (Archibold, 2012, 
p.A6). The government has frequently dismissed deaths by saying that the victims had dealings 
with criminals therefore, transforming them into a sort of accomplice. The government has used 
the otherness o f  criminals to try to cover the collateral damage of the war. In this sense, Aradau’s 
logic prevails, for the security is rooted in an exclusionary logic (Aradau, 2004, p.400).
5.2.3 -  T he  n e g l e c t  o f  so c ia l  a p p r o a c h e s
The most frequently discussed topic in Calderon’s speeches regarding policy had to do 
with police forces, followed by social approaches, while army and military matters were the least 
discussed. Table 1 provides with a summary of the main themes by order of importance:
Table 2 -  Policy in speeches by order of importance43
Police Social Army/Military Other
Primary theme 13 6 9 15
Secondary theme 8 4 3 8
Third theme 2 7 4 1
Total 23 17 16 24
*
*) Detail of “other”: Justice/Legal System (15); Institutional/Administrative (5);
Bilateral cooperation (3); Intelligence (1)._______________________________
It should be noted that because the majority of the speeches discussed several government
policies simultaneously, I coded them based on three levels of importance, where the “primary
43 The “primary theme” line does not add up to 44 because one speech did not discuss policy.
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theme” represents the topic that is discussed more substantially or thoroughly within the speech, 
followed by the second and third. The totals are calculated by simply adding the times a 
particular theme was discussed in the 44 speeches. This reveals the preeminence of police 
oriented policy and the emergence of a fourth major topic that was not contemplated in the 
original coding sheet: transformations44 to the judicial/legal system. The first theme is the only 
one that numerically stands apart from the group, while social approaches, military policy, and 
judicial/legal system reform are very close together. The frequency in which the topics were 
spoken reveals that the speeches were very enforcement oriented -  social policy is the only 
theme from the four that does not represent an enforcement type of response to narco-trafficking.
The first theme, police forces, refers to the need for improvements to this institution. The 
President talks about the necessity of modernization of the force’s equipment, training, and the 
implementation of trust control tests to eliminate corruption. This is very closely related to the 
fourth major theme, the need for transformations in the judicial system. This theme (judicial 
system) has to do with administrative and institutional changes in the state’s structures and the 
President’s hope for some reforms to be approved by the Congress. In a certain way, these first 
two themes complement each other and contribute to Calderon’s call to build a “culture of 
legality”: “Only by generating a new culture of legality and respect to others, we can build a 
Mexico where fundamental rights are respected” (Calderon, 2009a). This is related to the moral 
discourse explained above as it is a way of becoming “better citizens” and a “better 
government”. When the President talked about public policy on these two topics, the major issue
44 Here, I use the word “transformations” because “reforms” has a specific connotation in Mexican politics. Reforms 
is used whenever modifications to the Constitution are made. Transformations refer to administrative changes that 
are not only confined to legal change.
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was is the corruption of policemen and to a lesser degree, justice officials. He argues that these 
two institutions are not fulfilling their task of protecting the citizens.
Regarding social policy, there were three main components which represented the 
government’s social approach of the war against crime: “Safe School”, the “Rehabilitation of 
Public Spaces”, and “Addiction Prevention” (Calderon, 2007d). According to the speeches,
“Safe School” consisted of preventing drugs and weapons from entering public schools, while 
the “Rehabilitation of Public Spaces” was mostly devoted to the upgrading of public parks 
(Calderon, 2007d, 2008e, 2008c, 2009b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). The most mentioned feature of 
this platform was the drug rehabilitation programs (Calderon, 2007b, 2007d, 2009b, 201 lc, 
2012a, 2012c). Interestingly, however, the social policy mentioned in the speeches changed 
throughout the administration. At the beginning of Calderon’s government, for example, the 
President emphasized the prevention of drug addiction. But this was not emphasized towards the 
end of his administration. Instead, he admitted that there was not much of a drug problem in 
Mexico, and talked more frequently about the importance of “creating (economic and work) 
opportunities” so that young people do not become easy recruits for the cartels (Calderon, 2010c, 
2010g, 2012b,2012c). Yet, the link between youth and crime was mentioned for the first time in 
October 2010. Therefore, the speeches slowly incorporated the creation of “opportunities” as a 
topic in social policy, although it seemed rather improvised as there was no specific program that 
tackled recruitment to criminal organizations.
The least discussed policy was military strategy. This is surprising given that in the 
speeches, whenever results of the “war against crime” were being presented, these usually 
involved either crop eradication or the capture of cartel leaders, both of which that were carried
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out by the army.45 The “silence” on strategies lead by the army has some likely explanations.
First, the use of this institution was somewhat controversial, as it is not common for this group to 
play a major political role When the President talked to the Commission of Human Rights or 
other civil organizations, for example, he emphasized the use of the army as a temporary 
measure, and its employment in a very cautious way (Calderon, 2008a, 2009a). Also, because 
Mexico sees itself as a democratic and modem state, focusing the strategy completely on this 
institution is incompatible with this worldview. Still, contrary to the discourse regarding police 
forces, the armed forces are always presented as brave and loyal: “.. .soldiers of the Homeland, 
army of brave men and women, supported by their love to Mexico and by the recognition of a 
whole society, which overwhelmingly condemns the action of criminals and applauds the 
Mexican Army” (Calderon, 2009). Regarding the discussion of policy itself, there is not much 
besides the rise of wages for soldiers and the acquiring of new technology and equipment. The 
President does not discuss strategies and only mentions the army’s role as the protector of state 
security.
In order to reveal if the speech changes according to the audience, I took the primary theme 
and broke it down according to the addressees. The audience can be labeled as: media/public, 
civil organizations, government, elite/exclusive, army, and public event (see table 3).46
45 For purposes of this analysis presenting “results” did not constitute a ‘policy’ in my coding sheet.
46 The first refers to messages that were usually televised and had as an audience the whole country. Typical 
speeches in this context are the Presidential annual reports or special communiques. I use the label civil 
organizations for bodies such as the Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) or other national and international non 
government organizations. Typical speeches whenever I used the government label were usually delivered in events 
such a summit of governors or a special conference on a topic. The “elite/exclusive” label was used whenever the 
audience was made up of members with a diverse background, such as government, civil organizations, or 
academics and important businessmen, for example. The army label is quite explicit and lastly, by “public event” 
this usually implies a non-specialized audience. Speeches in this label usually are the inauguration of a park or plaza 
to which civilians attend.
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Media/Public 4 3 5 1 2
Civil
organizations 4 1 2 1 0 Money laundering (1)





Elite/Exclusive 1 1 1 2 0
Army 0 fjBaa 0 0 0
Public Event
r
jM am fcl 0 0 1 0
Total 13 9 9 6 3 4
The analysis reveals two important features. Because it deals with the primary theme of the 
speeches, it provides us with a better idea of what issues were considered the most important. 
Indeed, the ranking of the most mentioned theme differs from the last table, which took into 
consideration the secondary and tertiary themes. Even though police inspired policy remained in 
the top spot, social approaches for example, decreased in importance. Meanwhile the 
justice/legal aspect of public policy was mentioned as much as military approaches. Still, it is 
important to note that a large part of military references were done in a military context, while 
the judicial/legal approach was more evenly distributed. This means, that the judicial/legal 
approach had more references in different audiences. Also, the justice/legality theme was the 
more frequently quoted policy in the speeches that had a broader audience (media/public).
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Therefore, this theme can be considered as a more important theme in general. Regarding the 
social approaches, these were only the most mentioned policy with the audience that was 
convened in two annual “International Day Against the Trafficking and Use of Illicit Drugs” 
(Calderon, 2011c, 2012c).
The exercise of public policy is quite similar to the ranking of policy in the speeches. More 
importantly, it confirms the priority of narco-trafficking on the federal government agenda. The 
costs of enforcement, together with prosecution costs, mounted to an average of 1% of the 
annual GDP during the Calderon administration. This is a considerable amount, if we take into 
consideration that the largest expenditure of the government- education, represented 1.6% 
(Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Publicas [CEFP], 2012, p.41). The majority of the funds that 
the federal government spent in the war against organized crime were channeled through the 
administrative functions of “defense of national security” and the “keeping of public security”. 
The army, the navy, and the federal police, all of which play an active role in the war against 
narco-trafficking, are administratively attached to these functions. In fact, these agencies were 
the largest spenders in the security budget. Meanwhile the social platform “Clean Mexico”, 
represented one of the smallest percentages of the total, (see table 4).
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Table 4- Security budget and spending on social policy to prevent crime during the government of Felipe 
Calderdn
Defense of 
National + Public 
Security
Prosecution 






“Clean Mexico” (Safe SchooH- 











% of total 
enforcement
2007 64,327.00 0.6 43417.3 0.3 1077443 0.90 900.00 162% 0.8%
2008 68,689.78 0.6 45998.5 0.3 114688.3 0.92 2,359.76 4% 2.1%
2009 93,367.57 0.8 47869.7 0.4 1412373 1.10 2,460.48 37% 1.7%
2010 86,428.98 0.6 48613.7 0.3 135042.7 0.97 3,371.40 -23% 2.5%
2011 102,856.49 0.7 51095.5 0.3 153952.0 1.08 2,587.81 2% 1.7%









816882.3 1.00 14,308.48 1.7%(Average)
Source: Diana Blanco with information from CEFP (2012), ICESO (2011), PEF (2011), PEF (2012), Reyes Tepach
(2012).
The costs of enforcement consisted of an average of 0.7% of the GDP, amounting to more 
than 500 billion pesos. Of that amount, 61% was spent in tasks aimed at to protecting national 
security and 39% in public security. Spending on national security, which amounted to more than 
300 billion pesos, was divided into several agencies: the Army, the Navy, the Interior Secretariat 
(Secretaria de Gobemacion -  SEGOB) and the Presidency of Mexico (Presidencia de la 
Republica). The army and the navy embodied the largest spenders, using 68.7% and 26% of the 
budget respectively (Flores, 2011). Meanwhile, the budget of the Secretariat of Public Security 
(Secretaria de Seguridad Publica -  SSP), which is in charge of the Federal Police, averaged an 
annual spending of about 0.23% of the national GDP (CEFP, 2012, p.87). Although this is less 
than that which was spent in national security, it is worth noting that the SSP budget increased
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substantially in the Calderon administration, registering a 127.2% raise in the 2006-2008 period 
(CEFP, 2008, p.31).
The public security strategy had two main objectives: to gain public legitimacy and 
recognition for police forces in Mexico, and to implement “Clean Mexico” as a crime prevention 
strategy (Diario Oficial de la Federation [DOF], 2008, p. 15). The first objective was exercised 
through the SSP, which devoted 54% of its annual budget to this task, an average of 18.6 billion 
pesos a year. Meanwhile, the second objective fell under the purview and budget of three 
different government agencies: the Secretariat of Health (SALUD), Education (SEP), and Social 
Development (SEDESOL). Each secretariat was in charge of one of the three main programs 
that made up “Clean Mexico”: “Safe School”, “Rescue of Public Spaces”, and “Addiction 
Prevention”. The strategy sought to prevent crime by strengthening citizen participation and 
promoting a “culture of legality” (DOF, 2008, p. 16). According to the government this was 
necessary because “crime is fed by a social context in which there is a lack of jobs and 
opportunities, social inequality, the lack of trust in authorities, loss of public spaces, family and 
community disintegration, and family violence” (Ibid., p. 15). Supposing that this idea represents 
an assessment of the government about the reasons that propitiate crime in the country, there was 
not a program designed to tackle the “lack of jobs and opportunities, and social inequalities” in 
the security platform. In fact, during the last years of the administration, Calderon quoted some 
economic programs as part of the strategy of crime prevention. However, these were not 
considered as part of the official strategy, which only consisted of the three abovementioned 
programs. Still, although crime prevention was in theory an important objective for the 
government, the total spending of the “Clean Mexico” initiative for the six years, $14.3 billion,
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was less than the average annual budget for police forces. In fact, it represented an average of 
1.7% of the total enforcement and prosecution budget.
In summary, the analysis of policy does indeed reveal an emphasis on enforcement and the 
neglect of social approaches to narco-trafficking. This was seen in both the speeches and in the 
public spending. In the speeches, this was especially noticeable when the “primary theme”, the 
most frequently and thorough theme in the speech, was analyzed. In that case, social approaches 
were the least discussed topic, just before “bilateral cooperation” (see table 2). In the speeches, 
the overall dominant subject is the necessity to make police forces a reliable institution, which is 
congruent with the public security platform (planning) and with spending. The federal budget 
revealed that this institution is a major source of spending, monopolizing the majority of the 
budget of the SSP.
Despite being the second major objective of the public security strategy, the “Clean 
Mexico” initiative did not represent a major source of spending in the federal budget. This is 
congruent with the speeches, in which social approaches were not a dominant theme. The neglect 
of social policy is even more noticeable if spending in the military is considered. This latter point 
reveals an interesting turn in the rhetoric-budget relationship, because the army was the largest 
source of spending in the security budget for the government while not being frequently 
mentioned in the speeches as a major policy strategy. A plausible reason for this is revealed if 
we analyze the frequency of topics discussed according to the audience. Military strategies were 
mostly discussed amongst members of the army and not with other audiences, as using the army 
in counter-narcotics operations had a rather negative connotation. Although Mexicans have in 
general a good image of the army, particularly when contrasted with the police (Pew Research 
Center, 2012; Latinobarometro, 2013), the citizenry sees Mexico as a state with a tradition of
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civilian governments, and is fearful of the army taking too much power. In democratic 
governments, the operating ways of the army are frequently seen as secretive, highly hierarchical 
and centralized (Deudney, 1990, p.465). Mexico is no exception to this.
5.2.4 - U se o f  r h eto r ic  t o  l im it  g o v e r n m e n t ’s a c c o u n t a b il it y
The casualties of the “war on crime” have been one if not the most controversial aspects of 
the Calderon administration. Not only has the toll been high, but there are also doubts about the 
identity of the victims. Often those that died were suspected to have dealings with criminals, and 
the majority of deaths were written off as part of drug related violence (Archibold, 2012). 
However, the population eventually grew suspicious of these accusations as evidence of the 
manipulation of information emerged. In this area, two events in particular were quite notorious, 
for they involved the deaths of students who were initially portrayed as criminals. In the first, the 
President himself rushed in making accusations and created a great deal of controversy. The 
second case points to the manipulation of the incident by government agencies.
The first event took place in Ciudad Juarez, in a neighborhood called Villas de Salvarcar. 
On January 31, 2010, a squad of armed men attacked a house where young men and women 
were attending a party. Eighteen of the attendees were killed. The president, who at the time was 
touring Japan, issued an initial statement where he declared that the victims were “gang 
members” (Villalpando, 2010). After various protests from family members, the government 
realized that the victims were not gang affiliated. The administration attempted to contain the 
controversy. Both the Interior Secretary and the President travelled to Juarez, where they met 
with the parents of the deceased (Ibid.). In a public event, the mother of one of the victims 
directly addressed Calderon and demanded that the culprits to be found (CNN Mexico, 2012).
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Also, the families of the victims demanded an apology for the false accusations made by the 
government. After the tragedy, several protests took place in the city in which the citizens of 
Juarez demanded that no “scapegoats” would be blamed. They also made public their distress 
with the violence in Juarez (CNN Mexico, 2010). This resulted in the implementation of the 
strategy “We Are Juarez” (Todos Somos Juarez), a multidimensional strategy to decrease 
insecurity in the city.
Later that year, another controversy that revealed the manipulation of terminology by the 
government took place. On March 19, 2010, a gun battle took place between the Mexican army 
and an armed group of individuals near the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher 
Education (ITESM), a privately owned university in Monterrey. The shooting resulted in two 
casualties, who according to members of the Army, were hit men belonging to a criminal 
organization. According to the Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA), both men were riding the 
truck being chased, and shot the officials. The ballistics investigation reported that both victims 
were fatally wounded by the type of bullets used by the army. For the next two days, several 
news media reported on this event confirming the identity of the victims as criminals. 
Nevertheless, on March 22, the president of ITESM reported that the victims were in fact two 
graduate students: Javier Francisco Arredondo and Jorge Antonio Mercado. According to the 
president of the university, who had initially confirmed the identity of the men as criminals on 
previous days, erroneous information had been provided to him by the state’s attorney general 
and members of the army (El Universal, 2010; Milenio, 2010). Indeed, the National Commission 
of Human Rights (CNDH) also noted that the Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA) had provided 
the organization with a report in which it confirmed the identity of the victims as criminals. More 
importantly, in its investigation the CNDH compiled evidence that pointed to the alteration of the
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crime scene by government authorities in order to make Arredondo and Mercado appear like 
criminals. In this report, the CNDH noted that the State’s Attorney Office, the Attorney General, 
and the Attorney General of Military Justice were uncooperative and made research difficult, 
banning or censoring information about the case (CNDH, 2010, p.l). This organization noted 
that the victim’s bodies were moved and that their student IDs and a backpack were apparently 
removed from the scene. Also, guns were planted in their belongings. In addition, the security 
camera that shot footage where the students were dead was destroyed by the army, and video 
tapes from nearby cameras were confiscated (Ibid).
By turning civilian deaths into criminal casualties, the government attempted to nunimize 
the perceived errors in the operation of the strategy. Civilian deaths suggest that the government 
is ineffective providing security and instead, is creating more insecurity. However, if the victims 
are criminals, the enemies, the strategy is being effective. In both of these cases, the Mexican 
government tried to remain within the acceptable domain of “extreme measures” by 
manipulating information. If innocent people begin to die, the sacrifices that the population has 
to endure are greater than the threat itself, which is likely to cause securitization to fail. As 
evidenced by the polls quoted earlier, although the population supports the initiatives of 
Calderon, it also recognizes that security has increased and that this is a pressing concern. 
Evidence of this perception is seen in the speeches where the President seeks to tackle the image 
of the government as a source of insecurity. More importantly, by attacking the “enemy” and 
thus being effective in the strategy, the government does not feel the need to account for its 
actions. It was just doing what it was supposed to do.
This thinking is dangerous because it may have unwanted consequences in government 
procedures and structures. Indeed, scholars have argued that the exceptionalism that
securitization calls for can be unsettling for democratic politics (Aradau, 2004, p.406), as it 
represents a disruption of an open and accountable government (Roe, 2012, p.252). In the case of 
Mexico, hindering accountability can undermine civil liberties and human rights (Elbe, 2006, 
p. 120). In fact, as the Pew Centre revealed, this is already an important concern for Mexicans. 
Also, as Elbe (2006) and the Paris school point out (Bigo, 2000, 2002; Buzan & Hansen, 2009), 
security tends to be pushed to the hands of the security professionals. Neverthless, the procedures 
of security professionals tend to be a lot more secretive than the workings of other government 
institutions. In the case of Mexico, how these work is looked upon with a great deal of cynicism: 
the majority of the population professes little or no trust in the police. This has not changed since 
the 1990s (Latinobarometro, 2013). Therefore, in Mexico at least, this is not a desirable outcome. 
In sum, the two cases presented above showcase the abuse of the threat and enemy perception for 
political purposes. Theoretically then, the Mexican case leads to an interesting dilemma for the 
Copenhagen School, in which the theory’s analytical value is met with skepticism about its 
normative value (the desirability of securitization).
5 .4  - C o n c l u s io n s
The main objective of this chapter was to demonstrate that narco-trafficking was 
securitized during the Calderon administration, to describe how it had been done and discuss 
some of its implications. A first step to do this was to demonstrate that although this issue has 
been important in the Mexican political agenda for the last thirty years, it had never been 
securitized before. I concluded the first section of this chapter by saying that although the link 
between narco-trafficking and security had been asserted by previous presidents it had never 
been acted upon. Departing from this point, I present the results of the investigation by linking 
them to each of the research stages set out in chapter three.
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The first stage refers to the analysis of the speeches in order to determine how 
securitization takes place. The initial way to do this is to confirm that the internal structure of the 
speeches fulfilled the requirements for securitization. Indeed, narco-trafficking is presented as a 
threat that jeopardizes survival of the state and that calls for priority o f action. As well, the 
speeches allowed for an almost literal reading and application of the elements stated in 
securitization theory. The discourse analysis revealed that the President is the main securitizing 
agent, although he is acting in behalf of the government. This is compatible with its role as head 
of state, government and the armed forces. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the use of the 
terminology is somewhat ambiguous: narco-trafficking, narcotraficantes, and the cartels are 
rarely mentioned in the speeches. The President uses “criminals” and “organized crime” instead. 
Despite the frequent assertion that the war was not only against narcos, the perception of these as 
the main threat is confirmed by opinion polls (Buendia & Laredo, 2012; Pew Research Centre, 
2012). Polls also show that the majority of Mexicans supported the strategy (Pew Research 
Centre 2012), which is seen as indicator of successful securitization. The referent object in this 
case is the state. Yet, the risk that narco-trafficking poses to the state was understood in terms of 
its threat to other elements that comprise it: to the physical integrity/survival of citizens, as well 
as to the institutions by its corrupting abilities. In this sense, narco-trafficking represents a 
military and a political threat. Figure 5 presents a summary of the way in which threats are 
perceived in the speeches.
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Apart from “threat perception”, an important element in the speeches is the creation of an 
“us versus them” mentality. Citizens, families, the federal government and honest security 
forces formed the “us” group. Criminals, corrupt police men and government officials were seen 
as enemies. According to Calderon, criminals sought to poison the youth with drugs, terrorize the 
citizenship and impose their own law. Apart from this, Calderon used moralistic arguments to 
justify the war against crime. In the speeches, the main difference between the “good citizens” 
and the “enemies of Mexico” were the commitment of the first to positive values, such as 
honesty and hard work. Meanwhile, the others followed a set of anti-values. It is likely that 
Calderon used ethical arguments as the basis of his discourse because it is hard to pin down the 
identity of narcos, since these groups have neither a particular agenda nor a distinctive identity 
that contrasts with the rest of the population.
114
A second main purpose of this chapter was to talk about the consequences of the 
securitization of narco-trafficking. I hypothesized that thinking in terms of exclusionary politics 
(us versus them) could result in the prevalence of enforcement approaches and the neglect of 
social responses to narco-trafficking. I tested this idea through speech and budget analysis. This 
corresponds to the second research stage set out in chapter three. Indeed, the discourse analysis 
revealed a prevalence of enforcement related policy in the speeches, with police related measures 
being the most frequently mentioned. Meanwhile, while social approaches were the second most 
frequent mention when all references to policy are quantified, they plummet if the analysis is 
limited to the single most important policy in the speeches. This trend is equated in the public 
budget: the social strategy represents a mere 1.7% of the spending in enforcement. Army related 
policy, which was rarely mentioned other than with military audiences, is the largest expenditure 
in the security budget. This paints a curious scenario: although the President uses a moralistic 
discourse, the social platform is neither important in the speeches nor the budget. This is noted 
by Hernandez Tinajero (2012):“The moralism has strange effects: drug consumption problems 
are the moral basis for a militarized strategy against organized crime, a strategy that does not 
care about people’s health, human rights or other collateral damage like corruption, money 
laundering or even the judicial process” (Hernandez Tinajero, 2012, p.58)
This takes me to the last point of my research, in which I argue that the government has 
used the “us versus them” mentality to its benefit. The cases of Villas de Salvarcar and ITESM 
show how the government sought to cover up civilian deaths by saying that the victims were 
criminals. By doing so, the government attempted to minimize the perceived errors in the 
operation of the strategy. This was important considering the widely diffused image of the 
government as a source of the wave of violence as opposed to narco-trafficking itself. This last
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point is inserted in a broader debate about the normative value of securitization and whether it is 
desirable. I identify two possible negative consequences of securitizing narco-trafficking in 
Mexico. The first relates to Elbe’s (2006) concern about pushing responses away from a 
particular sector to other, which in this case may be the military and the police. These operate 
more hermetically than civilian institutions, which lead to a second issue: the power to override 
human rights and civil liberties (Elbe, 2006, p. 120). Indeed, the CNDH notes that there has been 
a 300% increase in the number of human rights complaints in the territories where the military is 
on the ground (Hernandez Tinajero, 2012, p.60). As a relatively new democracy, it is paramount 
for Mexico to understand some of the implications that securitization has both in the formulation 
and conduction of public policy as well as in government structures and procedures.
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C h a p t e r  6 : C o n c l u s io n s
This thesis applied the Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s (1998) securitization framework to 
study narco-trafficking in Mexico during the government of Felipe Calderon. By using discourse 
and content analysis, this thesis finds that the government securitized this issue by using a 
rhetoric that emphasized the “moral otherness” of criminals. This resulted in the neglect of social 
approaches to combat drug-trafficking, and in the use of this discourse to limit government’s 
accountability regarding the high number of casualties in Mexico.
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the main findings of this thesis and to reflect 
about the contributions of this investigation. Above all, I discuss this thesis’ practical and 
theoretical value and suggest areas of further research. This chapter is divided into two main 
sections. In the first section, I summarize the most relevant aspects of the literature review and 
list the main findings of the speech and discourse analysis. In the second section, I discuss the 
thesis’ theoretical and practical value. I begin by assessing some of the contributions that 
securitization theory can bring to the study illegal narcotics trade. Afterwards, I suggest areas of 
further research that would contribute to make securitization more applicable to case studies of 
illegal drug trade. I conclude by talking about the contributions of this thesis in a real-life context 
and why it is important to study this topic.
6.1  -  D is c u s s io n  a n d  s u m m a r y  o n  f in d in g s
In this thesis, I used securitization theory to study narco-trafficking in an attempt to 
overcome key omissions in the academic literature that studies this topic. By bringing together 
elements from realist theory and constructivism, securitization theory allows us to take the
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research on narco-trafficking in new directions. In this thesis, I argued that previous theoretical 
approaches frame the international development issues related to narco-trafficking through the 
optics of the threatened states. This means that the study of narco-trafficking has been done 
mostly through the eyes of states with a drug-consuming problem.
As one of the strongest voices behind the majority of international drug control initiatives, 
the United States has been a major influence in policy making (Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Woodwis, 
2003; Carstairs, 2006; Crick, 2012), and in the study of the illegal narcotics trade. Indeed, the 
first works on this topic surfaced in this country during the 1980s (Craig 1980, 1980a; Lupsha, 
1981, Carpenter, 1985; Bagley, 1988, 1988a; Sharpe, 1988; van Wert, 1988). Today, the US 
remains a major centre for the study of illegal drug trade. Taking this into consideration, it is not 
surprising to see that during the 1980s and the most part of the 1990s, narco-trafficking was 
approached as an external threat to the state. Cutting the supply of drugs was seen as an 
imperative to achieve international peace and security. With almost no discussion of theoretical 
standpoints to explore the issue, the literature remained policy-oriented. It is likely that one of 
the most important challenges for the creation of a more sophisticated theoretical framework to 
study this issue is the difference between the experience of drug-consuming and drug-producing 
countries (Griffith, 1994). Attempts to transcend this dichotomy dining the second half of the 
1990s resulted in the framing of illegal drug trade as a threat to international peace and security 
(Crick, 2012, p.407). Yet, this did not contribute substantially to change the original framing of 
the issue. Indeed, the majority of the literature remains state centric, policy-oriented and rooted 
in the perspectives of the “threatened” states.
Taking this into consideration, this thesis sought to use a more critical approach to study 
narco-trafficking in Mexico. By using securitization theory to study the illegal drug trade, I
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sought to explore the issue through a perspective that remained more sensitive to the experiences 
of drug-producing states and to raise awareness of the “grey areas” in the narcotics and security 
studies literature. This thesis sought to answer the following questions: How and why has narco- 
trafficking been securitized in Mexico during the administration of Felipe Calderon? What have 
been the consequences of this securitization? By using discourse and content analysis to answer 
these questions, I argued that the government of Felipe Calderon had securitized narco- 
trafficking (in Mexico) by using a rhetoric that emphasized the “moral otherness” of criminals. 
This resulted in two important consequences: The neglect of social approaches to combat drug- 
trafficking, and the use of this discourse to limit the government’s accountability regarding the 
high number of casualties in Mexico.
Central to this hypothesis is the assumption that even though other Presidents had framed 
narco-trafficking as a threat to national security in the past, it had never been securitized. The 
relationship between the illegal drug trade and national security in Mexico was ambiguous and 
evidence suggests that the government may have used this rhetoric because of its foreign policy 
obligations with the United States47. More important, securitization does not take place only by 
talking about security. Securitization also involves the adoption of exceptional measures to deal 
with the issue, and their acceptance by the audience. This was not done in any previous 
administrations. Even though previous governments did adopt several anti-narcotics measures, 
there was no sustained effort and anti-narcotics measures were not a priority. The Calderon,
47 The anti-drug policy of previous Presidents did not constitute a sustained nor coherent effort. Rather, it seems that 
Mexico would step up anti-narcotics operations whenever Washington pressured Mexican politicians to do so. 
Evidence of this is found in the 1970s anti-drug “campafia” implemented in Mexico (Operation Condor), during 
which the Mexican government had been under enormous pressure of the Nixon administration. By the end of this 
decade however, the efforts of the Mexican government wore off. During the second half of the 1980s, pressure 
from the Reagan administrations and the assassination of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 1985, lead president 
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) to frame the issue as a security concern in 1987. Yet, this was merely a discursive 
exercise for there were no substantial operations to back up these claims. The same was also true during the Salinas 
(1988-1994) administration. The bargaining tool of the US in the case of Salinas were NAFTA negotiations.
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government however, did make the “combat48 against organized crime” one of its formal 
priorities. The first indicator of the preeminence of this issue on the agenda is revealed by 
looking at the National Development Plan. In it, we can find a section that is devoted in its 
entirety to the diagnosis of “organized crime” and to discuss the strategies that the government 
would follow to weaken it.
The discourse and content analysis revealed that the government of Felipe Calder6n was 
able to successfully securitize narco-trafficking. Surveys show that the majority of Mexicans 
supported the strategy adopted by Calderon. In 2012, 80% of Mexicans interviewed said they 
supported the use of the army to fight traffickers (Pew Research Centre, 2012). This number had 
been relatively stable since 2009 (Pew Research Centre, 2011). The President acted as the main 
securitizing agent, but it can be argued that he was acting on behalf of the government, since he 
is the head of state, government and the armed forces. Calderon framed narco-trafficking as a 
threat that jeopardized the “viability of the state”. He explicitly said on several occasions that 
repelling the cartels was urgent and a matter of “national priority”. It should be noted, however, 
that the use of the terminology to describe threats is somewhat ambiguous. Rather than explicitly 
framing narco-trafficking as a threat, the President uses the term “organized crime” instead. 
Implicitly however, the speeches pointed to the cartels as the main source of violence and 
corruption. In fact, despite explicitly saying that the war was not only against narcos, the 
perception of these as the main threat is confirmed by opinion polls (Buendia & Laredo, 2012; 
Pew Research Centre, 2012). In any case, narco-trafficking was framed as a military and a 
political threat to the state. It represented a military threat because it compromised the physical 
part of the country. A literal reading of this, which was used frequently by Mexican politicians
48 Phrase used in Spanish: “combate al crimen organizado”.
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before Fox, were national borders. Nevertheless, Calderon did not see the trespassing of 
Mexican borders as the main threat to the state by narco-trafficking, and instead he stressed the 
threat that the cartels and criminals posed to the physical integrity of the population. In fact, this 
was the most frequently mentioned motive in the speeches. Quoting Buzan, Waever and de 
Wilde (1998), “violence is the existential threat par excellence ” (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 
1998, p.58), and the government was aware of it. Aside from framing this issue as a military 
threat, the President stressed that by “creating impunity”49 drug dealers hindered the political 
structures of Mexico, specifically, the judicial system. This, in turn, damaged citizens because 
these institutions did not work to their benefit. In sum, although the emphasis on individuals may 
suggest that society is the referent object, individuals are in fact understood as part of the state.
An important component of this this was the discussion of the way securitization theory 
relates to Schmittian politics. For Carl Schmitt, a legal theorist whose works are related with 
political realism, the political is defined by the dichotomy friend/enemy. The political “we” of an 
entity exists when confronted with an enemy where survival is at stake (Williams, 2003, p.517). 
Thus, we can say that securitization takes some of these elements as it emphasizes the 
construction and confrontation of threats and enemies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.212). The 
separation between “us” and the “other” plays an important role in this theory, and it is assumed 
that this distinction is clear and accepted by the audience. Otherwise, the element will fail to be 
securitized. The process by which the government created an “us versus them” mentality was 
one of the most important features of this case. Because of the ambiguous attitudes that exist 
towards narco-trafficking in Mexico, creating a collective mentality in which narcos were 
considered enemies represented a challenge. The illegal drug trade had long existed in the
49 Phrase in Spanish: “creando impunidad” -  it implies that criminals seek to corrupt structures to not have the law 
applied to them.
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country without violence reaching the levels it did during the Calderon administration. This 
remained in the collective mentality of a large part of the population, and many Mexicans 
blamed the government and not the narcos themselves for the rise in violence. Moreover, drug 
dealers do not possess discernible characteristics or pursue a specific agenda that targets a 
particular sector of the population. In fact, a survey conducted in 2011 showed that 51 % of the 
interviewees agreed that the strategy was a source for greater violence (Buendia & Laredo, 2011, 
p.3). Indeed the government was aware about these attitudes and explicitly argued that the 
government was not the enemy, but criminals (Calderon, 2010c).
The government attempted to differentiate the “us” and “them” by using a moral rhetoric. 
The “us” group was made up of good citizens, families, the federal government and honest 
security forces. The adjectives associated with this group were good, honest, hard-working, and 
committed. Security forces were described as brave and loyal. The “them” group (enemies) 
contrasted sharply with the “us” group in every way. This group was formed by criminals, 
corrupt police officers and government officials. They were presented as violent, greedy, selfish, 
with no values or alternately, with anti-values of love for easy money and power. They were 
often described as “the enemies of Mexico” (Calderon, 2007a, 2007c, 2008b) and a “cancer to 
society” (Calderon, 2008d, 2010; 2010a; 201 Id; 2012). According to Calderon, criminals sought 
to poison the youth with drugs, terrorize the citizenship and impose their own law. The main 
difference between the “good citizens” and the “enemies of Mexico” was the commitment of the 
first to positive values. Apart from using a moralistic rhetoric, the President used a very 
emotional discourse that triggered a war-like mentality in which great personal sacrifice was 
required from the citizens (Calderon, 2007b). This discourse was used more frequently as 
casualties started to increase.
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Aside from the internal structure of the speech act, securitization is also defined by the 
emergency actions undertaken by security actors (Aradau, 2004, p.391). In this case, using the 
army to lead operations against cartels is considered extraordinary. Employing the army in such 
a way and to such an extent was unprecedented. Certainly, Mexico does not have a strong 
military tradition. This institution has mostly been used in operations to eradicate illegal drug 
crops and in providing aid when natural disasters occur. The exceptionality of this measure is 
recognized by Calderon, who in fact mentions in several occasions that the army will only 
support in fighting crime temporarily (Calderon, 2008a, 2009a). Still, the Secretariat of Defense 
represented the largest expenditure in the federal security budget.
Even though using a moral discourse as the basis for a militarized strategy may sound 
paradoxical, this makes sense if we understand that this rhetoric is used as some sort of “identity 
feature” that separates “us” from “the other”. Accentuating the difference between the “good” 
and “bad” Mexicans makes the enemy group seem all the more distant. In this case, it is easier to 
choose confrontational politics rather than to tackle the underlying reasons for crime. Indeed, 
both the speech and content analysis confirmed the prevalence of enforcement strategies over 
social approaches. Social policies were not a frequent topic in the speeches. Also, the total 
spending of the social initiative of the security platform for the six years, was less than the 
average annual budget for police forces. In fact, it represented an average of 1.7% of the total 
enforcement and prosecution budget. Addressing the social aspect of illegal drug trade is not 
done effectively by using an “us versus them” mentality. Instead, similarly to what Deudney 
(1990) notes, it requires a “we as the enemy” mentality (Deudney, 1990, p.468). In sum, this 
thesis found that the securitization of narco-trafficking can result in the prevalence of 
confrontational policies as opposed to social approaches.
Apart from the transformations in policy, by studying the cases of Villas de Salvarcar and 
ITESM, I concluded that there are other possible consequences of securitizing narco-trafficking. 
First, securitization can lead to an abuse of the threat and enemy perception with political 
purposes. Trying to cover up civilian deaths by saying that the victims were criminals was a clear 
attempt to abuse the image of the “enemy” to limit government accountability. The second 
consequence relates to Elbe’s (2006) concern about pushing responses away from a particular 
sector to other, which in this case may be the military and the police. These agencies operate 
more hermetically than civilian institutions. This also has the potential to hinder government 
accountability. The third and most important consequence is that securitizing narco-trafficking 
has the potential to override human rights and civil liberties (this is also noted by Elbe (2006) in 
the case of AIDS). This occurs as a consequence of limiting accountability while privileging 
confrontational politics. Indeed, the evidence suggests that this happened in Mexico, as there has 
been a 300%so increase in the number of human rights complaints in the territories where the 
military is active (Hernandez Tinajero, 2012, p.60).
6 .2  -  C o n t r ib u t io n s
By applying the Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) framework to study the case of
Mexico, I have identified five major contributions that securitization theory can bring to the
study illegal narcotics trade. Three of them are related to theory while the other two relate to
policy making. First, by using securitization theory, narco-trafficking is not understood in fixed,
objective terms. Previous works saw illegal drug trade as an objective threat that undermined the
state by hindering sovereignty, benefiting terrorism, organized crime and corruption (Crick,
2012, p.409), among others. Nevertheless, these assumptions rely on broad generalizations about
50 The complaints were made to the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) an autonomous government 
agency in charge of promoting and defending human rights in the country (CNDH, 2013).
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government structures, cultural and economic factors. Talking about corruption and its 
consequences in countries like Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau, for example, cannot be done in 
the same terms as when discussing corruption in the US. Related to this issue, previous works 
also put the state as the main referent of security. Yet, this is not always necessarily the case, as 
there are times that the government apparatus has an overt relationship with drug traffickers. By 
using securitization theory, it is possible to analyze how narco-trafficking poses an existential 
threat to the population without it necessarily being understood in state-centric terms. This does 
not undermine how “real” a threat can feel for a society that has been seriously damaged by 
threats that orthodox theory does not take into consideration. In sum, using securitization opens 
up the possibility to study narco-trafficking as a security threat in ways that have not been used 
before.
Second, by seeing narco-trafficking through the perspective of discursive security, it is 
possible to transcend the consuming/producing dichotomy. The securitization of narco- 
trafficking, if it occurs, can occur differently in each country. It is possible to talk about security 
while being aware that it is not necessarily in the same terms. For example, narco-trafficking 
may pose a danger to Mexico and Colombia because of cartel violence. Even so, in Mexico the 
cartels might have merely economic motivations to attack citizens, while in Colombia their 
motivation might be ideological. At the same time, the United States might see illegal drug trade 
as a danger because it threatens its national borders. My point being, the issues linked to narco­
trafficking are different in each country. Furthermore, along with these different understandings 
comes a whole mindset of shared meanings and connotations that are lost if we did not ask the 
questions through securitization.
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Third, securitization implicitly lets us weigh important factors which are common in 
producing countries but that are not perceptible in traditional approaches to security. By 
considering the audience in the securitization of an issue, cultural and economic factors are 
weighted against threat perception. This is important because producing countries tend to have 
ambiguous attitudes towards narco-trafficking. Drug production is mostly seen as an economic 
activity with no major repercussions to public health. At the same, there is recognition that there 
is certain shadiness to the business. In the case of Mexico, for example, because this activity has 
a long history in the country, it was almost normalized. For many years, narco-trafficking took 
place in the country without it being a particular important concern for society. This 
“negotiation” between the audience and securitizing actors, is not perceivable in other 
approaches.
Using securitization to study narcotics trade can also benefit policy-making. First, 
securitization’s roots in critical security encourage reflecting about the way in which policy 
informs theory and vice versa. Because of its important role in international drug control, much 
of the terminology and approaches used by the US to study narco-trafficking have been 
institutionalized. By changing the way we study narco-trafficking, our conception of this issue 
can change as well, leading policy to new directions. Moreover, the rhetoric in drug policy has 
rarely been analyzed (Edwards & Gill, 2002; Jackson, 2006; Brinkmoeller, 2011; Crick, 2012), 
and clearly there are important implications to it in the real world. If the issue of narco­
trafficking continues to be framed in terms of friend/enemy, for example, it is likely that policies 
will continue to neglect alternatives to enforcement.
Second, by becoming aware of the omissions in previous theoretical approaches and 
questioning the degree of understanding that we have thus far about the experiences of drug
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producing countries, we can raise questions about the desirability of policy prescriptions from 
the threatened states to producing states. These strategies do not always fit to the local context 
(something similar to what happened in the 1980s with the economic models imported by the 
World Bank). By pursuing research that is open to incorporate new elements in the study of 
narco-trafficking, such as the workings of local governments, the image of drug dealers, and the 
role that this activity in the local economy, to name a few, policies that are more akin to local 
circumstances can be designed.
Securitization theory proved to be of great analytical value to study the case of narco­
trafficking in Mexico. Applying the framework developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
(1998) was not problematic, as their definitions and categorizations were easily relatable to the 
Mexican case. In fact, the speeches allowed for an almost literal reading and application of the 
elements stated in securitization theory. The authors have developed a clear conceptualization 
that makes the theory relatable to traditional and more contemporary notions of security.
Still, there are some areas of in the theory that could benefit from further research. The 
framework developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) is not particularly useful in 
helping to understand the consequences of securitization. At the core of this debate is the under­
theorization of the concept of “de-securitization”. This has been noted by authors such as Aradau 
(2004) and Roe (2012). This is important in die case of narco-trafficking because, as the “war on 
drugs” is becoming increasingly unpopular, more and more scholars and policy makers are 
calling for a halt to military and enforcement approaches to drug trafficking. However, these 
calls are made by speaking in security terms. Paradoxically, they call for a “normalization of 
politics” by using security terms that make it seem urgent. This dichotomy needs to be addressed 
in order to translate the findings of securitization into initiatives applicable in the real world.
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Another problematic area related to this, is the lack of more clarity about what Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde (1998) mean by “exceptional measures” undertaken by security actors. 
Although the authors might suggest that the lack of clarity is because the implications are issue- 
dependent, engaging in discussions about this is important because it can tell us more about the 
consequences of securitizing an issue. This relates to another aspect in securitization theory that 
might benefit from further research. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) determine that the 
“acceptance” of the speech act is seen in the toleration of breaking free of rules and procedures 
that otherwise would have to be obeyed. Yet, this is mostly perceivable in countries with 
developed democracies. In countries with authoritarian governments or in nascent democracies, 
as duly pointed by Jackson (2006) policies are constantly in “emergency mode.” In a less radical 
but equally problematic scenario, governments with high levels of corruption or where there are 
no “procedures” to observe, such as in autocratic governments, the breaking free of rules is not 
rare. Although in this particular analysis this was not the case, it is likely that if I had focused on 
studying the securitization of an economic issue during the 1980s, for example, in which 
corruption was rampant among high level of government officials, the analysis would have been 
much more difficult. All of these issues are important because they limits securitization theory’s 
applicability to study real life cases.
In general, however, I believe that this theory can provide with very interesting insights 
when used to study narco-trafficking, especially drug producing countries. Countries like 
Afghanistan for example, where the state does not play such a dominant role and in which 
institutions such as the UN are largely involved, pose a challenge to traditional theory.
Therefore, securitization might be able to bring new insights and a better understanding of the 
situation in such countries.
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In the case of Mexico, examining the degree until which different regions of the country 
respond to securitization, based on the assumption that cultural aspects play a role in the 
perception of narcotraficantes, would advance the understanding of the role of the audience in 
the theory. Also, a further development could examine the country’s relationship with the 
United States in order to examine patterns of security connectedness. For example: how does the 
securitization of narco-trafficking in the US impinge in the security of others? (Buzan, Waever,
& de Wilde, 1998, p.42). This investigation could even be expanded as to examine all of Latin 
America.
The findings of this thesis are important to Mexico for several reasons. Firstly, because for 
decades, the country has used anti-narcotic strategies modeled by or with the assistance of the 
United States. Although Mexico believes that demand for illegal narcotics is the main reason 
why drug-trafficking occurs, throughout history it has relied in methods that limit supply by 
eradicating crops and not by tackling the growth of criminal organizations. This is consistent 
with Washington’s view about what needs to be done. Meanwhile, the underlying reasons for the 
growth of crime are ignored. Clearly, the socio-political and economic context in Mexico is very 
different to that of the United States. As obvious as this may sound, it seems that this 
consideration has been ignored in more than one occasion by Mexican politicians. By adopting 
enforcement measures, such as “the war on drugs”, factors such as the prevalence of 
corruption51, poverty and marginalization and their link to security are overlooked. Academics 
and politicians should encourage the study of narcotics trade from other perspectives, which 
might provide a better insight to the situation in the country.
51 This changed with the PAN lead governments of Fox and Calderdn, who addressed corruption as a major issue. 
Calderon in particular, stressed this issue. One of his administrations’ objectives sought to make honesty controls 
mandatory for the police.
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The immediate benefit of studying the securitization in Mexico is to understand the 
dynamics that shaped public policy during the Calderon era. The findings of my thesis pointed to 
a link between securitization and confrontational politics. Enforcement policies, it can be argued, 
lead to an increase in violence in the country. This is an important consideration for analysts and 
policy-makers, as it might indicate that the securitization of narco-trafficking is not desirable. It 
is also important for civil organizations because it evidences the need to approach narco­
trafficking from other areas, such as of social policy. Studying the case of Mexico also raised 
awareness about the potential manipulation of rhetoric in a securitization context, resulting in the 
limiting of government’s accountability. Therefore, in the instances where security is being 
invoked, civilian scrutiny of (in this case) the government’s actions is paramount.
6.3 - C o n c lu sio n s
In sum, this thesis made a series of theoretical and practical contributions by applying the 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde’s (1998) securitization framework to study narco-trafficking in 
Mexico. Firstly, this thesis sought to contribute to the literature on narco-trafficking by 
suggesting how it would benefit from approaching the issue from a critical perspective. I argued 
that using the securitization framework is useful because it allows us to remain more sensitive to 
the experiences of the drug producing because security is not defined in objective terms, which 
allows transcending the consuming/producing dichotomy. Moreover, securitization allows 
weighing cultural factors that are relevant in producing countries and are obscured when using 
other theoretical approaches. Secondly, the study of this case contributed to assessing the 
applicability of the theory and suggested further areas of research. The two most important 
being, the difficulty to make the “breaking free of rules and procedures” an indicator of 
securitization in corrupt or autocratic governments, when this is not exceptional, and, the under
130
theorization of de-securitization, which hinders our understanding of the consequences of 
securitization.
Also, using securitization theory has practical value because it invites us to reflect about 
the way in which theory influences policy-making and political processes. In the case of Mexico, 
this is important because evidence from the analysis suggests that by adopting a security 
language, confrontational politics were favored over social approaches. The analysis also 
presented two cases in which the government manipulated the discourse to its convenience. This 
raises questions about the desirability of securitizing an issue.
Overall, approaching narco-trafficking from a securitization perspective has the potential to 
take research into new directions. More importantly, it may provide alternatives that would help 
in decreasing the number of victims that drugs take each year.
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People (themes: women, children, youth, social fabric, fear, insecurity) 
Economy (thenes: economy, businesses, investment)
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Us Them
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2 Hard-working Mexicans 2 Narcomenudistas
3 Citizens 3 Cartels
4 Youth and Children 4 Narcotraficantes
99 Other 5 Drug-users
99 Other
le  What is it that "they” want?
Section 2: Policy measures 
2a Policy mentioned in the speech:
Social programs 
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Year Trimester Name (Spanish)
1 2006-07 T1 Operation Conjunta Michoacan
2 2006-07 T1 CONAGO XXXI
3 2006-07 T2 Programa Nacional Contra las Adicciones
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5 2006-07 T3 Limpiemos Mexico (Monterrey)
6 2006-07 T3 Primer Informe de Gobiemo
7 2006-07 T4 Comida con la Comunidad Judia 07
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10 2008 T1 Comision Nacional Derechos Humanos
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25 2010 T1 Reunidn con Embaj adores XXI
26 2010 T1 Todos Somos Juarez
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28 2010 T2 Foro Seguridad con Justicia
29 2010 T3 Ditigos por la Seguridad (media)
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31 2010 T4 Di&logos por Seguridad
32 2010 T4 Mensaje Poir6
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35 2011 T2 Clausura Cumbre Mexico
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